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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This civil action is before the Court on rehearing, gra ted
July 12, 1989, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.
The Court has continuing jurisdiction of this appeal under and
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1989) .
DETERMINATIVE RULES
The rules applicable to appeals from a judgment of a district
court in a civil matter have changed several times since the Notice
of Appeal was filed in this case on January 6, 1984. At that time,
appellate practice and procedure was governed by Rules 72-76 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Shortly thereafter, on November 9, 1984, the Utah Rules of
Appellate

Procedure were

adopted

and

promulgated

Supreme Court to be effective January 1, 1985.

by

the Utah

Simultaneously,

the prior rules concerning appellate practice and procedure before
the Utah Supreme Court were repealed.
As a result of the creation of the Utah Court of Appeals in
1986,

however,

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure

superseded by two different sets of appellate rules.

were

The Rules of

the Utah Court of Appeals were promulgated by the Utah Supreme
Court and made effective January 13, 1987.

The Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure were then amended to reflect the changes in the
statutory jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court and the appellate
practices and procedures before the Court.

amc-w007.chd
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the "Rules of the Utah Supreme Court", and became effective April
20, 1987.
The interpretation of Rule 75 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rules

11 and

12 of the Utah Rules

of Appellate

Procedure, and Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court may be dispositive of this matter on rehearing.

They are,

therefore, reprinted verbatim in the addendum hereto, as appendices
A, B, and C, respectively.
The Introductory Note of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Appellate Procedure, published simultaneously with
the promulgation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1984
and reprinted immediately following the "Foreword" to the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court in 1987, is critical to the determination
of the impact of these rule changes on this appeal. Consequently,
the Introductory Note is also reprinted verbatim in Appendix D
hereto.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff, Stephen Whitehead, when the vehicle in which he was
riding, a Jeep Commando, was struck from behind by defendant Larry
Anderson, causing the vehicle to roll over.

Plaintiffs alleged

that defendant Anderson was negligent and that he was in the course
and scope of his employment with defendant Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Company at the time of the accident.

Plaintiffs later

joined defendants Jeep Corporation and American Motors Sales

amc-w007.chd
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Corporation, claiming that their vehicle, manufactured by defendant
Jeep Corporation

in 1971 and originally marketed by defendant

American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, was
defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous at the time it

ft

the hands of the manufacturer•
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following trial to a jury, the Fourth Judicial District Court
entered judgment on the jury verdict for the plaintiff Stephen
Whitehead

and against

$1,638,125.00.

all defendants

in the total

amount

of

Liability on the judgment was apportioned pursuant

to further findings by the jury that defendants Jeep Corporation
and American Motors Sales Corporation were 70% responsible for the
injuries sustained by Mr. Whitehead and that defendant Anderson
was 30% responsible.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
On appeal, defendants American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation ("AMC/Jeep") sought reversal of the trial court's
judgment

against

them

on

the

grounds

that

the

trial

court

repeatedly made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions of
law and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence to
the extent that the jury was permitted to hear only one side of the
case.

Specifically, AMC/Jeep argued that the trial court erred (a)

in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory
evidence, (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's fundamental right to crossexamine plaintiffs' witnesses, (c) in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep

amc-v.O07.chd
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to rebut such evidence by excluding

substantial portions of

AMC/Jeep's own evidence, (d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for
mistrial based upon improper closing arguments by opposing counsel,
(e) in excluding all evidence relating to the presence of and
plaintiff's

failure to. utilize available

seat belts,

(f) in

refusing to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer
to include a statute of limitations defense, and (g) in refusing
to direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of their starute
of limitations defense.
In a decision announced February 2, 1989, this Court reversed
the judgment of the trial court against AMC/Jeep and remanded the
case for new trial, stating with respect to the improper admission
of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence offered by plaintiffs rhat
[g]iven our standard of review of the admissibility
of evidence at trial, we cannot clearly say that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting
plaintiffs' films in light of the foundation laid by
their experts...
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,
28 (February 2, 1989), but holding that the trial court did err in
limiting

AMC/Jeep's

cross-examination

of

plaintiffs'

expert

witnesses and in excluding significant portions of AMC/Jeep's own
evidence.
With regard to the improper limitation of AMC/Jeep's crossexamination of plaintiffs' experts, the Court stated:
An assertion or opinion given on direct testimony
that bears on a key issue in the case is a proper subject
of cross-examination. While the trial court's attempt
to avoid confusion of the issues and a long and
cumbersome trial is understandable, defendants were
amc-w007.chd
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entitled to conduct cross-examination into the basis r,r
the opinions offered by plaintiffs' expert witnesses .x:.J
to probe the comparisons they had made on direct
examination.
Here defendants were repeatedly cut off during their
attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts.
The
numerous objections of plaintiffs1 counsel, many of which
were improperly sustained, prevented defendants from
probing the basis of opinions given by plaintiffs1
experts on comparisons they had made in their direct
examination. As a result, the issues were presented to
the jury without the added light that thorough crossexamination sheds. We find therefore that the trial
court erred in limiting defendants' cross-examination of
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. The trial court did not
limit those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles
on their direct examination. Hence cross-examination
should not have been so restricted.
Id. at 29-30.
The Court also held that the district court erred in excluding
significant portions of AMC/Jeep's evidence, stating, in part,, as
follows:
The trial court can exclude evidence that violates
discovery orders under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
However, defendants point out that the
discovery covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep CJ5. The film
simply was not covered by the language of the
interrogatory. Although plaintiffs' experts were allowed
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films
of CJ5s based on their foundational testimony that its
handling was substantially similar to that of the
Commando, that ruling does not place the film within the
scope of material sought in the pretrial discovery
request. The dissenting opinion would have defendants
divine the scope of the requests by a trial court ruling
on the admissibility of evidence which came much later.
This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The tests
were not produced to show the handling of the "66-73 Jeep
Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose.
Defendants maintained that the handling of the CJ5 and
the Commando were not the same. The tests were offered
to rebut evidence presented by plaintiffs that the CJ5
was defective because of its handling characteristics.
Although this evidence could have been excluded on the
amc-v.-007.chd
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basis of relevancy had the trial court earlier excluded
plaintiffs1 films, once the court allowed plaintiffs to
try their case on the basis of comparison with the CJ5,
it could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to
rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the presentation
of their case. The trial court erred in excluding the
film on the basis that defendants had failed to comply
with orders regarding discovery.
. at 30.
Defendants offered a second film in conjunction with
Heitzman's testimony. This film showed non-Jeep vehicles
doing mechanically induced rollovers similar to those
shown in plaintiffs1 film. After excluding defendants
first film for failure to produce it in discovery, the
trial court ruled that this second film was not
admissible...[on the basis of relevancy]...The evidence
was offered to rebut the tests shown on plaintiffs1 films
and to demonstrate that there was no design defect in
the Commando because virtually any vehicle would roll
when subjected to such tests.
We have no quarrel with the rule of law relied upon
in the dissenting opinion that "evidence of the condition
of other products is irrelevant and not admissible to
establish a defect in a particular product." This is a
sound rule when properly applied as it was in the cases
cited in the dissenting opinion.
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of
Jeep CJ5s rolling. In Part I of this opinion, we upheld
the admissibility of those films because of the [expert
testimony regarding] substantial similarity of the
vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle in which
plaintiffs were injured.
However, plaintiffs in
presenting their case did not stop there. They produced
several experts who repeatedly in their testimony drew
comparisons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles
to non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to show that
the Jeep in which they were riding was of an unsafe
design and had a tendency to roll much easier than other
vehicles.. .Under the rule of law relied upon by the
dissenting opinion/ that evidence of the condition of
other products is not admissible to establish a defect
in a particular product, it may be questioned whether
such comparisons should have been admitted because of the
lack of similarity. However. right or wrong, plaintiffs'
experts were allowed to draw the comparisons between the
rollover propensities of Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles.
Certainly then, defendants should have been allowed in
-v.-007.chd
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rebuttal to prove the experience of plaintiffs1 experts
and to introduce into evidence the film showing non-Jeep
vehicles doing mechanically induced rollovers similar to
those shown in plaintiffs' film.
This situation is
wholly different from the situations in the two above
cases relied upon in the dissenting opinion where the
plaintiff was not allowed to make comparisons when the
circumstances were dissimilar.
*

*

*

*

*

Defendants7 expert, Dr. Warner, offered exhibit No.
13 0, a storyboard, to illustrate his testimony that the
vehicle in question had been involved in a prior accident
that compromised the structural integrity of the roof.
Plaintiffs7 counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit
was not material.
The trial court sustained the
objection. Plaintiffs1 experts had testified that the
roof of the vehicle was defectively designed, thus
contributing to plaintiffs1
injuries.
Evidence
illustrating how the roof had been damaged in a prior
accident was relevant to rebut this assertion. The trial
court erred in sustaining plaintiffs' objection to
exhibit No. 130.
* * * * *

. at 31.
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred
in excluding all references to the availability of
seatbelts
and
plaintiffs'
failure
to
use
them...Defendants contend that the evidence of seatbelts
was relevant and necessary to show (1) that their
presence was a factor the jury should consider when
determining if the vehicle was unsafe as designed, and
(2) that plaintiffs' injuries could have been prevented
or lessened by the use of seatbelts and therefore the
jury should be allowed to determine whether plaintiffs'
duty of ordinary care or their duty to mitigate damages
required them to wear seatbelts.
We agree that evidence of how the presence of
seatbelts affected the design safety of the vehicle
should be admitted...
. at 32.
The Court then concluded as follows:
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that
-\v007.chd
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error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected. In the instant case, the trial court
erroneously excluded evidence offered by defendants.
That evidence was necessary to rebut the assertions that
plaintiffs made to establish liability. This error was
compounded by unduly restricting the scope of defendants'
cross-examination.
Given the conflicting testimony
presented on this key issue, we cannot say that the
substantial rights of defendants were not affected by the
combined effects of the erroneous exclusion of the
evidence and the limitation of cross-examination. While
no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence that defendants were able to present to the
jury their theory of the case and that a fair trial was
had.
We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
Id. at 32.

A copy of the full opinion

is reprinted

for the

convenience of the Court in Appendix E.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Background Facts.

This litigation revolves around a Jeep Commando manufactured
by Jeep Corporation in December, 1971 (T. , 10/25/83, at 930; R.
2710), nearly eight years before plaintiffs7 accident, for sale by
appellant American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model
year, at least seven years before plaintiffs7 accident.
The Commando at issue in this case was purchased in "used"
condition by George Mollner of Orem, Utah in 1975 or 1976 (T. ,
10/19/83, at 336; R. 2105), Mr. Mollner made several repairs and
alterations to the Commando

(id., at 336-338, 343, 347-355; R.

2105-2107, 2112, 2116-2124), and on October 16, 1979, permitted his
daughter, plaintiff Deborah Whitehead, to use the Commando to move

amc-w007.chd
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some household items. .(Id., at 338; R. 2107.)

Deborah Whitehead

picked up her husband, plaintiff Steven Whitehead, in American
Fork, Utah, and proceeded to drive him on Interstate 15 towards
Springville.

(IdL, at 375-376; R. 2144-2145.)

After plaintiffs

had been on the freeway for several miles, and while they were
traveling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour, the Commando
was struck from behind by another vehicle; a large 1978 Oldsmobile
station wagon driven by defendant Larry Anderson.
382; R. 2146-2147.)

(Id., at 3 7 7-

At the time it struck plaintiffs' Commando,

defendant Anderson's Oldsmobile was traveling at the rate of 65 to
70 miles per hour; 15 miles per hour faster than plaintiffs,

(T. ,

10/20/83, at 552; R. 2327.) The Oldsmobile struck the Commando on
its left rear corner, causing it to spin in a clockwise manner.
(Id. , at 556; R. 2329.)

The Commando went out of control (T. ,

10/19/83, at 382; R. 2151), hit the median, and rolled over.
at 383; R. 2152.)

(Id. ,

During the course of the accident, Deborah and

Steven Whitehead sustained various injuries, the most serious of
which was a spinal cord injury sustained by Steven Whitehead
resulting in paraplegia.

(Id., at 447; R. 2216.)

At the time of

the accident, the Commando was equipped with seat belts, but
plaintiffs Deborah and Steven Whitehead were not wearing them.
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint herein on November
20, 1979, naming only Larry Anderson, the driver of the Oldsmcbile
station wagon that struck the Commando from behind, as a defendant.
(R. 7-8.)

amc-v.007.chd
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Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, as a defendant, and then
filed a Second Amended Complaint on July 31, 1980, naming AMC/Jeep.
(R. 84-87.)
B.

Pre-Trial Rulings.
Trial to a jury commenced on October 18, 1983. . One day

prior to that date, however, the trial court made the first in a
series of crucial, erroneous and prejudicial evidentiary rulings
which were to dictate the entire three-week trial that followed.
On October 17, 1983, the trial court considered plaintiffs7 Motion
In Limine "to allow the admissibility of a certain pictorial movie
developed by Dynamic Science, Inc. for the Insurance Institute of
Highway Safety," purporting to depict automobiles rolling ever
during "normal" highway maneuvers.

(R. 1128-1129.)

AMC/Jeep

objected to the motion (R. 1200-1224) and to the admission of the
film on the grounds that:

(1) the Dynamic Science film showed Jeep

CJ5s and CJ7s rolling over, not Commandos;1

(2) the tests

reflected in the film were conducted under conditions wholly
dissimilar to the off-center rear-end collision which led to
plaintiffs1 accident; and (3) plaintiffs offered no foundation to
show that the maneuvers depicted in the film were in any way
relevant to the issue before the court and jury in this case.
AMC/Jeep further objected to the film on the ground that it had

The evidence showed that CJ5's have a wheel base 2 0 inches
shorter than the wheel base of a Commando. (T. , 10/24/83, at 659,
672; R. 2436, 2449.) It was also clear that a longer wheel base
makes a vehicle more resistant to rollover. (Id., at 676-675; R.
2451-2452).
amc-w007.chd
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been selectively edited to dramatize the rollovers and to enhance
the

visual

impact,

demonstrative

destroying

evidence.

anthropomorphic

For

dummies,

fully

violently during a rolloverexperienced

the

value

example,
dressed,

of

the

the
being

film

film

as

showed

tossed

about

There was no evidence that plaintiffs

similar movement during their accident.

Finally,

AMC/Jeep argued that if plaintiffs were allowed to show the film
raising the inference that the non-Commando vehicles depicted in
it were "comparable" to a Commando, AMC/Jeep should similarly be
allowed to introduce evidence showing that, in fact, the Commando's
handling

characteristics

and

favorably to other vehicles.
Trial,

10/17/83,

at

53-59;

resistance

to

rollover

compared

(T. , Abstracts from Transcripts of
R.

4856-4861.)

The

trial

court

nevertheless rejected AMC/Jeep7s arguments against the Insurance
Institute film and ruled that any difference between the tests
depicted in that film and the actual events of plaintiffs' accident
would go "to the weight of it and not to the admissibility."

(Id. ,

at 60; R. 4863; see also id., at 62; R. 4865.)
On the morning of October 18, 1983, just before the trial
began, the trial court also addressed plaintiffs' Motion in Limine
"to preclude the defendants or their witnesses or attorneys from
mentioning the subject of seat belts or the use or nonuse of seat
belts at the trial of this case."

(R. 1274-1294.)

AMC/Jeep

opposed the motion arguing that (1) the failure of plaintiffs to
utilize their seat belts was relevant to the issues of comparative

amc-v.007.chd

-liDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fault and mitigation of damages, and (2) the presence of seat belts
in the Commando was relevant to the question whether the Commando
was defectively designed.

Here, as throughout the trial, the trial

court barred any comment on the presence of or plaintiffs' failure
to utilize the Commando's seat belts.

(See also T. Abstracts from

Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, at 88, 156; R. 4891, 4959.)

(T.

10/18/83, at 12; R. 1763.)
C.

Plaintiffs' Case in Chief.

During the presentation of plaintiffs' case-in-chief, Newell
Knight was called as a witness for plaintiffs to express an opinion
as to the allegedly "defective" nature of the accident vehicle.
(T.,

10/20/83, at 541; R. 2314.)

AMC/Jeep, anxious to assure that

all such testimony would be related to Commandos and that the jury
not be misled into believing that "a Jeep is a Jeep," attempted to
limit

the

Commando.

testimony

to

the

relevant

characteristics

of

the

Beginning with Mr. Knight, however, the trial court

embarked on an erroneous course of permitting plaintiffs' expert
witnesses to lump all Jeep vehicles into the same evidentiary ball,
(id., at 559-560; R. 2327-2328; see especially id., at 559-559; R.
2331-2332;

id.,

at

560; R.

2333),

thus

obscuring

characteristics of the Commando.

the

unique

-

—

Plaintiffs then called LeRoy Maurice Shaw, a consultant in
automotive

safety.

(T.,

10/24/83,

at

631;

R.

2408.)

As

plaintiffs' counsel began to delve into Mr. Shaw's opinion about
the Commando's handling characteristics, AMC/Jeep elicited by way
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of voir dire that one of his basic exhibits —

a mathematical

prediction of the so-called "roll-over threshold" of a Commando
(Exhibit 56) —

was actually based on information and data with

respect to the Jeep CJ5 and CJ7 — not the Commando.
679; R. 2450-2457.)

(Id., at 67 2-

The trial court, nevertheless, admitted the

evidence over the objection of AMC/Jeep (id., at 678; R. 2456), and
then exacerbated the error by unduly restricting the right of
AMC/Jeep to test Mr. Shaw's credibility by repeatedly sustaining
objections to cross-examination into Mr. Shaw's knowledge of the
design period of the accident vehicle.

(Id., at 782-783; R. 2561-

2562.)
Similarly,

through

their

"star"

witness,

Robert

Lloyd

Anderson, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce two additional
films prepared at Dynamic Science showing Jeep CJ5s, not Commandos,
rolling

over

when

subjected

to

extraordinary

tests

never

encountered under normal driving conditions and certainly not
encountered by plaintiffs during the course of their accident.
AMC/Jeep objected to the admission of these films on the ground
that they showed CJ5s, not Commandos, rolling over as the result
of mechanically-induced maneuvers that bore no relation to the
circumstances of plaintiffs1 accident.

One of the tests, for

example, showed a CJ5 undergoing a maneuver in which 24 0 degrees
of steer is mechanically input into the vehicle in the span of 1.8
seconds while the speed of the vehicle is being artificially
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maintained.

(T. , 10/25/83, at 910; R. 2690.) 2 No attempt was made

to show any connection between the maneuvers depicted in the film
and the actual events of plaintiffs' accident.

In fact, Mr.

Anderson admitted that he had "no way of knowing" what type of
.steering maneuvers were undertaken by Mrs. Whitehead during the
course of the accident.

(Id., at 957; R. 2737.)

The trial court

nevertheless overruled AMC/Jeep's objection to the films, stating
that "I'll let you get at it any way you want to by crossexamination or whatever.

But I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule

your objection with respect to those films."

(Jd. , at 109; R.

4912.)
The

objectionable

films were

then

shown

to

the

jury

exemplary of the handling characteristics of "CJ vehicles".
10/25/83, at 906; R. 2676.)

as
(T. ,

The plain and intended implication

was that the vehicles shown in those films were similar to the
Commando and that they demonstrated the circumstances experienced
by plaintiffs and the accident vehicle at the time of the accident
even though Mr. Anderson admitted that he, in fact, had no way of
knowing what steering movements were made by plaintiffs immediately
prior to and during plaintiffs' accident.

(Id., at 956-957; R.

2736-2737.)

2

0ther maneuvers depicted in the films included a "test at 2 5
miles an hour and 180 degrees on the steering wheel. Then we go
up to 270 degrees.
And the next turn is 360 degrees."
(T.,
10/25/83, at 915-916; R. 2695-2700.)
amc-w007.chd
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The ultimate point made by Mr. Anderson was that the handling
characteristics of "Jeeps",

(CJ5s and CJ7s) coupled with their

"rollover propensities", rendered the Commando involved in this
case unreasonably dangerous.

(Id., at 897; R. 2677.)

Mr. Anderson

further testified that other vehicles he had tested, the S10 Blazer
and the Chevy Chevette, did not have delays in handling response
similar to those of a "Jeep", (id., at 896; R. 2676), and that
"most vehicles" would maintain control in situations similar to
those experienced by plaintiffs at the time of the accident.

(Id. ,

at 1039-1040; R. 2818-2819.)
In its cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, AMC/Jeep attempted
to rebut Mr. Anderson's characterization

and

implication

that

"Jeeps" are more dangerous than other automobiles on the road by
asking him:
control

(1) whether other vehicles would have gone out of

if subjected

to circumstances

like those which

caused

plaintiffs' accident (id., at 963; R. 2743); (2) whether he thought
that other vehicles with similar track widths were also defective
(id., at 1001; R. 2780); (3) whether he thought other vehicles were
defective (id.); (4) whether other vehicles have the same center
of gravity as a Commando (id., at 1003; R. 2782); 5) whether all
convertibles are defective if they do not have rollbars (id., at
1004; R. 2783); (6) whether he knows what other vehicles will do
when subjected to the tests shown in the films (id., at 1005, 1018;
R. 2784, 2797); and (7) whether CJ5s have different suspensions
than a Commando.

amc-v.007.chd
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assurances by the trial court that AMC/Jeep would be permitted to
cross-examine Mr. Anderson on these issues (T. , 10/25/83, Abstracts
from Transcript of Trial, at 109; R. 4912), however, the trial
court sustained plaintiffs7 objections to these questions and
precluded

AMC/Jeep

from

pursuing

its

cross-examination

of

plaintiffs7 key expert witness.
The

trial

courtfs

decision

to

admit

films

of

CJ5s

to

demonstrate the characteristics of a Commando combined with the
trial court1s rigid restriction of AMC/Jeep1s cross-examination of
Mr. Anderson led to AMC/Jeep^ first Motion for Mistrial on October
26, 1983.

(T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at

123; R. 4926.)

The grounds for the Motion were that plaintiffs1

experts had been allowed, without foundation, to declare the
Commando unreasonably dangerous based (1) upon comparisons to other
vehicles undergoing maneuvers in no way related to the subject
accident, (2) upon certain calculations derived from tests of CJ5s,
not Commandos, and (3) upon opinion testimony that "Jeeps" roll
over more easily than "other vehicles," while AMC/Jeep had been
barred from showing that the relevant characteristics of Jeeps, in
fact, compared favorably with other vehicles.
R. 4920-4926.)

(Id., at 117-123;

The trial court, nevertheless, denied the Motion

for Mistrial stating that "under the circumstances as they exist
at this time in this lawsuit, the evidence of what other vehicles
do is irrelevant."

(Id., at 130; R. 4933.) The trial court later

attempted to justify its erroneous ruling as prohibiting AMC/Jeep
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"from attempting to show that the subject Jeep in this case was
safe by evidence which shows that other vehicles not manufactured
by Jeep are also unsafe."

(T., 10/26/83, at 1171; R. 2949.)

The

trial court had permitted plaintiffs1 experts to compare "Jeeps"
with vehicles manufactured by others.

It was only when AMC/Jeep

sought to inquire further into that very comparative testimony that
the trial court concluded it was irrelevant.

In so ruling, the

trial court did not even suggest to the jury that the comparisons
adduced by plaintiffs should not be considered.

(Id., at 60; R.

4863; see also Id. at 62; R. 4865.)
Plaintiffs' next expert witness was John N. Noettl.
Noettl,

like Mr. Anderson, brought along

a film

showing

Mr.
CJ5s

rolling over. Mr. Noettl's film, however, also shows fully clothed
anthropomorphic "dummies" being tossed about during the testing.
AMC/Jeep
relevance

objected
and

to

its

this

film

inflammatory

on the basis
nature

(T.,

of

its

lack

Abstracts

of

from

Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 131-133; R. 4934-4936), but after
being shown in chambers on October 26, 1983 (T. 10/26/83, at 1205;
R. 2982) , the trial court ruled that it could be admitted.

As with

all of plaintiffs7 films, there was absolutely no foundation for
the implicit proposition that the maneuvers exhibited in the film
were related to the maneuvers experienced by the accident vehicle
during the accident. Mr. Noettl was then permitted to testify that
the "Jeep" is easier to overturn than a "passenger car.11
1262;

R.

2*nc-w007.chd

3039.)

(Id., at

As was the case with Mr. Anderson, however,
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AMC/Jeep's efforts to cross examination on this point were blocked
by the trial court.
D.

(Id., at 1266; R. 3043.)

AMC/Jeep*s Case.

AMC/Jeep began its case on October 27, 1983.

Before AMC/Jeep

called its chief expert, however, the trial court heard plaintiffs'
objections to two films to be introduced through that expert.

One

film was of a CJ5 and was intended to rebut plaintiffs' evidence
purporting to prove that CJ5s roll over under certain emergency
situations.

The

film

demonstrated

the

subjected to extreme emergency situations.
1565-1566; R. 3343, 3347-3348.)

CJ5's

stability

when

(T., 10/27/83, at 1561,

The second film was similarly

intended to rebut plaintiffs7 theory that Jeeps roll more often
than other vehicles, or that Jeeps are the only vehicles that would
have rolled under the circumstances of the plaintiffs' accident.
AMC/Jeep was precluded from presenting its evidence, however, the
court ruling that neither film was admissible.

(Id., at 1571,

1576; R. 3353; 3358.)
AMC/Jeep then proceeded to call Edward Heitzman, a mechanical
engineer with extensive experience
safety.

in the field

(Id., at 1577-1587; R. 3359-3369.)

of automobile

Through Mr. Heitzman,

AMC/Jeep attempted to introduce a film showing non-Jeep vehicles
undergoing certain maneuvers with "outriggers" attached,"3 for the

3

0utriggers are attached to a test vehicle in order to restrain
it from rolling over completely.
An expert's eye and ear can
discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers would have rolled
over but for the outriggers. (T., 10/28/83, at 1744; R. 3527,)
amc-w007.chd
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purpose of rebutting plaintiffs' film which had shown a Commando
equipped with " out riggers.'' Plaintiffs' expert, Mr- Anderson, had
testified that but for the outriggers the Commando in his film
would have rolled over.
Mr.

Heitzman

(T., 10/25/83, at 918-926; R. 2698-2706,)

testified,

however,

that,

in his

opinion, Mr.

Andersonfs film did not illustrate situations in which the Commando
would have rolled.

(T. , 10/28/83, at 1674-1676; R. 3457-3459.)

Mr. Heitzman would then have utilized his film to illustrate to the
jury the difference between a vehicle with outriggers "rolling" and
a similarly equipped vehicle not rolling. The film would also have
rebutted plaintiffs' testimony that only Jeeps, as opposed to more
common vehicles, would roll over in emergency situations. AMC/Jeep
needed these films in order to illustrate Mr. Heitzman's point that
many types of vehicles —
Commandos —

not just Jeeps and certainly not just

will roll over when subjected to the conditions

illustrated in plaintiffs' films. The films would have shown that,
in fact, other vehicles subjected to the same type of tests wculd
have rolled over.

(T. , 10/28/83, at 1746-1750; R. 3529-3533.) The

court, however, refused to permit the introduction of appellants'
film "because it's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because they
involve other vehicles which the jury would have to take into
consideration as to how it was done, the comparisons, the whole
works. . . ."

(Id., at 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-3530, 3533.)

AMC/Jeep then called Dr. Charles Warner, a mechanical engineer
and automobile accident consultant, to reconstruct the accident and
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to give his opinion that the characteristics of the Commando had
nothing to do with the extent of plaintiffs' injuries, that
virtually any automobile would have rolled under the circumstances
presented

in this case, and

that

the

injuries

suffered

by

plaintiffs were not caused by the fact, that the accident vehicle
happened to be a Commando.
testimony

was his

study

A crucial aspect of Dr. Warner's

and

reconstruction

of

the

probable

movements of plaintiffs inside the vehicle during the course of the
accident.

(T., 10/31/83, at 1956-1961; R. 3743-3748.)

In support

of this testimony Dr. Warner had prepared a series of photographs
demonstrating his opinion.
court,

however,

sustained

(Id., at 1961; R. 3748.)
plaintiffs'

objection

The trial
to

this

demonstrative exhibit on the ground "that the probative value is
limited

at

least

because

of

the

photographs

representative of just what did happen to vehicles."
1967; R. 3754.)

not

being

(Id., at

AMC/Jeep had, of course, based many of its

objections to plaintiffs' evidence on precisely this ground.

The

only difference was that the trial court overruled AMC/Jeep's
objections but sustained those made by plaintiffs.
Dr. Warner was next to testify with respect to certain tests
he performed on an exemplar vehicle — a Commando. The film showed
a Commando undergoing certain emergency maneuvers with outriggers
attached and would have demonstrated that the Commando is a stable
vehicle.

The film would also have demonstrated Dr. Warner's

opinion that the Commando will remain upright when subjected to
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realistic

emergency

situations.

AMC/Jeep

also

intended

to

introduce a film, through Dr. Warner, demonstrating rollover and
the type of damage that typically occurs during rollover.
at 1976; 3764.)

(Id.,

The two films were shown in chambers (id., at

1979-1983; R. 3767-3771), plaintiffs objected to both, and the
trial court ruled that both were inadmissible on the grounds that
they were "not probative of any issues except perhaps the test
which was made. . . ."

(Id. at 1986; R. 3774.)

Again, no

explanation was offered by the court as to why plaintiffs' film - which showed a Commando performing certain extreme maneuvers that
one could not reasonably expect to encounter (but of course showed
rollovers) presented probative evidence, while the Warner film,
showing no rollovers, did not.
Dr. Warner was also asked to testify as to his opinion
regarding the movement of plaintiffs inside the Commando during
the course of the accident to rebut plaintiffs' contention that
the commando's roof was defective and that it had crushed during
the course of the accident causing plaintiff Steven Whitehead's
back injury.

(See, e.g., T., 10/24/83, at 663-664; R. 2441-2442.)

The trial court, however, excluded each and every exhibit offered
to demonstrate this testimony.

(T. , 10/31/83, at 2009-2011; R.

3797-3799.)
AMC/Jeep then made a proffer, in chambers, of Dr. Warner's
testimony with respect to plaintiffs' failure to use seat belts.
Dr. Warner would have testified that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead
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"been using the seat belt in all probability he would not have
received the spinal injury that he did receive."
R. 3806.)

(Id., at 2018;

The trial court again ruled, however, that no evidence

of seat belts would be admitted.

As the trial court put it:

"to

speculate what the seat belt might have done in this type of
situation is just something that the jury ought not to do, and they
will not have, under my ruling, the obligation to consider. . . .
Therefore, there will be no more evidence in this case with regard
to seat belts.
from there."

I want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll go

(Id., 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808.)

Dr. Warner was next asked to express his opinion with respect
to the "buckling" experienced by the Commando during the course of
the accident. Dr. Warner had examined the actual accident vehicle
and had prepared an exhibit that demonstrated his opinion that the
Commando had been in a prior accident. It was Dr. Warner's opinion
that the prior accident had caused damage to the Commando which
resulted

in a weakening

of

its structural

integrity.

This

weakening, he concluded, in turn contributed to the injury suffered
by plaintiffs in the accident.

(Id. , at 2024; R. 3812.) The trial

court sustained plaintiffs' objection to this demonstrative exhibit
as well, (id. , at 2026; R. 3814), even though Dr. Warner had
actually testified without objection to all of the information in
the exhibit.

amc-w007.chd
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E.

Closing Argument,

Finally, after a three-week trial during which the record
reflects plaintiffs were unrestrained
irrelevant

and

inflammatory

in their presentation of

evidence,

AMC/Jeep

was

severely

restricted by the court's rulings limiting their cross-examination
of plaintiffs' witnesses, virtually all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative
evidence had been excluded and their witnesses hamstrung by the
court's rulings limiting their testimony, the ultimate effects of
the trial court's rulings were noted in closing argument:
(1)

Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to argue (a) that

AMC/Jeep had offered
11/3/83, at 32; R.

"No positive proof.
4582);

evidence, none at all,"

(b) that "They

(id. , at 33; R.

None at all.";

(T.

[AMC/Jeep] bring no
4583);

and

(c) that

AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce of engineering data"
(id. at 35; R. 4585); and
(2)

Counsel

for

defendant

Larry

Anderson

following flatly incorrect statement to the jury:
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test data
of the plaintiff's experts, knowing exactly
what they had done, even to the height of the
outriggers off the ground; why didn't they go
out and get a Commando, put some outriggers on
there and go do some testing of their own? Why
didn't they come in here and tell you, 'We have
done the same kind of tests that the plaintiffs
did, we have put the same number of degrees of
steer in on a Commando, and that vehicle
wouldn't turn over'; why didn't they do that?
I'll tell you why: They were afraid to do it.
The didn't dare do it. Because they knew that
Commando would turn over.
(Id., at 109; R. 4659.)
amc-w007.chd
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made

the

AMC/Jeep

had,

of course, done precisely

Anderson's counsel asserted had not been done.

what

Defendant

When it became

apparent for the first time during trial that the Court was not
going

to

properly

limit

the

admission

of

irrelevant

and

inflammatory demonstrative evidence, in an effort to show that the
Commando

was

defective

and

unreasonably

dangerous,

AMC/Jeep

obtained an exemplar vehicle, a Commando, had it tested in the very
respects stated in the above quotation, and proffered rebuttal
evidence of the results of those tests, both in the form of
testimony and in the form of demonstrative motion pictures.

The

tests were systematically and erroneously excluded by the trial
court, however based upon Defendants' failure to produce them in
response to pretrial discovery requests, even though the evidence
had been developed during the trial for the express purpose of
rebutting plaintiffs' improper evidentiary offerings.
AMC/Jeep's motion for a mistrial based upon the subsequent
false, misleading and prejudicial arguments of opposing counsel was
nevertheless denied.

(Id., at 193, 197; R. 4743, 4747.)

Following these arguments the jury returned a Special Verdict
finding:

(1) that the Commando was defective to the extent that

it was unreasonably dangerous to the purchaser or user; (2) that
the defective condition of the Commando was a proximate cause of
plaintiff Steven Whitehead's injuries; (3) that AMC/Jeep was 70%
at fault for the injuries sustained by plaintiff Steven Whitehead;
and (4) that general and special damages totalled $1,638,125.00.

amc-w007.chd
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(R.

1359-1361.)

The trial

court then

entered

judgment

in

accordance with the Special Verdict, (R. 1362-1364), and denied
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in
the Alternative for a new Trial (R. 1569-1574, 1642-1644.)
F*

Post Trial Proceedings.

On January 5, 1984, AMC/Jeep gave Notice of Appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court (R. 1659-1660) under and pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appendix A.

On

January 13, 1984, AMC/Jeep filed and served its Designation of
Record (R. 1661-1663), under and pursuant to the provisions of Rule
75 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Appendix A), designating
that the entire record be certified in this case as follows:
All records and transcripts of all proceedings in
the above-entitled matter, including all pleadings,
documents, and evidence, and excluding only the
transcript of voir dire jury selection.
(R. 1661-1662.) AMC/Jeep's Designation of Record is reprinted for
the convenience of the Court in Appendix F.
The Brief of Appellants American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation was served May 16, 1984 (Appendix G) ; Respondents7
Brief was served August 2, 1984 (Appendix H) ; and Appellants' Reply
Brief was served October 2, 1984 (Appendix I) . Oral Arguments were
presented April 17, 1986, and the Court issued its opinion in the
case February 2, 1989.

(Appendix E).

Rehearing was granted July

12, 1989.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The purpose of a rehearing is not to raise new questions or
rehash old arguments but to allow the court to correct mistakes and
consider misapprehensions.

A losing party may not use a petition

for rehearing to present to the Supreme Court a new theory or
contention which was neither in the record as it was before the
Court nor in the argument made. Matters which were not presented
during the original hearing are deemed to have been waived, either
expressly or by implication, and may not be considered on a
petition for rehearing.

Similarly rehearings are not granted to

reargue matters determined by the original decision.

Where the

petitioner's brief on rehearing merely restates arguments raised
previously and discussed in the dissenting opinion to the Supreme
Court's original decision, and where the Supreme Court's original
decision has considered and disposed of each point raised by the
petitioner on the original appeal, rehearing is improper.
On rehearing, plaintiffs have asked the Court to set aside its
February 2, 1989 decision reversing and remanding the case for a
new trial, and, instead, to affirm the decision of the trial court.
In the alternative, plaintiffs ask that the case be remanded for
a new trial on liability only.
As grounds therefor, plaintiffs argue:
1. that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were within its
discretion under the circumstances of this case and this court
failed to give proper deference to the trial court's determination
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that comparison with other vehicles was not a critical aspect of
plaintiffs7 case;
2.

that this court erred in considering defendants' claims

of error with respect to the exclusion of exhibits, where the
exhibits were purportedly not made part of the record on appeal;
and
3.*:

that this court erred in accumulating what plaintiffs

characterize as "insubstantial and nonprejudicial error".
On the first point, plaintiffs simply reargue, practically
verbatim, the dissenting opinion in this case.

On the second and

third points, plaintiffs improperly raise new issues for the first
time

on

this

rehearing.

Rehearing

has,

therefore,

been

improvidently granted and should be dismissed without further
proceedings.
Plaintiffs7 claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated upon the
theory of product liability as enunciated in Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. A critical element of plaintiffs7
proof in this case is, therefore, that the product (Whitehead's
Jeep Commando) was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time
it left the seller's hands.

In an effort to prove this most

critical element, plaintiff offered expert testimony that the
Commando was purportedly "substantially similar77 to the Jeep CJ5,
and that the CJ5 was purportedly defective because certain tests
show that the CJ5 is more likely to roll over than other vehicles,
including passenger cars. Defendants were not permitted to cross-
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examine plaintiffs' expert witnesses on these comparisons, however.
An assertion of opinion given on direct testimony that bears on a
key issue in the case is a proper subject of cross-examination.
The

comparisons

unquestionably

made

offered

by
to

plaintiffs'
show

that

expert
the

witnesses

Jeep

Commando

were
was

defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous; consequently, they
"bear on a key issue" in plaintiffs' product liability case against
AMC/Jeep as a matter of law, and the trial court abused its
discretion in determining otherwise.
The exhibits offered by defendants and improperly excluded
by the trial court were part of the record on appeal both by
designation and as a matter of law.

Defendants' Designation of

Record requested that all proceedings in the trial court, with the
single exception of the voir dire examination of the jury venire,
be certified in this case.

Furthermore, Rule 11 of the Rules of

the Utah Supreme Court provides, as a matter of law, that "the
original papers and exhibits filed in the district court, the
transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index prepared by the
clerk of the district court shall constitute the record on appeal
in all cases." Rule 12 provides, however, that "physical exhibits
other than documents shall not be transmitted by the clerk unless
he is directed to do so by a party or by the Clerk of the Supreme
Court."

The record, as transmitted in this case, contains a list

of the 218 exhibits filed in the District Court, which exhibits
constitute part of the record on appeal in this case as a matter
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of law.
In Ivie v. Richardson, 336 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1959), this
Court recognized the propriety and announced the standard for
reversing and remanding a personal injury case for new trial based
upon the cumulative effect of several trial court errors*

That

standard was properly applied in this case, even though the errors
recognized

by

the

Court

were

individually

substantial

and

prejudicial.
Finally, this Court must reject plaintiffs' new request to
limit reversal of this case to the issue of liability only.

A

partial retrial could not be conducted without injustice, since it
would be virtually impossible under the facts of this case to mask
the first jury's verdict for the plaintiff from the new jury that
would be sitting at the time the case is retried.

The prejudicial

inference that would be created by a limited remand is obvious and
impermissible.
The Court's February 2, 1989 decision in this case was
thorough, thoughtful and correct. It should be reaffirmed and the
case should be remanded to the trial court for retrial consistent
therewith.
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ARGUMENT
!•

The Trial Courts Evidentiary Rulings
Exceeded Permissible Discretion.

Plaintiffs first argue on rehearing that "[t]he majority
opinion in this case failed to give proper deference to the trial
court's determination that comparison with other vehicles was not
a "critical aspect" of plaintiffs' case."
Rehearing at 6.

Petitioner's Brief on

Plaintiffs contend "[s]uch comparisons were

irrelevant and inadmissible", and that "[t]he few comparative
statements which were made by plaintiff's experts were minor and
insignificant when compared with the main thrust of plaintiff's
case".

Id. More specifically, plaintiffs assert that the Court's

limitation

of

cross-examination

was

not

prejudicial

because

"[p]assenger vehicles were not an issue in the case and only
obliquely compared by plaintiff's experts to Jeeps". Id. at 20.
This argument is nothing more than a rehash of plaintiffs'
earlier briefs and a reargument of the dissenting opinion in this
case.

It is, therefore, wholly improper on rehearing and should

not be considered.
By way of substantive response, however, appellants point out
that plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated upon the
theory of strict product liability as enunciated in Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as adopted by this Court in
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co. , 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979).
The elements of a claim under Section 402A are:
(1) that defendant is engaged in the business of selling and
amc-w007.chd
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did sell the product at issue in the case; Section 402A(1);
(2) that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous
at the time it left the sellerfs hands; Section

402A(1) , and

Comments (g) and (i);
(3)

that the plaintiff is the ultimate consumer or user of

the allegedly defective product; Section 402A(1);
(4)

that the product's defective and unreasonably dangerous

condition caused the plaintiff physical harm; Section 402A(1); and
(5)

that the allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous

product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold; Section
402A(1)(b).
These elements of a plaintiff's cause of action for strict
product liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, were the key issues in plaintiff's product liability case
against AMC/Jeep as a matter of law.
In an effort to prove the most critical element of its product
liability cause of action —

that the Jeep Commando being driven

by Deborah Whitehead on the day of the accident made the basis of
this litigation was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the
time it left the hands of AMC/Jeep:
(1)

Plaintiffs offered and were permitted to display to the

jury one film after another showing Jeep CJ5s
rolling over in response to mechanically

(not Commandos) ,

induced test programs

bearing no resemblance to the accident conditions;
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(2)

Plaintiffs' experts were then permitted to compare Jeep

CJ5s to Commandos, and testify, without any foundation whatsoever,
that Jeep Commandos are "substantially similar" to Jeep CJ5s;
(3)

Plaintiffs' experts were then

"Jeeps" with
passenger

"other vehicles"

permitted

(including utility

cars) and to conclude, without any

to

compare

vehicles

and

foundation, that

"other vehicles" would not have rolled over under the circumstances
presented; and
(4) Hence, "Jeeps" are defectively designed and unreasonably
dangerous.
See Statement of Facts, supra at 12-18.
"An assertion of opinion given on direct testimony that bears
on

a

key

issue

examination."

in

the

Whitehead

case

is

a proper

at

29.

The

subject

of cross-

comparisons

made

by

plaintiffs' expert witnesses were unquestionably offered to show
that the Jeep Commando was defectively designed and unreasonably
dangerous; consequently, they "bear on a key issue" in plaintiffs'
product

liability

Petitioners'

case

against AMC/Jeep

first point on

rehearing

as

a matter

of

law.

is, therefore, entirely

without merit.
II.

Plaintiffs

Exhibits
Offered
by
Defendants
and
Improperly Excluded by the Trial Court
Were Made Part of the Record on Appeal.
next

make

a

hypertechnical

argument

that

defendants' exhibits, which this Court found had been improperly
excluded from evidence by the trial court, "were never before the
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Court for examination nor made part of the record on appeal."
Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 21.

To make that argument,

however, plaintiffs selectively quote and completely misrepresent:
(1)

AMC/Jeep's Designation of Record on Appeal;

(2) the factual context in which this argument is raised; and
(3)

the law applicable to this issue.

Specifically, plaintiffs argue that AMC/Jeep's designation of
record merely included "all pleadings, documents, and evidence."/
Petitioner's Brief on Rehearing at 21-22, when, in fact, AMC/Jeep's
Designation of Record requested that all proceedings in the trial
court, with the single exception of the voir dire examination of
the jury venire, be certified in this case, as follows:
All records and transcripts of all proceedings in
the above-entitled matter, including all pleadings,
documents, and evidence, and excluding
only
the
transcript of voir dire jury selection.
(R. 1661-1662)

Appendix F.

Next, plaintiffs argue that this issue was raised
initial

"Brief

of

Respondents

Deborah

Whitehead

and

in its
Stephen

Whitehead dated August 2, 1984 (at page 45)", and that it is merely
"renewing" that argument here.
In fact, plaintiffs made an entirely different argument in
their earlier brief.
The

films

In that brief they argued as follows:D
offered

by

Heitzman

were

simply

The period following "evidence" within the purportedly
quoted material has been improperly added by plaintiffs and does
not appear in AMC/Jeep's Designation of Record.
This is the entire argument reprinted verbatim and in context!
amc-w007.chd
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inadmissible because of appellants7 violation of the
orders of the court. In addition, the court determined
that the films were not relevant. The persuasive effect
of the film cannot be demonstrated or argued without its
admission in evidence.
Matters not admitted in evidence before
the trier of fact will not be considered on
appeal before the Supreme Court.
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450
(Utah 1983); In re Estate of Kropf, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah
1978); Corbett v. Corbett. 24 Utah 378, 472 P.2d 430
(1970) .
At no time prior to rehearing have plaintiffs ever suggested
that the AMC/Jeep exhibits improperly excluded by the trial court
were not part of the "record" in this case, or before the Court for
examination in connection with this appeal.

Plaintiffs are,

therefore, precluded from even raising the issue now.
A losing party cannot use a petition for rehearing to present
to the Supreme Court a new theory or contention which was neither
in the record as it was before the Court nor in the argument made.
Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah 1982), quoting
Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498, 170 P. 774, 778 (1918). Accord
State Board of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 745 P.2d 58
(Wyo. 1987) (Rehearing may not be had on matters which were not
urged at the original hearing or for the purpose of affording the
opportunity to present new questions or issues. Matters which were
not brought at the original hearing are deemed to have been waived,
either expressly or by implication, and may not be considered on
petition for rehearing); Kentner v. Gulf Ins. Co., 298 Or. 69, 689
P.2d 955 (1984) (Generally, a contention not raised in connection
amc-w007.chd
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with the original hearing will not be considered on a petition for
rehearing, as the purpose of a rehearing is not to raise new
questions or rehash old arguments but to allow the court to correct
mistakes and consider misapprehensions); Rosson v. Boyd, 727 P.2d
765 (Alaska 1986); Wernberg v. State, 519 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1974);
Waters v. Double L,, Inc., 114 Idaho 256, 755 P. 2d 1294 (Ida. App.
1987), aff'd as clarified 115 Idaho 705, 769 P.2d

582

(1989);

Weyerhaeuser Co. . Inc. v. United Pacific Ins. Co. , 83 Or. App. 556,
732 P.2d 921 (1987); Hansen v. Singmaster Ins. Agency, Inc., 82
Or. App. 219, 728 P.2d. 69 (1986); First Interstate Bank of Oregon
v. Havnes, 75 Or. App. 18, 704 P.2d 1165 (1985).
Even if this Court determines to consider the argument on the
merits, however, plaintiffs are incorrect as a matter of law.

The

"record on appeal" is defined in Rule 11(a) of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court as follows:
Rule 11.

The Record on Appeal.

(a)
Composition of the Record on Appeal.
The
original papers and exhibits filed in the district court,
the transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index
prepared by the clerk of the district court shall
constitute the record on appeal in all cases.
Defendants' exhibits filed in the district court, and offered into
evidence were therefore a part of the record on appeal as a matter
of law.

Accord.

Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d

635, 638 (9th Cir. 1969); Munqin v. Florida East Coast Rwv Co. , 416
F.2d 1169, 1171, n.6 (1969); United States v. Cain. 467 F.2d 704,
707-708, n.6
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Craddock's

AdmLr, 274 N.C. 343, 163 SE 387, 390 (1932).
Rule 11 goes on to note that with respect to papers and
exhibits, only those prescribed under paragraph (d) of the Rule
shall actually be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

Id.

Rule 12 of the Rules of the Utah.Supreme Court then states in
pertinent part as follows:
(3) Transmission of Exhibits. Documents of unusual
bulk or weight, and physical exhibits other than
documents shall not be transmitted by the clerk unless
he is directed to do so by a party or by the Clerk of the
Supreme Court•
Rule 12(b)(3), Utah R. S. Ct. (1987).
The quoted language of Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, promulgated April 20, 1987, is identical to
that contained in Rules 11 and 12 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, promulgated November 9, 1984 (Compare Appendix A to
Appendix B), and substantially similar to that contained in their
predecessor, Rule 75(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provided in pertinent part as follows:
Large exhibits such as machinery or parts thereof,
bulky objects, clothing, narcotics, firearms, large maps
or charts, burglars' tools and items stolen in burglary
cases, will not be transmitted to this court pursuant to
this rule, unless inspection thereof by the court is
deemed essential to a determination of the cause. When
such an item is designated, the clerk of the district
court shall retain the same in his possession until
specifically requested by the clerk of the Supreme Court
to forward it to the court...
Rule 75(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983); Appendix A.
The Introductory Note of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Appellate Procedure, published simultaneously with
amc-w007.chd
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the promulgation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1984
and reprinted immediately following the Foreword to the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court in 1987, provides guidance to the bench and
bar in the transition to the new rules of appellate procedure:
It is recognized that in the transition from the
prior rules to these new appellate rules, some problems
may be encountered with respect to those cases that are
in the course of appeal on the effective date of these
Rules. It is intended that unless there is substantial
prejudice in a particular case which results from the
application of or compliance with these Rules, the Rules
shall govern as of the effective date, all appellate
procedure and practice in civil and criminal cases before
the Supreme Court, including cases presently in process.
If a claim of hardship or prejudice is claimed to exist
as to a transitional case, application for appropriate
relief may be made to the Supreme Court or to the Clerk
of the Court on an ad hoc basis.
* * * * *

The Advisory Committee Notes, while not promulgated
or formally adopted by the Supreme Court, may be used as
a guide to and for appropriate references in the
construction of the Rules.
Appendix D.
As a matter of practice, only documentary exhibits are ever
transmitted to the Supreme Court on appeal, unless and until the
Clerk of the Supreme Court requests the Clerk of the District Court
to transmit a particular non-documentary exhibit for examination.
Such requests for exhibits from the district court are made
telephonically, in the ordinary course, and no written record is
maintained of such requests.6
The physical Record checked out from the Supreme Court
Clerk's Office by appellants in connection with the preparation of
this Brief on Rehearing evidences that this Court has, in fact,
requested and obtained from the Clerk of the District Court,
amc-w007.chd
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The record, as transmitted in this case, contains a list of
the 218 exhibits filed in the District Court, which exhibits
constitute a part of the record on appeal in this case as a matter
of law, under and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

(R. 1540-1549)

That list of

exhibits is then included in the Index (R. 1712) to facilitate the
Court's request for specific exhibits, as necessary.
The physical record, as constituted at the time it was checked
out in connection with this brief on rehearing, includes some of
the exhibits filed with the District Court in this case, but not
all of them by any means.

There is no indication anywhere in the

record of the proceedings on this appeal when or why these exhibits
were transmitted to the Supreme Court, and officials of the Supreme
Court Clerk's office have no recollection of the circumstances
surrounding the request(s) for these exhibits.

Their presence in

the file bears eloquent testimony to the fact that the members of
this Court are capable of accessing the exhibits at any time they
deem

them

necessary

to

their

deliberations,

however,

and

plaintiffs' effort to invade the internal deliberations of this
Court to determine specifically what was reviewed or not reviewed
by members of the Court in connection with an appeal is clearly
improper, as a matter of law.

several of the non-documentary exhibits made the subject of
Appellants' claims of error in this case, which were not originally
transmitted when the Record was lodged with the Supreme Court in
1984.
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III. The Trial Court's Errors Are Not Justified
by Pre-Trial Rulings.
Plaintiffs next attempt to reargue, for the fourth time during
this appeal, that the trial court7s erroneous evidentiary rulings
were actually sanctions properly imposed by the trial court as a
result

of

defendants' purported

failure

to

make

discovery.

(Respondents7 Motion to Strike at 6-11; Respondents7 Brief at 519; Respondents7 Petition for Rehearing at 9-17; Petitioner7s Brief
on Rehearing at 23-37.)
Each
responded.

time

the

issue

has

been

raised,

appellants

have

(Response of American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep

Corporation to plaintiffs7 Motion to Strike at 4-6;
of Appellants

at 4-18;

Reply Brief

Appellants7 Answer to Petition

for

Rehearing at 8-15.) Furthermore, this Court7s opinion demonstrates
on its face that those arguments have been carefully reviewed,
thoroughly understood, and thoughtfully considered.
Specifically, the Court states in its opinion as follows:
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred
in excluding certain films and exhibits offered by them
as evidence. They called a Mr. Heitzman as an expert
witness to testify regarding the handling characteristics
of Jeep vehicles.
He offered a film showing CJ-5s
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers. Plaintiffs
objected on the around that the introduction of the film
violated previous orders of the court regarding
discovery. The objection was sustained.
Plaintiffs had submitted interrogatories seeking any
testing
Jeep
had
done
regarding
the
handling
characteristics of the 1966-73 Jeep Commando.
At a
hearing on plaintiffs7 motion to compel discovery. Judge
Sorenson ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arguments
in chambers on the admissibility of the film, the court
ruled:
amc-w007.chd
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I think that in the context of all the
circumstances and with respect to discovery
procedures...I think the plaintiffs were
entitled to have, or see, the films and test
results before trial pursuant to their
discovery interrogatories..., the films are not
admissible.
The trial court can exclude evidence that violates
discovery orders under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
However, defendants point out that the
discovery covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep CJ-5. The film
simply is not covered by the language of the
interrogatory. Although plaintiffs' experts were allowed
at trial, over objections of defendants, to show films
of CJ-5s based on their foundational testimony that its
handling was substantially similar to that of the
Commando, that ruling does not place the film within the
scope of material sought in the pretrial discovery
request. The dissenting opinion would have defendants
divine the scope of the requests by a trial court ruling
on the admissibility of evidence which came much later.
This burden cannot fairly be placed on them. The tests
were not produced to show the handling of the "66-13 Jeep
Commando," nor were they offered for that purpose.
Defendants maintained that the handling of the CJ-5 and
the Commando were not the same. The tests were offered
to rebut evidence presented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5
was defective because of its handling characteristics.
Although this evidence could have been excluded on the
basis of relevancy had the trial court earlier excluded
plaintiffs' films, once the court allowed plaintiffs to
try their case on the basis of comparison with the CJ-5,
it could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to
rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in the presentation
of their case. The trial court erred in excluding the
film on the basis that defendants had failed to comply
with orders regarding discovery.
101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30.
A vigorous dissent clearly demonstrates how thoroughly the
matter

has

considered.

been

reviewed

and

how

thoughtfully

Id. at 36. It is, therefore, improper for plaintiffs

to reargue that issue on rehearing.
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Rehearings are not granted to reargue matters determined by
the original decision-

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ind. Comm., 90 Ariz.

379, 368 P.2d 450 (1962).
entertained

only

when

the

A petition for rehearing should be
Supreme

Court

has

overlooked

or

misapprehended some material matter. Matter of Estate of Herrmann,
100 Nev. 149, 679 P.2d 246 (1984).

Indeed, Rule 35(a) of the Rules

of the Utah Supreme Court clearly directs the petitioner on
rehearing to "state with particularity the points of law or fact
which

the

petitioner

misapprehended".
restates

claims

the

court

has

overlooked

or

Where the petitioner's brief on rehearing merely

arguments

raised

previously

and

discussed

in

the

dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court's original decision, and
where the Supreme Court's original decision has considered and
disposed of each point raised by the petitioner on the original
appeal, rehearing is improper. Board of Trustees of Weston County
School Dist. No. 1 v. Holso, 587 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1978). The purpose
of rehearing is not to raise new questions or rehash old arguments
but

to

allow

the

misapprehensions.

Court

to

correct

mistakes

and

consider

Kentner v. Gulf Ins. Co., 298 Or, 69, 689 P.2d

955 (1984).

Accord In re Shirk's Estate, 194 Kan. 671, 401 P.2d

279 (1965);

Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 78 Nev. 69, 369 P.2d 676,

cert, denied 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
As exhaustively demonstrated in appellants' three previous
briefs on this point, AMC/Jeep responded
objected,
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in this

litigation.

Plaintiffs' discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep

information relating to the demonstrative evidence
excluded

by the trial

evidence created

during

court, except

in the case

the course of the trial

erroneously
of

rebuttal

and

excluded

because it was not produced pursuant to the Court's discovery
orders prior to trial, and this court has inexplicably upheld the
exclusion of that evidence anyway. The arguments presented on this
point in the Reply Brief of Appellants at 4-18

(Appendix I) are

incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth.
Plaintiffs now argue for the first time, however:
(1)

that the Court might have excluded defendants' evidence

for failure to respond fully to expert witness interrogatories; and
(2)

that AMC/Jeep should have known what plaintiffs' trial

strategy was going to be based upon the deposition testimony of
plaintiffs' experts to the effect that there was no foundation to
support their testimony that the Jeep Commando was defective and
unreasonably dangerous.
These arguments cannot properly be considered for the first time
on rehearing.

In Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P. 2d 678, 681 (Utah

1982) this Court held that "[a] losing party cannot use a petition
for rehearing 'to present to this Court a new theory or contention
which was neither in the record as it was before this court nor in
the arguments made.'" (quoting Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498,
170 P. 774, 778 (1918)).
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More importantlyf the trial court did not exclude the evidence
on either basis and could not properly have done so under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure as they existed at that time.

Rule

26(b)(4) then provided in pertinent part as follows:
(4) Trial Preparation:
Experts.
Discovery of
facts known and opinions held by experts under the
provisions of subdivision (b) (1) of this Rule may be
obtained only as follows:
(A) A party may discover facts known or opinions
held by an expert who has been retained or specially
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial only as provided by Rule 35 or
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which
the party seeking discovery is not able to obtain the
discovery of requested facts or opinions on the same
subject by other means, or otherwise upon a showing that
manifest injustice would result unless discovery is
permitted.
That rule has, of course, subsequently been amended to permit
expert witness discovery, but the amendment did not occur until
years after the trial of this case.

Indeed, plaintiffs did not

even ask the Court to exclude the evidence on the basis of the
objections put forward on rehearing.

Under this Court's standard

of review on rehearing, those arguments are simply inappropriate.
IV.

This Court Properly Held that the
Erroneous Exclusion of Evidence and the
Improper Restriction of Cross-Examination
Combined to Require Reversal.

In the case of Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P. 2d 781,
787 (1959), this Court reversed and remanded a personal injury case
for new trial based upon the cumulative effect of several trial
court errors, stating:
It is unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose
for us to decide whether any one of the errors above
amc-\*O07.chd
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discussed, considered separately, would constitute
sufficient prejudicial error to require a new trial. The
question is whether the case was presented to the jury
in such a manner that it is reasonable to believe there
was a fair and impartial analysis of the evidence and a
just verdict. If errors were committed which prevented
this being done, then a new trial should be granted,
whether it resulted from one error, or from several
errors cumulatively. We expressly do not mean to say
that trivia Which would be innocuous in themselves can
be added together to make sufficient error to result in
prejudice and reversal. The errors must be real and
substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed would
affect the result.
However, errors of the latter
character, which may not by themselves justify a
reversal, may well, when considered together with others,
render it clear that a fair trial was not had. In such
event justice can only be served by the granting of a new
trial, absent the errors complained of.
It is so
ordered...
Similarly, in State v. St. Clair. 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323
(1955), the Court stated:
None of the rulings on evidence, considered singly,
may seem of any great import.
But the defendant is
nevertheless
entitled
to
have
them
considered
cumulatively and as part of the over-all picture in
determining whether he had a fair opportunity to present
his defense.
Id. at 328; and
The proposition for us to decide here is not whether
any of the irregularities herein discussed would
separately have been such as to constitute prejudicial
error and require a new trial. It is recognized that a
combination of errors which, when singly considered might
be thought insufficient to warrant a reversal, might in
their cumulative effect do so.
Id. at 332; Accord Moss v. Magnetic Peripherals, Inc., 744 P.2d
1285, 1288 (Okla. App. 1987).
Plaintiffs' argument that the Court's decision in this case
"adopts a 'cumulative error doctrine' and overrules, sub silentio.
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prior decisions of this Court to the contrary," Petitioner's Brief
on Rehearing at 41, is simply inaccurate•

The case of Bundv v.

Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988), on which plaintiffs principally
rely for their argument, merely held that the cumulative error
standard

did not apply

substantial errors.

in that case because there were no

Id. at 806. The Court expressly recognized,

however, the existence of a "cumulative error" doctrine in cases
where a number of errors prejudice the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Id. Similarly, in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah
1974), cited by plaintiffs, the Court merely found that the errors
were insubstantial.
The holdings in Richlin v. Gooding Amusement Co. , 113 Ohio
App. 99, 170 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1960) and Nicholas v. Yellow Cab Co, ,
116 Ohio App. 402, 180 N.E.2d 279, 286 (1962), cited by plaintiffs,
are distinguishable

from the present case

in that they are

predicated on the fact that the various errors complained of were
unrelated to one another. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. v. Nash, 226 Ga.
706, 177 S.E.2d 70, 72-73 (1970), which relies on the Nicholas
holding, is further distinguishable in that the appellant did not
specify cumulative error as a basis for reversal.
In this case, the Court properly held that:
1.

after permitting plaintiffs to present, through

their expert witnesses, a theory of liability that the accident
vehicle (a Jeep Commando) was defective and unreasonably dangerous
because:
(a)
amc-w007.chd
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the CJ5; and
(b)

2.
*:

the CJ5 was purportedly defective because
certain tests purportedly showed that the
CJ5 was more likely to roll over than other
vehicles, including passenger cars;

the trial court then erroneously:
(a)

cut defendants off during their attempts to
cross-examine plaintiffs7 experts, preventing
defendants from probing the basis of the
opinions given by plaintiffs' experts on
comparisons they had made in their direct
examination, allowing the issues to be
presented to the jury without the added light
that
thorough
cross-examination
sheds
(Whitehead at 29; and

(b)

excluded defendants7 own expert testimony and
exhibits to rebut the plaintiffs7 theory of
liability (Id. at 30-32).

The Court specifically observed as follows:
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced films of
Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this opinion, we upheld
the admissibility of those films because of the
[purported] substantial similarity of the vehicle shown
in the films to the vehicle in which plaintiffs were
injured. However, plaintiffs in presenting their case
did not stop there. They produced several experts who
repeatedly in their testimony drew comparisons of the
rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles to non-Jeep
vehicles. Plaintiffs7 aim was to show that the Jeep in
which they were riding was of an unsafe design and had
a tendency to roll much easier than other vehicles. For
example, plaintiffs7 expert, Mr. Shaw, testified: 77There
is no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone to roll
over than some others.77 Likewise, plaintiffs7 expert,
Mr. Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to turn
a passenger car over.77 Finally, Mr. Anderson, another
of plaintiffs7 experts, testified that Jeep vehicles have
77
a delay in the handling response77 that is greater than
S10 Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule of law
relied upon by the dissenting opinion, that evidence of
the condition of other products is not admissible to
establish a defect in a particular product, it may be
questioned whether such comparisons should have been
admitted because of the lack of similarity. However,
right or wrong, plaintiffs7 experts were allowed to draw
amc-w007.chd
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the comparisons between the rollover propensities of Jeep
and non-Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants should
have been allowed in rebuttal to prove the experience of
plaintiffs' experts and to introduce into evidence the
film showing non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced
rollovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs/ film...
Id. at 31.
Similarly, the Court properly held that:*
1.

After receiving expert testimony presented by the

plaintiffs that the accident vehicle was defective at the time it
left the hands of the manufacturer because its roof collapsed
during the rollover made the subject of this litigation, thus
contributing to the plaintiffs' injuries;
2.

The trial court erroneously sustained plaintiffs7

objection (on the basis of materiality) to the admissibility of an
exhibit offered by defendants to show that the accident vehicle had
been

involved

in a prior accident that had compromised

structural integrity of the vehicle's roof.

the

Id.

Finally, the Court properly held that evidence of how the
presence of seat belts affected the design safety of the vehicle
was erroneously excluded under the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 32.
Contrary to plaintiffs' contention in its Brief on Rehearing,
the aforesaid errors do not constitute isolated, insubstantial and
nonprejudicial errors.

Indeed, as this Court properly held:

Given the conflicting testimony presented on this key
issue, we cannot say that the substantial rights of
defendants were not affected by the combined effects of
the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the
limitation of cross-examination. While no one error by
itself perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative effect
amc-w007.chd
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of the several errors undermines our confidence that
defendants were able to present to the jury their theory
of the case and that a fair trial was had.
Id. at 32.
This finding is completely consistent with the standard
enunciated

in

Ivie

v.

Richardson.

supra,

and

particularly

appropriate when the Court was required to consider the impact of
the evidentiary limitations and exclusions in the context of the
plaintiffs' arguably improper comparative theory of liability.
Those evidentiary limitations and exclusions were individually
significant

and prejudicial*

Collectively

they were

simply

devastating.
V,

Finally,
This
Court
Must
Reject
Plaintiff's New Request to Limit Reversal
of the Case to the Issue of Liability
Permitting the Damage Award to Accrue
Interest Pending Retrial of the Liability
Issues.

In Hvland v. St. Mark's, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738
(1967), this Court stated that
[t]here are undoubtedly some instances where limiting a
trial to the issue of damages only may be justified, as
our rules allow. But courts generally do not look with
favor upon such a restriction. The reasons why this is
so in personal injury actions are well exemplified in
this case. The questions relating to the plaintiff's
injury, how it happened, who was at fault, and the pain
and injury occasioned thereby, are so intermingled that
if there is to be a new trial, in fairness to both
parties it should be on all issues.
Similarly, in Groen v. Tri-O, 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), this
Court determined that the new trial in a personal injury action
should be on liability and damages.

amc-v.O07.chd
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that because the jury had made a finding on the amount of damages,
only liability should be retried. The Court stated in a footnote,
however, that "[w]hether such a finding should be reopened in
connection with a new trial on the issue of liability depends on
whether the two issues are so intermingled that fairness to both
parties requires retrial on both."
P,2d

730, 735

(Utah

1982).

Cf. Nelson v. Truiillo, 657

Without

explanation

the Court

determined that the retrial should involve damages as well as
liability.

Groen v. Tri-O, 667 P.2d at 607, n.ll.

The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Maxwell v. Portland
Terminal RR Co. , 253 Or. 573, 456 P.2d 484, 486 (1969) is also
persuasive:
In the ordinary two-party personal-injury case, ...
evidence of fault can influence the jury's measurement
of damages; and the kind and degree of injuries may
influence some jurors in their evaluation of the evidence
on liability...Whatever logical problems these elements
of lawyer folklore may suggest, we believe that neither
side in this type of case should be encouraged to
manipulate errors in one trial to gain advantage in a new
trial before a new jury. Accordingly, we hold that the
new trial in a personal injury case ordinarily should be
a new trial on all contested factual issues, regardless
of the ability of the parties on appeal to pinpoint error
so as to show that the error, if any, may have affected
only one issue. There will, of course, be exceptional
cases in which the trial court, in the exercise of
judicial discretion, properly will limit the issues for
a new trial. But the standard to be applied in the
exercise of this discretion is reasonable certainty that
the issue or issues to be eliminated from the second
trial are no longer viable issues in the case and that
their removal will not prejudice the right of either
party to the kind of jury trial to which he would have
been entitled but for the error or errors necessitating
the new trial.
And the Colorado Supreme Court points out in Bassett v.
amc-w007.chd
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O'Dell, 178 Colo. 425, 498 P.2d 1134, 1135 (1972) that:

[i]t is also clear that a partial retrial could not be
conducted without injustice, since it would be virtually
impossible under the facts of this case to mask the first
jury's verdict for the plaintiff from the new jury that
would be sitting at the time the case is retried. The
prejudicial inference that would be created by a limited
remand is to us obvious.
"A claim for damages arising out of a personal injury is
unliquidated in the sense that the defendant cannot know, prior to
judgment, the precise amount he is going to be required to pay.
Therefore, courts, in the absence of an applicable statute, apply
the general rule for unliquidated claims and do not allow interest
as a part of the damages awarded in such an action."

22 Am. Jur.

2d Damages § 667 (1988).
In Utah, of course, "special damages'' arising in personal
injury actions accrue interest from the occurrence of the act
giving rise to a cause of action, under and pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1987).
CONCLUSION
Appellants and Respondents on Rehearing respectfully suggest
that rehearing has been improvidently granted in this case, and
urge the Court to reaffirm its February 2, 1989, decision in this
matter, reversing and remanding this case to the trial court for
a new trial on all issues.

amc-w007.chd
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of October, 1989.
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

^rijcLA^^AH^c^
by.
Patricia W. Christensen
Attorneys for Appellants
American Motors Sales Corporation
Jeep Corporation
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 1989, four
bound copies of the foregoing were served by United States Mail,
first class postage prepaid, on the following:
Jackson Howard
Leslie W. Slaugh
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellees
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(As Amended 1983)
Rule 75
Record on Appeal-Briefs
(a) Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal. Within ten
days after the filing of the notice of appeal, the appellant shall
serve upon the respondent and file with the district court a
designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and
evidence to be contained in the record on appeal unless the
respondent has already served and filed a designation. Within ten
days after the service and filing of such a designation, any other
party to the appeal may serve and file a designation of additional
portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be included.
If the respondent files the original designation, the parties shall
proceed under subdivision (b) of this Rule as if the respondent
were the appellant.
(1) Within fifteen days after filing the notice of appeal,
the appellant shall file with the clerk of the district court his
certificate stating (a) that a transcript of evidence has been
ordered from the court reporter, or (b) that he does not intend to
rely on said transcript. For failure to so file such certificate
the appeal may be dismissed.
(b) Transcript. If the trial or hearing was stenographically
reported and appellant designates for inclusion any evidence or
proceedings at such trial or hearing, the appellant shall file with
his designation a copy of the reporter's transcript of the evidence
or proceedings included in his designation.
If the designation
does not include all of the evidence, the appellant shall file a
copy of such parts thereof as the respondent may need to enable him
to designate the parts he desires to have added, and if the
appellant fails to do so the court on motion nay require him to
furnish the additional parts needed. The copy so filed by the
appellant shall be available for the use of the other parties. In
the event that a copy of the reporter's transcript or of the
necessary portions thereof is already on file, the appellant shall
not be required to file an additional copy.
(c) Form of Testimony. Testimony of witnesses designated for
inclusion need not be in narrative form, but may be in question and
answer form. A party may prepare and file with his designation a
condensed statement in narrative form of all or part of the
testimony, and any other party to the appeal, if dissatisfied with
the narrative statement, may require testimony in question and
answer form to be substituted for all or part thereof.
(d) Statement of Points.
No assignment of errors is
necessary. If the appellant does not designate for inclusion the
ctn;-.<k&chd
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complete record and all the proceedings and evidence in the action,
he shall serve with his designation a concise statement of the
points on which he intends to rely on the appeal.
If the respondent desires to cross appeal, or if the appellant
has filed a statement of the points on which he intends to rely and
the respondent desires to have the appellate court consider other
or additional matters, the respondent shall, within 10 days after
the service and filing of appellant's designation, or if the
parties stipulate as to the record on appeal, within 10 days from
the filing of such stipulation, serve and file a statement of
respondent's points, either by way of such cross appeal or for the
purpose of having considered other or additional matters than those
raised by appellant.
(e) Record to be Abbreviated. All matter not essential to
the decision of the questions presented by the appeal shall be
omitted. Formal parts of all exhibits and more than one copy of
any document shall be excluded. Documents shall be abridged by
omitting all irrelevant and formal portions thereof.
For any
infraction of this Rule or for the unnecessary substitution by one
party of evidence in question and answer form for a fair narrative
statement proposed by another, the appellate court may withhold or
impose costs as the circumstances of the case and discouragement
of like conduct in the future may require; and costs may be imposed
upon offending attorneys or parties.
Whenever the transcript exceeds 400 pages in length the court
may order the appellant to prepare and file with the record an
abstract of the testimony by preparing a concise statement of the
same in narrative form. The statement shall contain appropriate
references to the pages of the transcript. If the respondent or
any other party is dissatisfied with the abstract he may prepare
a separate statement of the testimony or propose amendments to the
abstract filed by the appellant. If any party deems an abstract
unnecessary or too burdensome he may apply to the court for an
order relieving him from compliance.
(f) Stipulation as to Record.
Instead
of serving
designations as above provided, the parties by written stipulation
filed with the clerk of the district court may designate the parts
of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be included in the
record on appeal.
(g) Record to be Prepared by Clerk—Necessary Parts. The
clerk of the district court, under his hand and the seal of the
court/ shall transmit to the Supreme Court a true copy of the
matter designated by the parties (unless the original papers are
designated for inclusion in the record, in which event he shall
transmit such original papers), but shall always include, whether
or not designated, the originals or copies of the following: The
amc-^-OO&xhJ
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material pleadings without unnecessary duplication; the pretrial
order, if any; the verdict or the findings of fact and conclusions
of law; in an action tried without a jury, the masters report, if
any; the opinion, if any, the judgment, order, or part thereof
appealed from; the notice of appeal (or order granting an
interlocutory appeal) with date of filing; the designations or
stipulations of the parties as to matter to be included in the
record; and any statement by the appellant or the respondent of the
points on which such party intends to relyThe matter so
certified and transmitted constitutes the record on appeal. The
copy of the transcript filed as provided in subdivision (b) of this
Rule shall be certified by the clerk as a part of the record on
appeal and the clerk may not require an additional copy as a
requisite to certification.
Large exhibits such as machinery or parts thereof, bulky
objects, clothing, narcotics, firearms, large maps or charts,
burglars1 tools and items stolen in burglary cases, will not be
transmitted to this court pursuant to this rule, unless inspection
thereof by the court is deemed essential to a determination of the
cause. When such an item is designated, the clerk of the district
court shall retain the same in his possession until specifically
requested by the clerk of the Supreme Court to forward it to the
court. Appropriate notation of such retained exhibits shall be
made on the clerkfs certificate.
(h) Power of Court to Correct or Modify Record. It is not
necessary for the record on appeal to be approved by the district
court or a judge thereof except as provided in subdivisions (m) and
(o) of this Rule; but if any difference arises as to whether the
record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the
record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to
either party is omitted from the record on appeal by error or
accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or
the district court, either before or after the record is
transmitted to the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court, on a proper
suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission
or misstatement shall be corrected, and if necessary that a
supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk
of the district court. All other questions as to the content and
form of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court.
(i) Order as to Original Papers or Exhibits. Whenever the
district court is of the opinion that original papers or exhibits
should be inspected by the Supreme Court or sent to that court in
lieu of copies (and the appellant has not designated that such
original papers be a part of the record on appeal), it may make
such order therefor and for the safekeeping, transportation, and
return thereof as it deems proper.
amc-Hikl&chd
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(j) Record for Preliminary Hearing in Appellate Court. If
prior to the time the complete record on appeal is settled and
certified as herein provided, a party desires to make in the
Supreme Court a motion for dismissal, for a stay pending appeal,
for additional security on the bond on appeal or on the supersedeas
bond, or for any intermediate order, the clerk of the district
court at his request shall certify and transmit to the Supreme
Court such portion of the record or proceedings below as is needed
for that purpose,
(k) Several Appeals. When more than one appeal is taken from
the same judgment, a single record on appeal shall be prepared
containing all the matter designated or agreed upon by the parties,
without duplication.
(1) Form of Record—Size of Paper and Style of Type* The
general form of the record, including the size of paper, weight,
margins, kind and spacing of type, shall be the same as required
by Rule 10(d), The pleadings, proceedings, and papers shall be
chronologically arranged, the pages thereof numbered, and the
record shall be prefaced with an alphabetical index specifying the
page on which each paper, pleading, proceeding, and the testimony
of each witness may be found. If the record is insufficient or if
it is not prepared and arranged in accordance with the foregoing
directions, the court may order the appellant to make the same
conform thereto.
(m) Appeals When No Stenographic Report Available. In the
event no stenographic report of the evidence or proceedings at a
hearing or trial was made, or is available, the appellant may
prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best
available means, including his recollection, for use instead of a
stenographic transcript. This statement shall be served on the
respondent who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto
within 10 days after service upon him. Thereupon the statement,
with the objections or proposed amendments, shall be submitted to
the district court for settlement and approval and as settled and
approved shall be included by the clerk of the court in the record
on appeal.
(n) Transmission of Original Papers. At the time of filing
a stipulation as to the record on appeal, or if no stipulation is
filed, at the time of filing any designation of the parts of the
record to be included in the record on appeal, the parties, or
party filing such designation may specify that the original papers
filed in the action be transmitted to the Supreme Court in lieu of
copies. If a transcript of the testimony is on file, the appellant
may designate that such transcript be transmitted to the Supreme
Court; otherwise, the appellant shall file with the clerk for
transmission such transcript of the testimony as he deems necessary
for his appeal, subject to the right of the respondent either to
omc-*'00&chJ
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file additional portions or to require the appellant so to do,
under the provisions of subdivision (b) of this Rule- After the
appeal has been disposed of, any original papers shall be returned
to the custody of the district court.
The provisions of
subdivisions (h) , (j), (k) , (1), and (m) of this Rule shall be
applicable to appeals where the original papers are transmitted to
the Supreme Court, but with reference to such original papers
rather than to a copy or copies.
(0) Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal. When the questions
presented by an appeal to the Supreme Court can be determined
without an examination of all the pleadings, evidence, and
proceedings in the court below, the parties may prepare and sign
a statement of the case showing how the questions arose and were
decided in the district court and setting forth only so many of the
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential
to a decision of the questions by the appellate court.
The
statement shall include a copy of the judgment appealed from, a
copy of the notice of appeal with its filing date, and a concise
statement of the points to be relied on by the appellant. If the
statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions
as the court may consider necessary fully to present the questions
raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the district court and
shall then be certified to the Supreme Court as the record on
appeal*
(p) Briefs on Appeal.
(1) Time for Filing. Within one month after the record on
appeal is filed in the Supreme Court, unless a motion to dismiss
the appeal has been interposed, in which event within 20 days from
the denial of such motion, the appellant shall file with the clerk
of the Supreme Court not less than ten copies of his brief on
appeal, and shall serve upon the opposing party not less than two
copies of such brief. Within one month after the service upon him
of appellant's brief, the respondent shall file with the clerk of
the Supreme Court at least ten copies of his brief and serve upon
appellant at least two copies thereof. A reply brief nay likewise
be served and filed by the appellant at any time before the first
day of the session of court at which the case is set for hearing.
(2) Contents. The appellant's brief shall contain in order:
(1) a table of contents including a concise statement of the points
upon which appellant intends to rely for a reversal of judgment or
order of the court below, without redundancy or duplicity and in
the same order in which such points are argued in the brief, and
including an alphabetical index of the cases and authorities cited;
(2) (a) a short one-sentence statement of the nature of the case;
(b) the disposition made of the case in the lower court; (c) the
exact nature of the relief sought on appeal, and (d) a concise
statement of the material facts of the case citing the pages of the
antc-tvOflfiehJ
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record supporting such statement; (3) the argument under separate
headings in so far as such separation is practicable; (4) the cover
of all briefs shall set forth the full title of the case, plaintiff
in the court below being named first and designated as PlaintiffAppellant or Plaint iff-Respondent as the case might be and the
defendant below designated as Defendant-Appellant or DefendantRespondent as the case might be, the party on whose behalf filed,
the court from which appeal is taken, the name of the judge who
presided, and names and mailing addresses of counsel for the
respective parties.
If the respondent agrees with the statement of facts set forth
in appellant's brief, he shall so indicate• If he controverts it,
he shall state wherein such statement is inconsistent with the
facts and shall make a statement of the facts as he finds them,
giving reference to the pages of the record supporting his
statement and controverting appellant's statementIn other
respects, respondent's brief shall conform to the same requirements
set forth above for appellant's brief.
The reply brief, if any, shall be limited to answering any new
matter set forth in respondent's brief, and shall conform generally
to the requirements of other briefs.
No brief shall be filed with such court which exceeds 50
pages, exclusive of the index, notes, appendices and copies of
documents, written instruments, pleadings and other similar
matters, which must be on separate pages from the main body of the
brief, without first obtaining special permission, on good cause
shown, from the Supreme Court or a Justice thereof.
(3) Corrections and Newly Uncovered Cases.
Briefs are
distributed to the justices usually not earlier than two weeks
before the beginning of the session* Up to that time they will be
lodged in the office of the clerk. Errors should be discovered
before that time and corrections made directly in ink on the copies
of the briefs. Likewise, with the additions of newly uncovered
cases with their citations, except that the proposition to which
the newly added cases apply, shall also be specified.
In the event corrections are not timely made on the briefs
directly, and in order to save the time of the justices making
corrections on a tightly articulated calendar, a party desiring to
make any corrections or add any additional authorities, shall, not
later than the day of the argument, submit to the clerk for
insertion in the brief, ten typewritten copies of such corrections
or additional authorities on paper the same size as the brief, the
correcting page to be given the same number as the page sought to
be corrected.
Each such page shall set forth the title of the
case, the name of the party for whose benefit the correction or
addition is made, and a statement giving the line or lines of the
amc-**-008.chd
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page where the corrections should be made, and in the case of
additional authorities, shall designate the proposition> or
propositions to which they apply.
In case corrections or authorities not uncovered before the
argument are tendered, the insertion sheets as above specified in
the manner and number above set out may be made by mail to the
clerk's office.
(4) Size and Style. All briefs must be printed in not less
than ten-point type on good white, unglazed paper, 6 inches wide
by 9 inches long, with inside margins of not less than one inch,
and with double leaded text and single leaded citations and
quotations; provided, that upon application of a party, the court
or any justice thereof, may where the circumstances require, make
an order dispensing with printed briefs and permitting typewritten
briefs to be filed. Typewritten briefs must be on unglazed white
paper, 6 inches wide by 9 inches long. The impression must be on
one side of the paper only and must be double spaced, except for
matter customarily single spaced and indented, with adequate
margins on the top and sides of each page. Briefs and appendices
may be produced by standard typographic printing or by any
duplicating or copying process which produces a clear, black,
permanent image on white paper.
All briefs shall be bound on the left side and securely
fastened, with an outside cover of heavy weight paper. All copies
must be neat and the matter therein clearly legible. The clerk
shall examine all briefs before filing the same and if they are not
prepared in accordance with this Rule he shall not file them, but
shall return them to be properly prepared.
(5) Cost of Printing Taxable. The actual expense of printing
briefs not to exceed $2.00 for each page of printed matter may be
taxed as costs.
Costs of typewritten briefs, including
mimeographed or carbon copies may be taxed at not to exceed $.50
per page, except if planographed copies or copies prepared by
similar process or photographed copies are filed, the additional
expense of preparing such copies, not to exceed $.25 per page may
be taxed as costs.
(q) Application of Rule to Original Proceedings in the
Supreme Court. The provisions of subdivisions (1) and (p) of this
Rule shall apply to the record, if any, and to all briefs filed in
an original proceeding in the Supreme Court, in so far as such
provisions are applicable; provided that the plaintiff in any such
original proceeding shall file his brief within one month from the
return date of the writ.
(r) Filing
Copies
of
Motions
and
Applications
for
Extraordinary Writs.
Motions and answers thereto made in the
J.*TC-*»<>14.CW
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Supreme Court must be in writing, served upon opposing counsel, and
at least six copies thereof filed with the clerk* A motion to
dismiss an appeal must be accompanied by a memorandum of
authorities in support thereof.
When an application is made to the Supreme Court for an
extraordinary writ to be issued in the exercise of original
jurisdiction, six copies of such application must be filed with the
clerk, together with a brief memorandum of authorities upon which
the applicant relies for the issuance of the writ.
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
(As Amended 1984)
Rule ll.

The Record on Appeal.

(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal. The original papers
and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of
proceedings, if any, and the index prepared by the clerk of the
district court shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.
However with respect to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed
under paragraph (d) of this Rule shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court.
(b) Pagination and Indexing of the Record. Immediately upon
filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the district court
shall prepare an index of all of the original papers filed in the
district court, and shall paginate those papers in chronological
order.
(c) Duty of Appellant. After filing the notice of appeal,
the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is taken,
each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d)
and (e) of this Rule and shall take any other action necessary to
enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the record. A single
record shall be transmitted.
(d)

Papers and Exhibits on Appeal.

(1) Criminal Cases. All of the original papers in a criminal
case shall be included by the clerk of the district court as part
of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil Cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain
in the custody of the cleric of the district court, as set forth in
Rule 12(b)(2) during preparation and filing of briefs.
The district court clerk shall establish rules and procedures
for checking out the record, after pagination, for use by the
parties in briefing.
(A) Civil Cases with Short Records.
In civil cases
where all original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of
the original pages will be transmitted to the Supreme Court
upon completion of the filing of briefs by the parties, as set
forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such cases, the appellant shall
serve a notice upon the clerk of the district court,
simultaneous with the filing of appellant's reply brief with
the Clerk of the Supreme Court, of the date in which
appellant's reply brief was filed; if appellant does not
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk
of the district court of that fact within 30 days of the
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filing of respondent's brief with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court.
..
(B) All Other Civil Cases*
In all other civil cases
where the original papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties
shall file with the clerk of the district court, within 10
days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate
designation of those papers referred to in their respective
briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to
the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the Clerk of
the Supreme Court by the clerk of the district court:
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure;
(ii)

the pretrial order, if any;

(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order
from which the appeal is taken;
(iv)

other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;

(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or
conclusions of law filed or delivered by the trial court;
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda
upon which the court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

jury instructions given, if any;
jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
the notice of appeal.

(e) The Transcript of Proceedings; Duty of Appellant
Order, Notice to Respondent if Partial Transcript is Ordered.

to

(1) Request for Transcript; Time for Filing. Within 10 days
after filing the notice of appeal the appellant shall request from
the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not
already on file as he deems necessary. The request shall be in
writing and within the same period a copy shall be filed with the
clerk of the district court. If no such parts of the proceedings
are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall
file a certificate to that effect.
(2) Transcript Required of all Evidence Regarding Challenged
Finding or Conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to
the evidence, he shall include in the record a transcript of all
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion*
amo»-00SLdiJ
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(3) Statement of Issues; Cross-Designation by Respondent.
Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant
shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a
statement of the issues he intends to present on the appeal and
shall serve on the respondent a copy of the request or certificate
and of the statement. If the respondent deems a transcript of
other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, he shall, within
10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a
designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10
days after service of such designation the appellant has requested
such parts, and has so notified the respondent, the respondent may
within the following 10 days either request the parts or move in
the district court for an order requiring the appellant to do so.
(4) Payment of Reporter. At-the time of the request, a party
shall make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter for payment
of the cost of the transcript.
(f) Agreed Statement as the Record on Appeal. In lieu of the
record on appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this Rule, the
parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case showing how
the issues presented by the appeal arose and were decided in the
district court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred
and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth,
it, together with such additions as the court may consider
necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall
be approved by the district court and transmitted by the district
court clerk to the Clerk of the Supreme Court as the record on
appeal within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The index
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court by the clerk of the
district court upon approval by the district court of the
statement.
(g) Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings When no Report
was Made or When the Transcript is Unavailable. If no report of
the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if
a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement
of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means,
including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the
respondent, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto
within 10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any
objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the
district court for settlement and approval and as settled and
approved shall be included by the clerk of the district court in
the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or Modification of the Record.
If any
difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
amc'H408.chd
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occurred in the district court, the difference shall be submitted
to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the
truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the
record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties
by stipulation, or the district court, or the Supreme Court, either
before or after the record is transmitted to the Supreme Court, on
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the
omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a
supplemental record be certified and transmitted.
The moving
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall
serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within
10 days after service any party may serve objections to the
proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content
of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court.
Rule 12.

Transmission of the Record.

(a) Duty of Reporter to Prepare and File Transcript; Notice
to Supreme Court. Upon receipt of a request for a transcript, the
reporter shall acknowledge at the foot of the request the fact that
he has received it and the date on which he expects to have the
transcript completed and shall transmit the request, so endorsed,
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. If the transcript cannot be
completed within 30 days of receipt of the request the reporter
shall seek an extension of time from the Clerk of the Supreme Court
and the action of the Clerk shall be entered on the docket and the
parties notified. In the event of the failure of the reporter to
file the transcript within the time allowed, the Clerk of the
Supreme Court shall notify the district judge and take such other
steps as may be directed by the Supreme Court including but not
limited to an order relieving the reporter of his regular duties
until such time as the transcript is completed. Upon completion
of the transcript the reporter shall file it with the clerk of the
district court and shall notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court that
he has done so.
(b) Transmittal of Record on Appeal to Supreme Court; Duty
of District Court Clerk
(1) Duty of District Court Clerk in Criminal Cases.
In
criminal cases, all of the original papers and the index prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(b) will be transmitted by the clerk of the
district court to the Clerk of the Supreme Court upon completion
of the transcript under paragraph (a) above, or if there is no
transcript, within 20 days of the filing of the notice of appeal.
(2) Duty of District Court Clerk in Civil Cases. In civil
cases, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, the record
shall remain in the custody of the district court clerk during the
preparation and filing of briefs. When the transcript is completed
pursuant to paragraph (a) above for purposes of the appeal, the
amc-H-008.chd
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clerk of the district court shall forthwith transmit a certified
copy of the index prepared pursuant to Rule 11(b) to the Clerk of
the Supreme Court. Within 20 days from the date of receipt of the
notice of appellant pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(A) or within 20 days
of receipt of the designations from all parties to the appeal
pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(B), the clerk of the district court shall
forthwith transmit to the Clerk of the Supreme Court the papers,
transcript and exhibits in the appeal.
(3) Transmission of Exhibits. Documents of unusual bulk or
weight, and physical exhibits other than documents shall not be
transmitted by the clerk unless he is directed to do so by a party
or by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. A party must make advance
arrangements with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of
exhibits of unusual bulk or weight*
(c) Retention of the Record in the District Court by Order
of Court. If the record or any part therein is required in the
district court for use there pending the appeal beyond the time set
forth in paragraph (b) hereof, the district court may make an order
to that effect, and the clerk of the district court shall retain
the record or parts thereof subject to the request of the Supreme
Court, and shall transmit a copy of the order and of the index
together with such parts of the original record as the district
court shall order and copies of such parts as the parties may
designate*
(d) Stipulation of Parties that Parts of the Record Be
Retained in the District Court.
The parties may agree by written
stipulation filed in the district court that designated parts of
the record shall be retained in the district court unless
thereafter the Supreme Court shall order or. any party shall request
their transmittal. The parts thus designated shall nevertheless
be a part of the record on appeal for all purposes.
(e) Record for Preliminary Hearing in Supreme Court.
If
prior to the time the record is transmitted a party desires to make
any motion in the Supreme Court, the clerk of the district court
at the request of any party shall transmit to the Supreme Court
such parts of the original record as any party shall designate.
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RULES OP THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
(1986)
Rule 11•

The Record on Appeal

(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers
and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of
proceedings, if any, and the index prepared by the clerk of the
district court shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.
However with respect to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed
under Paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of the record. Immediately upon
filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the district court
shall prepare an index of all the original papers filed in the
district court, and shall paginate those papers in chronological
order.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal,
the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is taken,
each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of Paragraphs (d)
and (e) of this rule and shall take any other action necessary to
enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the record. A single
record shall be transmitted.
(d)

Papers and exhibits on appeal.

(1) Criminal cases. All of the original papers in a criminal
case shall be included by the clerk of the district court as part
of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain
in the custody of the clerk of the district court, as set forth in
Rule 12(b)(2), during prepaxation and filing of briefs.
The district court clerk shall establish rules and procedures
for checking out the record, after pagination, for use by the
parties in briefing.
(A) Civil cases with short records.
In civil cases
where all the original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all
of the original papers will be transmitted to the Supreme
Court upon completion of the filing of briefs by the parties,
as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such cases, the appellant
shall serve a notice upon the clerk of the district court,
simultaneous with the filing of appellant's reply brief with
the clerk of the Supreme Court, of the date in which
appellant's reply brief was filed; if appellant does not
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk
amc-M-OO&chd
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of the district court of that fact within 30 days of the
filing of respondent's brief with the clerk of the Supreme
Court.
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases
where the original papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties
shall file with the cleric of the district court, within 10
days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate
designation of those papers referred to in their respective
briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to
the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of
the Supreme Court by the clerk of the district court:
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure;
(ii)

the pretrial order, if any;

(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order
from which the appeal is taken;
(iv)

other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;

(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or
conclusions of law filed or delivered by the trial court;
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying
upon which the court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

memoranda

jury instructions given, if any;
jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any:
the notice of appeal.

(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant
order; notice to respondent if partial transcript is ordered.

to

(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days
after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from
the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not
already on file as the appellant deems necessary.
The request
shall be in writing, and within the same period, a copy shall be
filed with the clerk of the district court and the clerk of this
court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested,
within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to
that effect with the clerk of the district court and a copy thereof
with the clerk of this court.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal
amc-^OOSxhd
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that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to
the evidence, he shall include in the record a transcript of all
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by respondent.
Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant
shall, within 20 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a
statement of the issues he intends to present on the appeal and
shall serve on the respondent a copy of the request or certificate
and of the statement. If the respondent deems a transcript of
other parts of the proceedings to be necessary/ he shall within 10
days after the service of the request or certificate and the
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a
designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10
days after service of such designation the appellant has requested
such parts, and has so notified the respondent, the respondent may
within the following 10 days either request the parts or move in
the district court for an order requiring the appellant to do so.
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party
shall make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter for payment
of the cost of the transcript.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the
record on appeal as defined in Paragraph (a) of this rule, the
parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case showing how
the issues presented by the appeal arose and were decided in the
district court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred
and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth,
it, together with such additions as the court may consider
necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall
be approved by the district court and transmitted by the district
court clerk to the clerk of the Supreme Court as the record on
appeal within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2).
The index
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court by the clerk of the
district court upon approval by the district court of the
statement.
(g) Statement of the evidence or proceedings when no report
was made or when the transcript is unavailable. If no report of
the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if
a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement
of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means,
including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the
respondent, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto
within 10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any
objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the
district court for settlement and approval and as settled and
approved shall be included by the clerk of the district court in
the record on appeal.
amc-*'0<XLchJ
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(h) Correction or modification of the record.
If any
difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the district court, the difference shall be submitted
to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the
truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the
record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties
by stipulation, or the district court or the Supreme Court, either
before or after the record is transmitted to the Supreme Court, on
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the
omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a
supplemental record be certified and transmitted.
The moving
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall
serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within
10 days after service any party may serve objections to the
proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content
of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court. (Amended,
effective April 20, 1987.)
Rule 12.

Transmission of the record.

(a) Duty of reporter to prepare and file transcript; notice
to Supreme Court. Upon receipt of a request for a transcript, the
reporter shall acknowledge at the foot of the request the fact that
he has received it and the date on which he expects to have the
transcript completed and shall transmit the request, so endorsed,
to the clerk of the Supreme Court. If the transcript cannot be
completed within 30 days of receipt of the request the reporter
shall seek an extension of time from the clerk of the Supreme Court
and the action of the clerk shall be entered on the docket and the
parties notified. In the event of the failure of the reporter to
file the transcript within the time allowed, the clerk of the
Supreme Court shall notify the district judge and take such other
steps as may be directed by the Supreme Court including but not
limited to an order relieving the reporter of his regular duties
until such time as the transcript is completed. Upon completion
of the transcript the reporter shall file it with the clerk of the
district court and shall notify the clerk of the Supreme Court that
he has done so.
(b) Transmittal of record on appeal to Supreme Court; duty
of district court clerk.
(1) Duty of district court clerk in criminal cases.
In
criminal cases, all of the original papers and the index prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(b) will be transmitted by the clerk of the
district court to the clerk of the Supreme Court upon completion
of the transcript under Paragraph (a) above, or if there is no
transcript, within 20 days of the filing of the notice of appeal.
(2)

Duty of district court clerk in civil cases.

amc~*v006xhd
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In civil

cases, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, the record
shall remain in the custody of the district court clerk during the
preparation and filing of briefs• When the transcript is completed
pursuant to Paragraph (a) above for purposes of the appeal, the
clerk of the district court shall forthwith transmit a certified
copy of the index prepared pursuant to Rule 11(b) to the clerk of
the Supreme Court. Within 20 days from the date of receipt of the
notice of appellant pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(A) or within 20 days
of receipt of the designations from all parties to the appeal
pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2)(B), the clerk of the district court shall
forthwith transmit to the clerk of the Supreme Court the papers,
transcript and exhibits in the appeal.
(3) Transmission of exhibits. Documents of unusual bulk or
weight, and physical exhibits other than documents shall not be
transmitted by the clerk unless he is directed to do so by a party
or by the clerk of the Supreme Court. A party must make advance
arrangements with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of
exhibits of unusual bulk or weight.
(c) Retention of the record in the district court by order
of court. If the record or any part therein is required in the
district court for use there pending the appeal beyond the time set
forth in Paragraph (b) hereof, the district court may make an order
to that effect, and the clerk of the district court shall retain
the record or parts thereof subject to the request of the Supreme
Court, and shall transmit a copy of the order and of the index
together with such parts of the original record as the district
court shall order and copies of such parts as the parties may
designate.
(d) Stipulation of parties that parts of the record be
retained in the district court. The parties may agree by written
stipulation filed in the district court that designated parts of
the record shall be retained in the district court unless
thereafter the Supreme Court shall order or any party shall request
their transmittal. The parts thus designated shall nevertheless
be a part of the record on appeal for all purposes.
(e) Record for preliminary hearing in Supreme Court.
If
prior to the time the record is transmitted a party desires to make
any motion in the Supreme Court, the clerk of the district court
at the request of any party shall transmit to the Supreme Court
such parts of the original record as any party shall designate.
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE OF SUPREME COURT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
These Rules provide for appellate procedure and practice
before the Supreme Court of Utah in all cases, civil and criminal,
and are effective the 1st day of January, 1985. The Rules have
been promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
rule-making power under 78-2-4 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
Simultaneous with the effective date of these Rules, the prior
rules concerning appellate procedure and practice before the
Supreme Court, Rule 54(d)(3) and (4), Rules 65B(g) and Rules 7276, with the exception of Rule 73(h) through (1), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (hereinafter "URCivP"), inclusive, are repealed.
Rule 73(h)-(l) URCivP governing appeals from a justice court to a
district court are not repealed and remain in force and effect.
It is recognized that in the transition from the prior rules
to these new appellate rules, some problems may be encountered with
respect to those cases that are in the course of appeal on the
effective date of these Rules. It is intended that unless there
is substantial prejudice in a particular case which results from
the application of or compliance with these Rules, the Rules shall
govern as of the effective date, all appellate procedure and
practice in civil and criminal cases before the Supreme Court,
including cases presently in process. If a claim of hardship or
prejudice is claimed to exist as to a transitional case,
application for appropriate relief may be made to the Supreme Court
or to the Clerk of the Court on an ad hoc basis.
In general, Rules 1 through 13 govern appeals from district
courts and juvenile courts of the State to the Supreme Court; Rules
14 through 18 govern appeals to and reviews by the Supreme Court
from the orders and decisions of administrative agencies,
commissions and boards; Rules 19 and 20 govern extraordinary writs
before the Supreme Court; and rules 21 through 39 govern filing
and service, computation of time, motion practice, briefs, oral
argument, decision of the Court, costs, petitions for rehearing,
discipline, and other general provisions of practice and procedure
before the Supreme Court.
These Rules follow the general format of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "FRAP")•
However there are
significant departures, both philosophical and practical, from the
federal rules at points where it was determined that the adopted
provisions better achieved the objectives of appellate practice or
were more applicable to practice before the Supreme Court of Utah.
The Advisory Committee Notes, while not promulgated or
formally adopted by the Supreme Court, may be used as a guide to
and for appropriate references in the construction of the Rules.
amc-*-008.chd
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Whitehead v. Americ t Motors Sates Corp.
101 Utah -

~-

*. Rep. 27
2H
was merely incidental that he chose to make ration and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep)
appeal a judgment awarded plaintiff Stephen
them from his home.
We hold that the "coming and going rule" is Whitehead on a products liability claim.
On October 16, 1979, Deborah Whitehead
applicable in cases involving third-party
negligence claims. Where a third party is was driving south on I-15 near Orem, Utah,
seeking to hold an employer vicariously liable, in a 1972 Jeep Commando that she had borthe employee must be in the "course and scope rowed from her father. Her husband, Stephen,
of his employment," that is, he must be acting was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant
to benefit his employer and subject to his Larry Anderson was returning home from
control. The trial court erred in ruling that work in his automobile, a short distance
Anderson was in the course and scope of his behind the Whiteheads. The Oldsraobile
employment at the time of the accident as a station wagon he was driving was traveling
matter of law. The order directing a verdict in approximately fifteen miles per hour faster
favor of plaintiffs and Anderson is reversed, than the Commando. The Oldsmobile struck
and the case is remanded to enter judgment in the Commando on the left rear corner; the
favor of VALIC in accordance with the jury Commando went out of control and rolled.
Stephen Whitehead suffered a spinal injury
verdict.
and was rendered a paraplegic.
Plaintiffs Deborah and Stephen Whitehead
WE CONCUR:
filed their original complaint on November 21,
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
1979, naming Anderson as defendant. The
Christine M. Durham, Justice
complaint was later amended, adding AndeMichael D. Zimmerman, Justice
rson's employer, Variable Annuity Life InsStewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
urance Company,1 and AMC and Jeep as
defendants.
L AMC/Jeep was held liable for the remaining 70
During the nearly four years between the
percent because of the negligent design of the 1972
filing
of the original complaint and the begiJeep Commando in which plaintiffs were riding.
AMC/Jeep has filed a separate appeal, No. 19695, nning of trial, the parties engaged in extensive
discovery. Plaintiffs propounded three sets of
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, which we also decide today.
interrogatories to AMC/Jeep. Their failure to
timely answer the interrogatories brought
motions by plaintiffs to compel discovery.
AMC/Jeep's answers, when received, proCue as
mpted a motion to strike as unresponsive and
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27
additional motions to compel discovery h~
IN THE SUPREME COURT
plaintiffs. A hearing on those motions v
held on October 29, 1982, where Judge S«-reOF THE STATE OF UTAH
nsen2 went through the interrogatories and
Stephen WHITEHEAD and Deborah
answers. He modified some of the questions,
Whitehead,
gave orders for supplemental answers to be
given, and stated that if the answers stood as
Plaintiffs and Appellee,
given, he would sustain objections to evidence
v.
not conforming with the answers. Plaintiffs
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES
orally asked for sanctions against AMC/Jeep
CORPORATION and Jeep Corporation,
for failure to cooperate in discovery. While no
Larry Anderson, Variable Annuity Life
formal motion was made and no order for
Insurance Company,
Defendants and Appellants.
sanctions was ever issued, plaintiffs did file a
motion in limine after the supplemental
answers were filed seeking to prohibit AMC/
No. 19695
FILED: February 2, 1989
Jeep from introducing evidence pertaining to
the subjects of certain interrogatories. The
FOURTH DISTRICT
court reserved ruling on the motion until the
Honorable J. Robert Bullock
evidence was offered.
Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine on
ATTORNEYS:
October 7, 1983, regarding the admissibility of
C. Keith Rooker, Patricia W. Christensen,
a film produced by Dynamic Science that
Thomas B. Green, Salt Lake City, for
showed Jeep CJ-5s rolling over in staged
Appellants
tests. Upon a prescreeninng of the film and
Jackson Howard, Richard B. Johnson, Provo, over AMC/Jeep's objection, the judge ruled
for Appellee
that the film was admissible. Plaintiffs also
moved to exclude all evidence as to the availHOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
ability and their nonuse of seat belts. After
Defendants American Motors Sales Corpo- reviewing memoranda of the parties and proffers of proof, the court barred references to
the availability or nonuse of seat belts.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.
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American Motors Sales Corporation filed its
answer to the complaint in September 1983,
over three years after being named in the
amended complaint and just one month prior
to the trial. It raised Utah Code Ann. §7815-3(1) (1987) as a defense. This statute bars
the bringing of a products liability action
"more than six years after the date of initial
purchase for use or consumption.9 Jeep Corporation moved to amend its answer to also
include this defense; the motion was denied.
Trial commenced on October 19, 1983, and
continued for three weeks. The jury determined that AMC and Jeep were negligent in the
design of the vehicle and awarded damages to
Stephen Whitehead. AMC and Jeep appeal,
raising several issues which we will separately
consider.

CODE«CO
Pruwa. Utah

steering and handling characteristics than the
Commando. Defendant also objected on
grounds that the tests were not substantially
similar to the accident conditions. The tests
were * J turns" where 588 degrees of steering
were suddenly input while a constant vehicle
speed was maintained. The test vehicles had
also been "specially prepared" to accentuate
the rollovers depicted in the films. The requirement of "substantial similarity of conditions" does not require absolute identity;
however, they must "be so nearly the same in
substantial particulars as to afford a fair
comparison in respect to the particular issue to
which the test is directed." Illinois Central
GulfR.IL v. Ishee, 317 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss.
1975) (emphasis added). The films here were
offered to show the handling characteristics of
the Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs' experts testI.
ified at length that the handling characteristics
Defendants contend that they should have of the CJ-5s shown in the tests and the
been allowed to interpose a defense based on Commando were substantially similar. DefeUtah Code Ann. §78-15-3 (1987), which ndants by cross-examination and presentaprovides that product liability actions are tion of their own evidence endeavored to bring
barred if brought "more than six years after out the differences between the test and the
the initial purchase/ In Berry arreL Berry v. accident and between the vehicle tested and
Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), we the vehicle in question.
held that statute to be unconstitutional; therGiven our standard of review of the admiefore, defendants'point is moot.
ssibility of evidence at trial, we cannot dearly
say that the trial court abused its discretion in
n.
Defendants contend that the court erred in admitting plaintiffs' films in light of the
admitting plaintiffs' films of Jeep CJ-5s. In foundation laid by their experts. As the trial
reviewing questions of admissibility of evid- court stated in admitting the films, any diffeence at trial, deference is given.to the trial rences between.the tests and the accident here
court's advantageous position; thus, that would go to the weight the jury would give the
court's rulings regarding admissibility will not evidence. Jones v. Stemco Mfg. Co., 624 P.2d
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 1044, 1046 (Okla. 1981); see Lopez v. Allen,
Bollock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 96 Idaho 866, ,871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175
1975); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 (1975).
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985); sec also Collins v.
III.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.
Defendants next contend that the trial court
1977).
erred in limiting their cross-examination of
The criteria for establishing the admissibility
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. While unduly
of crash test films, such as those in issue here,
harsh limitation pf a key expert witness can
are that the data be relevant, that the tests be
amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope
conducted under conditions substantially
of cross-examination is within the sound
similar to those of the actual occurrence, and
that its presentation not consume undue discretion of the trial court and should not be
amounts of time, not confuse the issues, apd disturbed absent a showing of abuse. Stare v.
not mislead the jury. Endicott v. Nissan Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); State v.
Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804
Rptr. 95 (1977); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of (1972); State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d
America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. 987 (1969); N.V. Maatschappij v. A.O. Smith
Rptr. 110 (1973); Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1978). In
F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981); Renfro Hosiery Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123
M2b Co. v. United Cash Register Co., 552 (Wyo. 1978), the Wyoming court held that it
F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); see Weaver v. Ford was prejudical error to refuse to allow crossMotor Co., 382 F.'Sujpp. 1068 (EJD. Pa. examination regarding a critical aspect of
1974), afVd, 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir. 1975) plaintiffs proof. There the court stated:
Having offered his expert opinion,
(without published opinion); see also Collins
the witness exposes himself to intv. BS. Goodrich, 558 F2d at 910.
errogation which ordinarily would
Defendants objected to admission of tests of
have no place in the crossCJ-5s on the basis that the CJ-5 has a 20examination of a factual witness,
inch shorter wheelbase, giving it different
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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but the expert exposes himself to
the most searching kind of investigation into his qualifications, the
extent of his knowledge and the
reasons for his opinion, including
the facts and other matters upon
which it is based.
/d. at 1133.
Defendants contend that there were several
instances where the trial court's limiting of
cross-examination prevented them from
examining the basis of opinions offered by
plaintiffs* experts. In his direct testimony,
plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Anderson, testified that
the Jeep Commando was defective because its
track width was narrow and its center of
gravity high, making it easily susceptible to
rollovers. He also testified concerning the
handling characteristics of Blazers, Chevy
C h c v e t t e s , and C J - 7 s . On crossexamination, he was asked:
Q: Are there other vehicles that
have the same track width?
Mr. Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant.
Court: Sustained on the grounds
it's irrelevant.
Q: Are there other vehicles that
have about the same center of
'
gravity?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Q: If you drive a three-quanerton pickup, is it the same as driving
a Honda Accord; handling, steering?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant.
./
CourU^ aed.
Q:
tHake another vehicle that
has'wider track width and lower
center of gravity, can it be rolled on
a level surface with driver (steering]
input?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Defendants contend that not allowing them to
cross-examine Anderson with regard to
characteristics of other vehicles and how they
would react under the conditions depicted in
plaintiffs* film left unchallenged the assertions
that track .width and center of gravity are the
essential characteristics in determining a
vehicle's rollover susceptibility and that Jeeps
are more dangerous than •other vehicles"
because their track width is narrower and their
center of gravity higher. Mr. Anderson had
been allowed to compare Jeeps with other
vehicles, including the Chevy Chevette, which,

-n
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contrary to the thesis of the dissenting
opinion, is not a utility vehicle. Defendant
should have been allowed to probe the comparisons Anderson made.
In testifying for plaintiff, Mr. Noettl,
another expert witness, testified: "It was very
difficult to turn a passenger car over/ On
cross-examination, he was asked the basis of
this opinion.
Q: What experience have you had
in trying to rollover [sic] a passenger vehicle?
Mr. Johnson: Object on the basis
of relevancy.
Court: I don't want to get into
testing all other kinds of vehicles,
because we've got enough problems
with the one. So, I'm going to
sustain the objection.
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting
opinion, it is clear that by inquiring as to his
experience, defendants were attempting to
probe the expert's credibility and the foundation for his testimony that it is difficult to
roll a passenger car.
On recross-examination, Mr. Noettl was
also asked:
Q: I think we were talking about
what you would expect to happen
to the Commando or any other
vehicle that's hit under the circumstances you have been describing.
A: Yes.
Q: And do you feel that any
vehicle would come out of that situation unscathed, basically?
Plaintiffs objection to this question was, also
sustained.
An assertion or opinion given. on direct
testimony that bears on a key issue in the case
is a proper subject of cross-examination.
While the trial court's attempt to avoid confusion of the issues and a long and cumbersome trial, is understandable, defendants were
entitled to conduct cross-examination into
the basis of the opinions offered by plaintiffs'
expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons
they had made on direct examination.
. Here defendants were repeatedly cut off
during their attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs* experts. The numerous , objections. of
plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were improperly sustained, prevented defendants from
probing the basis of opinions given by plaintiffs' experts on comparisons they had made
in their direct examination. As a result, the
issues were presented to the jury without the
added light that thorough cross-examination
sheds. We find therefore that the trial court
erred in limiting defendants* crossexamination of plaintiffs', expert witnesses.
The trial court did not limit those experts to
comparisons to utility vehicles on their, direct
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examination. Hence cross-examination
should not have been so restricted.
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could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in
the presentation of their case. The trial court
IV.
erred in excluding the film on the basis that
Defendants also contend that the trial court
defendants had failed to comply with orders
erred in excluding certain films and exhibits
regarding discovery.
offered by them as evidence. They called a
Defendants offered a second film in conjuMr. Heitzman as an expert witness to testify
nction with Heitzman's testimony. This film
regarding the handling characteristics of Jeep
showed non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically
vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s
induced rollovers similar to those shown in
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers.
plaintiffs* film. After excluding defendants*
Plaintiffs objected on the ground that the
first film for failure to produce it in discovery,
introduction of the film violated previous
the trial court ruled that this second film was
orders of the court regarding discovery. The
not admissible, stating:
objection was sustained.
Now, the other one rests on a difPlaintiffs had submitted interrogatories
ferent principle, I think. And the
seeking any testing Jeep had done regarding
question that I have there is, the
the handling characteristics of the 1966-73
relevancy of it and whatever else
Jeep Commando. At a hearing on plaintiffs'
you might want to raise.
motion to compel discovery, Judge Sorenson
ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory The evidence was offered to rebut the tests
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arg- shown on plaintiffs* films and to demonstrate
uments in chambers on the admissibility of the that there was no design defect in the Comfilm, the court ruled:
mando because virtually any vehicle would roll
when subjected to such tests.
I think that in the context of all the
We have no quarrel with the rule of law
circumstances and with respect to
relied
upon in the dissenting opinion that
discovery procedures ... I think the
"evidence of the condition of other products is
plaintiffs were entitled to have, or
irrelevant and not admissible to establish a
see, the films and test results before
defect in a particular product." This is a
trial pursuant to their discovery
sound rule when properly applied as it was in
interrogatories ... , the films are not
the cases cited in the dissenting opinion. For
admissible.
example, in Clark v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry.,
The trial court can exclude evidence that vio- 197 Mich. 489, 163 N.W. 964 (1917), a
lates discovery orders under rule 37 of the rowboat rented from the defendant capsized,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, causing four minors to drown. The Michigan
defendants point out that the discovery court held that it was error to attempt to
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep prove the unseaworthiness of the capsized boat
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep by admitting evidence of the various conditCJ-5. The film, simply is not covered by the ions of repair of the other boats kept for hire
language of the interrogatory. Although plai- by the defendant.
ntiffs' experts were allowed at trial, over
Similarly, in Detroit, T.& L R.R. v.
objections of defendants, to show films of CJBanning, 173 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert, denied,
5s based on their foundational testimony that
338 U.S. 815 (1949), also cited in the dissenits handling was substantially similar to that of
ting opinion, the plaintiff, a railroad brakthe Commando, that ruling does not place the
eman, was injured while making a flying
film within the scope of material sought in the
switch. He brought suit against his employer
pretrial discovery request. The dissenting
railroad, contending that the boxcar in which
opinion would have defendants divine the
he was riding and which he was required to
scope of the requests by a trial court ruling on
slow down by applying a hand brake had been
the admissibility of evidence which came much
pushed too fast by the engine, making it
later. This burden cannot fairly be placed on
impossible for him to adequately slow down
them. The tests were not produced to show the
the boxcar, which was to couple with a stanhandling of the "66-73 Jeep Commando,"
ding car. At trial, plaintiff was allowed to
nor were they offered for that purpose. Deftestify that although he had previously made
endants maintained that the handling of the
twenty-five to thirty flying switches, none of
CJ-5 and the Commando were not the same.
them were made at a rate of speed as high as
The tests were offered to rebut evidence prethe one in which he was injured. On appeal,
sented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5 was defethe Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
ctive because of its handling characteristics.
was error to have admitted the plaintiffs
Although this evidence could have been excltestimony. Said the court:
uded on the basis of relevancy had the trial
No foundation was laid to show the
court earlier excluded plaintiffs' films, once
circumstances, distance, grade or
the court allowed plaintiffs to try their case on
other conditions of such previous
the basis of comparison with the CJ-5, it
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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conducting a drive-through of the accident
operations. We believe the testiscene, and the second showed the same vehicle
mony was improperly admitted.
with outriggers attached doing maneuvers in a
Several factors can affect the speed
parking lot. The trial court ruled that the first
at the time of impact, variable
part of the film was not probative of any
under different operations, irrespissue. We agree. The second part was excluded
ective of the initial speed given to
because the test was not made until after the
the free rolling cars. It is a welltrial had commenced, in violation of pretrial
established rule of evidence that
orders regarding discovery. Counsel for defecircumstances under which other
ndants stated that No. 174 was offered to
comparable conduct occurs should
show the handling characteristics of the 1972
be substantially similar. Wigmore
Commando. Clearly, it came within the scope
on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. II,
of plaintiffs* interrogatories and was properly
§§459, 460 [and citing other
excluded for failure to respond to discovery.
cases].
In conjunction with exhibit No. 174, the
Banning, 173 F.2d at 756.
trial
court viewed a film of a 1970 Ford in a
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced
films of Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this rollover test (exhibit No. 175). Defendants
opinion, we upheld the admissibility of those offered No. 175 to demonstrate the movement
films because of the substantial similarity of of vehicle occupants during a rollover. The
the vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle in trial court determined that the film was not
which plaintiffs were injured. However, plai- probative and excluded it. The film was dissntiffs in presenting their case did not stop imilar to the accident, was not necessary to
there. They produced several experts who rebut any evidence offered by plaintiffs, and
repeatedly in their testimony drew compari- was not probative of any disputed issue. There
sons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles was therefore no error in the exclusion of
to non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to defendants' exhibit No. 175.
Defendants' expert, Dr. Warner, offered
show that the Jeep in which they were riding
was of an unsafe design and had a tendency to exhibit No. 130, a storyboard, to illustrate his
roll much easier than other vehicles. For testimony that the vehicle in question had been
example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testi- involved in a prior accident that compromised
fied: "There is no doubt that this vehicle is the structural integrity of the roof. Plaintiffs'
much more prone to roll over than some counsel objected, claiming that the exhibit was
others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. not material. The trial court sustained the
Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to objection. Plaintiffs' experts had testified that
turn a passenger car over." Finally, Mr. the roof of the vehicle was defectively desiAnderson, another of plaintiffs' experts, tes- gned, thus contributing to plaintiffs' injuries.
tified that Jeep vehicles have "a delay in the Evidence illustrating how the roof had been
handling response" that is greater than S10 damaged in a prior accident was relevant to
Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule rebut this assertion. The trial court erred in
of law relied upon by the dissenting opinion, sustaining plaintiffs* objection to exhibit No.
that evidence of the condition of other prod- 130.
Defendants also offered exhibit No. 164, a
ucts is not admissible to establish a defect in a
particular product, it may be questioned series of five photographs showing live models
whether such comparisons should have been posed in a static vehicle to represent passenger
admitted because of the lack of similarity. movement in a rollover. This was offered to
However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts illustrate the testimony of Dr. Warner that the
were allowed to draw the comparisons between movement of the passengers, not the design of
the rollover propensities of Jeep and non- the vehicle, caused the injuries. The trial court
Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants initially admitted and then excluded the
should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove exhibit, stating:
the experience of plaintiffs* experts and to
The probative value is limited at
introduce into evidence the film showing nonleast because of the photographs
Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rolnot being representative of just
lovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs'
what did happen to the vehicles ...
film. This situation is wholly different from
or the people in them.
the situations in the two above cases relied While it is not clear whether the basis of the
upon in the dissenting opinion where the pla- trial court's ruling was relevance, Utah R.
intiff was not allowed to make comparisons Evid. 401, or that the probative value was
when the circumstances were dissimilar.
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
The third film that defendants claim was confusion of the issues, etc., Utah R. Evid.
wrongfully excluded was offered as exhibit 403, we will uphold the trial court's ruling
No. 174, a video produced by defendants' where there is any valid basis to do so. State
expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two parts: v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).
the first showed a 1972 Jeep Commando Here the trial court could have properly exd-
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uded the evidence under either theory; therefore, we find no error in the exclusion of
exhibit No. 164.
V.
Defendants also contend that the trial court
erred in excluding all references to the availability of seatbelts and plaintiffs' failure to
use them. Plaintiffs made a motion in limine
to exclude all evidence of seatbelts. The trial
court excluded such evidence, stating:
[T]o speculate what the seatbelt
might have done in this type of
situation is just something that the
jury ought not to, and they will not
have, under my ruling, the obligation to consider .... I want no more
evidence in this case with regard to
seatbelts.
Defendants contend that the evidence of seatbelts was relevant and necessary to show (1)
that their presence was a factor the jury
should consider when determining if the
vehicle* was unsafe as designed, and (2) that
plaintiffs' injuries could have been prevented
or lessened by the use of seatbelts arid therefore the jury should be allowed to determine
whether plaintiffs* duty of ordinary care or
their duty to mitigate damages required them
to wear seatbelts.
We agree that evidence of how the presence
of seatbelts affected the design safety of the
vehicle should be admitted. However, the bulk
of defendants' proffered evidence and the
main thrust of their argument regarding seatbelts was directed at plaintiffs' failure to use
them as constituting contributory negligence or
failure to mitigate, damages. The majority of
the cases cited in the briefs submitted to this
Court have rejected this approach. See Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont.
471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980) (for citations to
dther jurisdictions which have rejected this
approach). More persuasively, the legislature
has passed Utah Code Ann. §41-6-186
(1988), which provides:
The failure to wear a seat belt does
not constitute contributory or
comparative negligence and may not
be introduced as evidence in any
civil litigation on the issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of
damages.
Although this statute was passed subsequent to
the litigation sub judice and was therefore not
controlling at trial, we nonetheless decline to
place ourselves in the awkward position of
adopting a stance that is in direct contravention of express legislation. We therefore find
that the trial court did not err in excluding
evidence that the failure to use seatbelts constituted contributory negligence or failure to
mitigate damages.
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VI.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
states that error may not.be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected. In the instant case, the trial court erroneously excluded evidence offered by defendants. That evidence was necessary to rebut the
assertions that plaintiffs made to establish
liability. This error was compounded by
unduly restricting the scope of defendants*
cross-examination. Given the conflicting
testimony presented on this key issue, we
cannot say that the substantial rights of defendants were not affected by the combined
effects of the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the limitation of crossexamination. While no one error by itself
perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative
effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence that defendants were able to
present to the jury their theory of the case and
that a fair trial was had.
We therefore reverse and remand for a new
trial.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
1. Variable Annuity Life Insurance has filed a separate appeal on the issue of vicarious liability. See
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,
101 Utah Adv. Rep 24, decided also today.
2. Judge Sorensen, after hearing most of the pretrial
matters, retired and did not preside at the trial.
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting)
After a two- and one-half-week trial
which produced some 5,000 pages of transcript, a verdict was returned for plaintiff
Stephen Whitehead for damages produced by
the tragic and permanent injuries suffered in
the rollover of a Jeep Commando. The Court
reverses the jury verdict and judgment on the
basis of a few evidentiary rulings culled from
a host of such rulings. The Court holds that
the trial court erred in (1) limiting defendants*
cross-examination, and (2) excluding defendants' films. I submit that the trial court was
clearly correct and that, in any event, the
rulings fall within a trial judge's discretion.
For these reasons, I dissent.
I. LIMITATIONS OF DEFENDANTS*
CROSS-EXAMINATION
The majority holds that the trial court
improperly limited defendants' crossexamination of plaintiffs' experts. The majority cites three instances in which the trial
court "cut o f f defendants* attempts to crossexamine plaintiffs' experts and which prevented defendants from probing the basis of
opinions given by plaintiffs' experts.
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This Court has long held that the trial court
has considerable discretion in determining
whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough v.
Bcthers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). The
judgment of the trial court in admitting or
excluding evidence should not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion, and only when
the error is prejudicial. State v. Miller, 727
P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706
P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); Terry v. Zion's Coop.
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).
Generally, evidence of the condition of other
products is irrelevant and not admissible to
establish a defect in a particular product. See
Detroit, T. & /. R.R. v. Banning, 173 F.2d
752, 756 (6th Cir.), cerr. denied, 338 U.S. 815
(1949); Clark v. Detroit & M. Ry., 197 Mich.
489, 503, 163 N.W. 964, 968 (1917); 29 Am.
Jur. 2d Evidence §302, at 348 (1967); 32
C.J.S. Evidence §583, at 712 (1964). Thus, it
is irrelevant whether the Jeep Commando was
unreasonably dangerous compared with other
makes or models of automobiles generally.
The only relevant inquiry is the turnover
characteristics of the Jeep Commando and
other vehicles substantially similar to it."1
In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by ruling that the scope of crossexamination would include only comparisons
of vehicles with the same or similar characteristics as the Jeep Commando. The court,
during the course of the trial, reminded defendants' counsel that only evidence of similar
vehicles would be admitted:
The Court: I don't think Tve
prohibited any kind of cross examination with reference to vehicles
that had the same or similar characteristics; to-wit: center of gravity
and wheel width, that Jeep has.
Mr. Mandlebaum [attorney for
defendant AMC/JeepJ: -Well, I
may be incorrect. But I believe you
have, your Honor. 1 thought the
Court's ruling was that we could
not compare other vehicles.
The Court: No. The only ruling
that I have made with regard to
that, at least, at least that's my
intent, was that unless the vehicles
were similar, that I wasn't going to
permit you to compare them in
order to show that other vehicles
might be as dangerous as this
vehicle.
The majority now holds that the trial
court's limitations on cross-examination
interfered with defendants' ability to attack
the foundation of the opinions of plaintiffs'
expert witnesses. Defendant was allowed,
however, to introduce such evidence when it
was intended to go to credibility, as shown
below.
The majority cites three examples of the
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trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's crossexamination. The examples cited do not prove
that there was a limitation of crossexamination as to any "critical aspect of plaintiffs' proof." In light of the trial court's
ruling that only evidence of vehicles with the
same or substantially similar characteristics
would be admissible, evidence of other nonsimilar types of vehicles was inadmissible
absent some special relevancy.
Every ruling criticized by the majority was
in fact required by the court's pretrial ruling,
yet the majority does not even discuss the
validity of that ruling. Indeed, the majority's
view of this case would allow defendants to
delve into the rollover characteristics of every
single type of four-wheeled passenger vehicle
on the road. Such a ruling would have made it
virtually impossible to try this case. It is, of
course, self-evident that all four-wheeled
vehicles can be rolled over. Whether a vehicle
is defectively designed depends upon whether
the vehicle is dangerous when used under the
ordinary conditions of its intended use. That
should be determined by examining vehicles
that are designed for similar purposes, i.e.,
utility vehicles in this case, as the trial judge
ruled. In my view, the majority undermines
the trial judge's ability to manage a case such
as this by permitting defendant to explore on
cross-examination matters of highly attenuated relevancy.
The majority's first example of limitation
of cross-examination arises out of plaintiffs'
expert's testimony on direct examination
concerning the "handling characteristics of
Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7s." On
direct examination, the expert stated:
Q: And what type of handling
and maneuvering tests did you
perform last week?
A: Well, I had some instrument
tests that I performed on four different vehicles. I had a CJ-5, a CJ7, a small Blazer, the new F10 [sic]
size Blazer, and the Chevy Chev-.
ette.
Q: And what did the results show
in regard to your tests on the Jeep
itself?
A: Well, all the results are preliminary. I don't have all the data
reduced yet. But my preliminary
quick look at that data indicates
that the Jeep vehicles both overturn
at speeds of 20 to 25 miles an hour,
and they both have a delay in the
handling response that's in the
magnitude of a half a second before
the vehicle is stabilized to turn.
The other vehicles I tested, the
S10 Blazer and the Chevy Chevette,
they did not have delays of that
magnitude. They were much less.
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The majority cites the following, which occurred in the context of the above testimony, as
a limitation of cross-examination:
Q: Are there other vehicles that
have the same track widthMr. Howard (plaintiffs* counsel]:
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant.
Court: Sustained on the grounds
it's.irrelevant.
Q: Are there other vehicles that
have about the same center of
gravity?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's
irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Q: If you drive a three-quarterton pickup, is it the same as driving
a Honda Accord; handling, steering?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's
irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Q: (T]ake another vehicle that
has wider track width and lower
[center of gravity], can it be rolled
on a level surface with driver
[steering] input?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's
irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Defendants' attempted cross-examination of
plaintiffs* expert went far beyond the scope of
the trial judge's order limiting the evidence
and also beyond the scope of direct examination. There was no testimony on direct concerning the rollover propensities, track width,
or center of gravity of "other vehicles" in
general. The only testimony given on direct
examination related to the "handling response" time of the CJ-5, CJ-7, S10 Blazer,
and Chevy Chevette, all of which are utility
vehicles having general characteristics substantially similar to the Jeep Commando. I
submit that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination.
The second example cited by the majority of
improper limitation of cross-examination
occurred in the following exchange on defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs'
expert:
Q: What experience have you had
in trying to roll over a passenger
vehicle?
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object on the basis of relevancy.
Court: I don't want to get into
testing all other kinds of vehicles,
because we've got enough problems
with the one. So, I'm going to
sustain the objection.
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The cross-examination question above was
based on an assumption made by plaintiffs*
expert and found in the following direct examination:
Q: When you started out with
this particular test, did you know
exactly what speeds and what input
it would take to turn the CJ-5
over?
A: No, absolutely. It was just the
opposite. That the belief was, that
since it was very difficult to turn a
passenger car over, especially on a
flat surface at low speeds, that it
would be difficult to do this with a
Jeep, too.
As is evident from the above, plaintiffs*
expert did not purport to have experience in
testing or researching the rollover propensities
of "passenger cars," nor did he claim to have
experience in rolling vehicles other than the CJ5. He clearly stated that he started with the
belief that since it was difficult to roll a passenger car, it would also be difficult to roll a
CJ-5. The testimony on direct examination
only made passing reference to "passenger
cars." The focus of the examination clearly
was not on the rollover propensity of passenger cars, and the trial judge was clearly
within the ambit of reasonable discretion in
sustaining the objection on crossexamination.
Nevertheless, after sustaining the objection
as to "passenger cars," the court allowed
defendant AMC to cross-examine about
"utility vehicles" because of their substantial
similarity to the CJ-5 and the Jeep Commando:
Mr. Jensen [attorney for defendants]:
What about the vehicles similar
to the CJ-5; that is utility vehicles? The Scout, Landcruiser, and
that class of vehicles? The small
pickups, narrow and with equivalent center of gravity?
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object on the basis of relevance and
foundation. Outside the scope of
direct.
The Court: What is the relevance?
Mr. Jensen: Similar vehicles,
Your Honor.
The Court: The same width, the
same Mr. Jensen: Similar track width
and center of gravity i
The Court: You may answer.
Thus, there was no limitation on crossexamination about substantially similar vehicles.
The majority's third example of an impr-
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oper limitation of cross-examination, if read
in context, reveals that the judge sustained an
objection that went only to the form of the
question. Since a question that is barred
because of its form may always be rephrased,
and since defendants' question was not rephrased, it simply is not true that the trial court
limited cross-examination in this instance. In
the following testimony, the focus of crossexamination was on a direct, straight-on rearend collision to a vehicle without any lateral
forces:
Q: So would you expect that
vehicle to stay on the road?
A: Again, under a hypothetical
thing where you just have an impact
from the rear, no lateral forces are
put in, yes, it will stay right on the
road.
Q: No problem at all staying on
the road?
A: No problem at all.
Q: The driver just rides it out and
no problem?
A: Under those conditions I
described, yes. If you have no
lateral forces acting on the vehicle,
[no] side forces, the vehicle isn't
going to turn over.
Q: All right. That would apply
whether it's a Commando or some
other vehicle?
A: In my opinion, that's correct.
Q: All right. And what distance
would it take for a driver to get
that vehicle under control, and
could he do it within the width of
three lanes of the freeway?
Mr. Johnson: Outside the scope,
Your Honor. We object to it. Secondly, the facts of this case are
clearly lateral force. The evidence at
this point is uncontroverted that six
inches, the Oldsmobile hit six inches
of the Jeep on a specific corner. We
don't have a direct back input.
The Court: I'm going to take an
afternoon recess at this time. I'll
overrule your objection with respect
to it not being within the scope of
the direct examination. But I will
sustain it with regard to the form of
the question. And when we come
back you may go from there.
Q [By Mr. Jensen): Thank you,
Your Honor.
I think we were talking about
what you would expect to happen
to the Commando or any vehicle
that's hit under the circumstances
that you have been describing?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you feel like any
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vehicle would come out of that situation unscathed, basically?
Mr. Johnson: Your Honor, the
Court sustained the objection as to
the form of the question.
The Court: And I'll sustain the
objection to that question.
Besides asking about the effect of a direct rear
impact without lateral forces, the question was
ambiguous and too broad and, at the least,
should have been restated. The trial court
acted well within its discretion, and in any
event, the incident is unimportant to the
outcome of the trial.
In fact, full cross-examination of plaintiffs' experts' qualifications and experience
was allowed.2 For example, Mr. Jensen,
counsel for AMC/Jeep, cross-examined Mr.
Noettl, plaintiffs' expert, on his knowledge of
vehicle rollover literature. Mr. Noettl identified various tests, reports, and studies concerning vehicle rollover thresholds and vehicle
characteristics. Overruling plaintiffs' objection
to a question concerning the rollover propensity of big trucks, the court stated:
Overruled. It may or may not be.
I have not changed my ruling with
respect to other matters, in permitting him to go into this. This may
have something to do with credibility, veracity, accuracy, or whatever.
The cross-examination of Mr. Anderson,
another of plaintiffs* experts, also demonstrates that defendants were not prevented from
questioning an expert about his experience and
qualifications. .
This Court has ruled that counsel should
make clear to the trial judge the relevance of
cross-examination questions when an objection is sustained on relevancy grounds. State
v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986). See
also State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah
1986). In none of the present instances where
the majority rules that the trial court improperly sustained plaintiffs* objections to questions regarding other vehicles did defense
counsel state the relevance of those questions.
Absent an explanation of the relevance of the
line of inquiry, exclusion was properly called
for under the pretrial ruling, which certainly
was within the discretion of the court. If,
indeed, the point was to attack the foundation
of the expert's opinion-and not to confuse
the substantive issue of determining whether
the Commando was defective-that should
have been explained to the trial court. Otherwise, the trial court was certainly entitled to
assume that defendants sought to circumvent
the judge's ruling on relevancy.
II. EXCLUSION OF FILMS
The trial court's decision to exclude defendants' test films was also clearly within its
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discretion. One film portrayed non-Jeep
vehicles performing mechanically induced
rollovers in a manner somewhat similar to
those shown in plaintiffs' film. The court
ruled:
Pit's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant
because they involve other vehicles
which the jury would have to take
into consideration as to how it was
done, the comparisons, the whole
works.
And the other witnesses have seen
the Jeep film. And I've let him
testify with regard to his version of
those tests with regard to the Jeep.
I kept out the other because I
thought they were irrelevant on the
issue as to whether or not the Jeep
was defectively designed, and I still
think it is.
Because each of those tests are they have a — they're not all
exactly the same. You don't even
have the same vehicle. And we'd
t have to determine the reliability of
' the tests for each individual car or
automobile. And I'm not going to
lctthejurydothat.
Defendants argued before the trial court that
plaihtiffs had at least three different tests or
films in evidence showing different vehicles
making different maneuvers, all of which
involved different steering inputs at different
speeds. The judge responded that those tests
and films were admitted because expert testimony established that the vehicles depicted in
the films were substantially the same as the
Jeep Commando involved in this case:
The Court: That's the only reason.
The rest of them were out. And
- I'm going to keep them all out.
The majority holds that because plaintiffs*
experts were allowed to draw the comparisons
between the rollover propensities of Jeep and
non-Jeep vehicles, defendants should also
have been allowed to introduce a film of nonJeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rollovers. As stated earlier, evidence of the condition of* other products is generally not
admissible to prove a defect in a particular
product. See Banning, 173 F.2d at 756; Clark,
197 Mich, at 503, 163 N.W. at 968; 29 Am.
Jur. Evidence §302; 32 C.J.S. Evidence
§583. Such evidence is admissible, however,
when the products are substantially similar.
There is no evidence that defendants' film
showed vehicles which were substantially
similar. Plaintiffs' film, however, was of
vehicles substantially similar to the Jeep
Commando.
In addition, the majority rules that the trial

CODE•Co
Provo,Utah

court erred in excluding defendants' film of a
Jeep CJ-5 on the basis that it violated a
discovery order directing defendants to answer
an interrogatory that would have disclosed the
existence of the film. The majority stales:
"[Defendants point out that the discovery
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep
CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the
language of the interrogatory." I submit the
majority is simply in error in stating that the
interrogatory did not cover the film. The interrogatory directed defendants to "state
whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep
Corporation tested for or otherwise determined the handling characteristics and qualities
of said automobiles [Commandos] both during
the development and subsequently to the
initial production...."
The interrogatory specifically requested
information as to all tests, even those subsequent to production, to determine the handling characteristics and qualities of the Commando. Defendants' tests of the Jeep CJ-5
were, in fact,.used to determine the handling
characteristics and qualities of the Jeep
Commando, contrary to the assertion of the
majority that the films were not offered for
the purpose of showing the handling of the
'66-73. Commando. The CJ-5 was shown
by foundational testimony to be substantially
similar to the Jeep Commando. A vehicle is
substantially similar only if it has substantially
the same characteristics and qualities. The
interrogatory requested information concerning not only the subsequent testing of Commandos, but also the testing for, or otherwise
determining, the characteristics or qualities of
the Commando. Such testing included the CJ5 because it had,many of the same characteristics and qualities of a Commando. Otherwise, the CJ-5 film would have been irrelevant to defendants' case and inadmissible.3
The majority claims, however, that defendants were forced to "divine the scope of the.
requests by a trial court ruling on the admissibility of evidence which came much later."
Defendants were instructed, weeks before trial,
that they could cross-examine but were "not
to bring up new facts which were not given
plaintiffs' counsel in their response to interrogatories." Given the' purpose of submitting
the CJ-5 film-to show the characteristics
of the Commando—defendants had prior
notice and should not be able to influence the
outcome of this long and difficult case by
surprise. The tests of the CJ-5 clearly fell
within the scope of the interrogatory in question. The trial court properly excluded the test
film on the ground that defendants failed to
comply with discovery orders based on that
interrogatory. Sec Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1284-85 (Wyo.
1983) (exclusion of defendants' rollover film
for violation of discovery order was within
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broad discretion of trial court).
Finally, the majority opinion states that it
was improper for the trial court to exclude
exhibit No. 130, a story board illustrating
defendants' expert's testimony "that the
vehicle in question had been involved in a
prior accident that compromised the structural
integrity of the r o o f / This question goes more
to damages rather than liability. Its admissibility turned on a whole host of variables.
Determination of admissibility is in the trial
judge's discretion.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart.
1. The majority opinion concedes that only films
showing accidents of a similar nature are admissible
and that the trial court correctly excluded one of
defendants' films on this basis. However, the majority appears to reject the proposition that the scope
of both direct and cross-examination may be properly limited to similar vehicles.
2. On a related point, the majority accepts AMCs
contention that
not allowing them to cross-examine
Anderson with regard to characteristics
of other vehicles and .how they would
react under the conditions depicted in
plaintiffs* film left unchallenged the
assertions that track width and center of
gravity were the essential characteristics
in determining a vehicle's rollover susceptibility and that Jeeps were more
dangerous than other vehicles because
their track width was narrower and their
center of gravity higher.
That is not correct. Defendants elicited such evidence from its own expert witness, Edward Heitzman. Heitzman testified at length concerning the
factors that determine the susceptibility to rollover
of vehicles in general. Heitzman testified about
numerous other vehicles (including both utility
vehicles and passenger cars) which have a center of
gravity equal to or higher than the Jeep Commando.
Heitzman also testified extensively about the static
stability ratio, which was relied on by plaintiffs'
experts, to determine a vehicle's propensity to roll
over. In fact, Heitzman had a list of vehicles with
their static stability ratios which formed the basis
for his testimony regarding the comparison of the
Jeep with other vehicles. After extensive discussion,
the list itsdf was admitted into evidence.
3. Defendants claim now on appeal that "(i]t was a
film made in 1983 of a Jeep CJ-S and had nothing
to do with the 1972 Commando." (Emphasis in
original.) If that is true, we should affirm the trial
court's order on grounds of irrelevancy.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Julie Warren VERDE,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20954
FILED: February 3,1989
THIRD DISTRICT
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

.

ATTORNEYS:
Robert Van Sciver, Margo L. James, Salt .
Lake City, for appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Earl F. Dorius, Salt Lake
City, for appellee
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Julie Verde appeals from her
conviction, following a jury trial, of the
offense of the sale of a child. See Utah Code
Ann. §76-7-203 (1978). She daims, that
certain evidence was improperly admitted, that
the jury was improperly instructed, and that
there was insufficient evidence on one dement
of the crime. We affirm.
We recite the facts from the record on
appeal in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. Cf., e.g., State v. Booker, 709
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v.
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,769 (Utah 1985); Scharf
v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985); Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433,
436, 315 P.2d 867, 864 (1957) (all addressing
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence).
Verde met the State's chief witness, Tammy
Watson, at the physician's office where
Watson worked and. Verde was being treated. ^
After hearing that Watson had recently suffered a miscarriage, Verde approached her
about the possibility of arranging for the
private adoption of a third party's child.
Verde and Watson continued discussing the
proposed adoption on a regular basis from
Septemberof 1984 until February of 19&5,
-:
In these discussions, Verde indicated that
Watson should expect to incur medical, legal;
and other costs incident to the adoption
ranging between $2,500 and $5,000. During,
this period, Watson arranged to pay $80 to
$90 of Verde's medical care costs in return for
Verde's commitment to give her a "discount*
on the adoption expenses. Verde claimed that
she was in the process of setting up a private,
adoption agency and was working with a local
attorney. However, Verde presented no cocr-
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SALES CORPORATION, JEEP
CORPORATION,
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Defendants and appellants American Motors Sales Corporation
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants,

Case No. 19645

and
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION
and JEEP CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained
by plaintiffs on October 1G, 1979, when the vehicle in which
they were riding, a Jeep Commando, manufactured eight years
earlier in 1971, was struck from behind by defendant Larry
Anderson, causing plaintiffs' vehicle to roll over.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Anderson was negligent and
that he was in the course and scope of his employment with
defendant Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company at the time
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of the accident.

Plaintiffs later joined defendants Jeep

Corporation and American Motors Sales Corporation, claiming
that their vehicle, manufactured by defendant Jeep
Corporation in 1971 and originally marketed by defendant
American Motors Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year,
was defectively designed and therefore unreasonably dangerous
at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer.

See

Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts; Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following trial to a jury, the Fourth Judicial
Dis-crict Court in and for Utah County, Utah, J. Robert
Bullock, District Judge, presiding, entered judgment on the
jury verdict for the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead and against
all defendants in the total amount of $1,638,125.00.
Liability on the judgiaent was apportioned pursuant to further
findings by the jury that defendants Jeep Corporation and
American Motors Sales Corporation were 70% responsible for
the injuries sustained by Mr. Whitehead and that defendants
Anderson and Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company were 30%
responsible.

The claim of plaintiff Deborah Whitehead has

been dismissed with prejudice and is not an issue in this
appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants

American Motors Sales Corporation and

Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep") seek
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reversal of the trial court's judgment against them on the
grounds that the trial court made incorrect and prejudicial
rulings on questions of law and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence.

Indeed, AMC/Jeep contends that

the trial court abandoned any pretext of impartiality during
the course of the trial and that the jury was permitted to
hear only one side of this case.

Specifically, the trial

court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's
fundamental right: to cross-examine plaintiffs' witnesses; (c)
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by
excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence;
(d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based on improper closing arguments by opposing counsel; (e) in refusing
to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to
include a statute of limitations defense; (f) in refusing to
direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of their
statute of limitations defense; and (g) in excluding all
evidence relating to the presence of and plaintiffs' failure
to utilize available seat belts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Background Facts.

Sometime prior to 1966, the Kaiser-Jeep Corporation
designed and began to manufacture a vehicle called the Jeep
Commando.

In 1970, American Motors Corporation purchased all

outstanding shares of capital stock of Kaiser-Jeep
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Corporation from Kaiser Industries Corporation, and the name
Kaiser-Jeep Corporation was changed to Jeep Corporation.

(R.

219, 671). This litigation revolves around a particular Jeep
Commando manufactured by Jeep Corporation in December, 1971,
(T., 10/25/83, at 930; R. 2710), nearly eight years before
plaintiffs' accident, for sale by appellant American Motors
Sales Corporation during the 1972 model year, at least seven
years before plaintiffs' accident.
The Commando at issue in this case was purchased in
"used" condition by George Mollner of Orem, Utah in 1975 or
1976, (T., 10/19/83, at 336; R. 2105), Mr. Mollner made
several repairs and alterations to the Commando, (i-d./ at
336-338, 343, 347-355; R. 2105-2107, 2112, 2116-2124), and on
October 16, 1979, permitted his daughter, plaintiff Deborah
Whitehead, to use the Commando to move some household items.
(Id.., at 338; R. 2107).

Deborah Whitehead picked up her

husband, plaintiff Steven Whitehead, in American Fork, Utah,
and proceeded to drive him on Interstate 15 towards
Springville.

(.Id., at 375-376; R. 2144-2145).

After plain-

tiffs had been on the freeway for several miles, and while
they were traveling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour,
the Commando was struck from behind by another vehicle, an
Oldsmobile, driven by defendant Larry Anderson.
377-382; R. 2146-2147).

(rd., at

At the time it struck plaintiffs'

Commando, defendant Anderson's Oldsmobile was traveling at
the rate of 65 to 70 miles per hour; 15 miles per hour faster
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than plaintiffs.

(T., 10/20/83, at 552; R. 2327).

The

Oldsmobile struck the Commando on its left rear corner,
causing it to spin in a clockwise manner
2329).

(Id., at 556; R.

The Commando went out of control (T., 10/19/83, at

382; R. 2151), and eventually rolled over and came to rest in
the median.

(jCd., at 383; R. 2152).

During the course of

the accident, Deborah and Steven Whitehead sustained various
injuries, the most serious of which was a spinal chord injury
sustained by Steven Whitehead resulting in paraplegia.

(Id.,

at 447; R. 2216).
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint herein on
October 11, 1979, naming only Larry Anderson, the driver of
the car that struck the Commando from behind, as a defendant:.
(R. 7-8).

Plaintiffs subsequently added Anderson's employer,

Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company as a defendant, and
finally filed their Second Amended Complaint naming AMC/Jeep
on July 31, 1980.

(R. 84-07).

Jeep Corporation answered the

Second Amended Complaint on November 11, 1900.

(R. 113-114).

American Motors Sales Corporation answered the Second Amended
Complaint on September 12, 1983.
B.

(k. 993-995).

Pre-Trial Rulings.

Trial to a jury commenced on October 18, 1983.
day prior to that date, however, the trial couri made the
first in a series of

crucial, erroneous and prejudicial

evidentiary rulings which were to dictate the entire
three-week trial which followed.

On October 17, 1983, the
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One

trial court considered plaintiffs' Motion In Limine "to allow
the admissibility of a certain pictorial movie developed by
Dynamic Science, Inc. for the Insurance Institute of Highway
Safety", purporting to depict automobiles rolling over during
"normal" highway maneuvers.

(R. 1128-1129).

AMC/Jeep ob-

jected to the motion (R. 1200-1224) and to the admission of
the film on the grounds that:

(1) the Dynamic Science film

showed Jeep CJ5s and CJ7s rolling over, not Commandos;

(2)

the tests reflected in the film were conducted under conditions wholly dissimilar to the off-center rear-end collision
which led to plaintiffs' accident; and (3) plaintiffs offered
no foundation to show that the maneuvers depicted in the film
were in any way relevant to the issue before the court and
jury in this case.

AMC/Jeep further objected to the film on

the ground that it had been selectively edited to dramatize
the rollovers and to enhance the visual impact, destroying
the value of the film as demonstrative evidence.

For

example, the film showed anthropomorphic dummies, fully
dressed, being tossed about violently during a rollover.
There was no evidence that plaintiffs experienced similar
movement during their accident.

Finally, AMC/Jeep argued

The evidence showed that CJ5s have a wheel base 20 inches
shorter than the wheel base of a Commando. (T., 10/24/83, at
659, 672; R. 2436, 2449.) It was also clear that a longer
wheel base makes a vehicle more resistant to rollover. (Id.,
at 674-675; R. 2451-2452).
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that if plaintiffs were allowed to show the film raising the
inference that the non-Commando vehicles depicted in it were
"comparable" to a Commando, AMC/Jeep should similarly be
allowed to introduce evidence showing that, in fact, the
Commando's handling characteristics and resistance to
rollover compared favorably to other automobiles.

(T.,

Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 53-59; R.
4856-4861).

The trial court nevertheless rejected AMC/Jeep's

arguments against the Insurance Institute film and ruled that
any difference between the tests depicted in that film and
the actual events of plaintiffs' accident would go "to the
weight of it and not to the admissibility."

(I_d*/ ^t 60; R.

4863; see also j_d., at 62; R. 4365).
On the morning of October 18, 1983, just before the
trial began, the trial court also addressed plaintiffs'
Motion in Limine "to preclude the defendants or their
witnesses or attorneys from mentioning the subject of seat
belts or the use or nonuse of seatbelts at the trial of this
case."

(R. 1274-1294).

AMC/Jeep opposed the motion arguing

that (1) the failure of plaintiffs to utilize their seat
belts was relevant to the issues of comparative fault and
mitigation of damages, and (2) the presence of seat belts in
the Commando was relevant to the question whether the
Commando was defectively designed.

Here, as throughout the

trial, the trial court barred any comment on the presence of
or plaintiffs' failure to utilize the Commando's seat belts.
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(See also T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83,
at 88, 156? R. 4891, 4959).

(T., 10/18/83, at 12; R.

1763) .
C.

Plaintiffs' Case in Chief.

During the presentation of plaintiffs' case-inchief, Newell Knight was called as a witness for plaintiffs
to express an opinion as to the allegedly "defective" nature
of the accident vehicle-

(T., 10/20/83, at 541; R. 2314).

AMC/Jeep, anxious to assure that all such testimony would be
related to Commandos and that the jury not be misled into
believing that "a Jeep is a Jeep," attempted to limit the
testimony to the relevant characteristics of the Commando.
Beginning with Mr. Knight, however, the trial court embarked
on an erroneous course of permitting plaintiffs' expert
witnesses to lump all Jeep vehicles into the same evidentiary
ball,

(id., at 559-560; R. 2327-2328;

see especially id.,

at 559-559; R. 2331-2332; id^, at 560; R. 2333), thus
obscuring the unique characteristics of the Commando.
Plaintiffs then called LeRoy Maurice Shaw, a consultant in automotive safety.
2408).

(T., 10/24/83, at 631; R.

As plaintiffs' counsel began to delve into Mr. Shaw's

opinion about the Commando's handling characteristics,
AMC/Jeep elicited by way of voir dire that one of his basic
exhibits —

a mathematical prediction of the so-called "roll-

over threshold" of a Commando (Exhibit 56) —

was actually

based on information and data with respect to the Jeep CJ5
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and CJ7 -- not the Commando.
2457).

(Id^i at 672-679; R. 2450-

The trial court, nevertheless, admitted the evidence

over the objection of AMC/Jeep, (id., at 678; R. 2456), and
then exacerbated the error by unduly restricting the right of
AMC/Jeep to test Mr. Shaw's credibility by repeatedly sustaining objections to cross-examination into Mr. Shaw's
knowledge of the design period of the accident vehicle.
(Id., at 782-783; R. 2561-2562).
Similarly, through their "star" witness, Robert
Lloyd Anderson, plaintiffs were permitted to introduce two
additional films prepared at Dynamic Science showing Jeep
CJ5s, not Commandos, rolling over when subjected to extraordinary tests never encountered under normal driving conditions and certainly not encountered by plaintiffs during the
course of their accident.

AMC/oeep objected to the admission

of these films on the ground that they showed CJ5s, not
Commandos, rolling over as the result of mechanically-induced
maneuvers that bore no relation to the circumstances of
plaintiffs' accident.

One of the tests, for example,

showed

a CJ5 undergoing a maneuver in which 240 degrees of steer is
mechanically input into the vehicle in the span of 1.8
seconds while the speed of the vehicle is being artificially
maintained.

(T., 10/25/83, at 910; R. 2690)."

No attempt

2
Other maneuvers depicted in the films included a "test at
25 miles an hour and 180 degrees on the steering wheel. Then
we go up to 270 degrees. And the next turn is 360 degrees."
(T., 10/25/03, at 915-916; R. 2695-2700).
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was made to show any connection between the maneuvers
depicted in the film to the actual events of plaintiffs'
accident.

In fact, Mr. Anderson admitted that he had "no way

of knowing" what type of steering maneuvers were undertaken
by Mrs. Whitehead during the course of the accident.
at 957; R. 2737).

(Id.,

The trial court nevertheless overruled

AMC/Jeep's objection to the films, stating that "I'll let you
get at it any way you v/ant to by cross examination or
whatever.

But I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your

objection with respect to those films."

(j^d., at 109; R.

4912) .
The objectionable films were then shown to the jury
as exemplary of the handling characteristics of "CJ
vehicles."

(T., 10/25/33, at 906; R. 2676).

The plain and

intended implication was that the vehicles shown in those
films were similar to the Commando and that they demonstrated
the circumstances experienced by plaintiffs and the accident
vehicle at the time of the accident even though Mr. Anderson
admitted that he, in fact, had no way of knowing what
steering movements were made by plaintiffs immediately prior
to and during plaintiffs' accident.
2736-2737).

(j^*/ a t 956-957; R.

.

The ultimate point made by Mr. Anderson was that
the handling characteristics of "Jeeps", coupled with their
"rollover propensities", rendered the Commando involved in
this case unreasonably dangerous.

(JL^*' a t 897; R. 2677).
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Mr. Anderson also testified that other vehicles lie had
tested, the SIO Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, did not have
delays in handling response similar to those of a "Jeep",
(Icl., at 896; R. 2676), and that "most vehicles" would maintain control in situations similar to those experienced by
plaintiffs at the time of the accident.

(^Id., at 1039-1040;

R. 2818-2819).
In its cross-examination of Mr. Anderson, AMC/Jeep
attempted to rebut Mr. Anderson's characterization and implication that "Jeeps" are more dangerous than other
automobiles on the road by asking him: (1) whether other
vehicles would have gone out of control if subjected to
circumstances like those which caused plaintiffs' accident
(ici., at 963; R. 2743); (2) whether he thought that other
vehicles with similar track widths were also defective (id. ,
at 1001; R. 2780); (3) whether he thought other vehicles were
defective (_id. ) ; (4) whether other vehicles have the same
center of gravity as a Commando, (Id., at 1003; R. 2782); (5)
whether all convertibles are defective if they do not have
rollbars (id., at 1004; R. 2783); (6) whether he knows what
other vehicles will do when subjected to the tests shown in
the films (id., at 1005, 1018; R. 2784, 2797); and (7)
whether CJ5s have different suspensions than a Commando.
(.Id-/ at 1047; R. 2826).

In spite of previous assurances by

the trial court that AMC/Jeep would be permitted to crossexamine Mr. Anderson on these issues, (T., 10/25/83,
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Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, at 109; R. 4912),
however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objections to
these questions and precluded AMC/Jeep from pursuing its
cross-examination of plaintiffs' key expert witness.
The trial court's decision to admit films of CJ5s
to demonstrate the characteristics of a Commando combined
with the trial court's rigid restriction of AMC/Jeep's
cross-examination of Mr. Anderson led to AMC/Jeep's first
Motion for*Mistrial on October 26, 1983.

(T., Abstracts from

Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 123; R. 4926).

The grounds

for the Motion were that plaintiffs' experts had been allowed, without foundation, to declare the Commando unreasonably dangerous based (1) upon comparisons to other
vehicles undergoing maneuvers in no way related to the subject accident, (2) upon certain calculations derived from
tests of the CJ5, and (3) upon opinion testimony that "Jeeps"
roll over more easily than "other vehicles," while AMC/Jeep
had been barred from showing that the relevant
characteristics of Jeeps, in fact, compared favorably with
other vehicles.

(Icl. , at 117-123; R. 4920-4926).

The trial

court, nevertheless, denied the Motion for Mistrial stating
that "under the circumstances as they exist at this time in
this lawsuit, the evidence of what other vehicles do is
irrelevant."

(_Id., at 130; R. 4933).

The trial court later

attempted to justify its erroneous ruling as prohibiting
AMC/Jeep "from attempting to show that the subject Jeep in
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this case was safe by evidence which shows that other
vehicles not manufactured by Jeep are also unsafe."
10/26/33, at 1171; R. 2949).

(T.,

The trial court had, of course,

permitted plaintiffs' experts to compare "Jeeps" with
vehicles manufactured by others.

It was only when AMC/Jeep

sought to inquire further into that very comparative
testimony that the trial court concluded it was irrelevant.
In so ruling, the trial court did not even suggest to the
jury that the comparisons adduced by plaintiffs should not be
considered.

(Icl., at 60; R. 4863; see also JLd. at 62; R.

4865).
Plaintiffs' next expert witness was John N. Noettl.
Mr. Noettl, like Mr. Anderson, brought along a film showing
CJ5s rolling over.

Mr. Noettl's film, however, also showed

fully clothed anthropomorphic "dummies" being tossed about
during the testing.

AMC/'Jeep objected to this film on the

basis of its lack of relevance and its inflammatory nature,
(T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, 10/26/83, at 131133; R. 4934-4936), but after being shown in chambers on
October 26, 1983, (T., 10/26/83, at 1205; R. 2982), the trial
court ruled that it could be admitted.

As with all of plain-

tiffs' films, there was absolutely no foundation for the
implicit proposition that the maneuvers exhibited in the film
were related to the maneuvers experienced by the accident
vehicle during the accident.

Mr. Noettl was then permitted

to testify that the "Jeep" is easier to overturn than a
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"passenger car."

(_I_d., at 1262; R. 3039).

As was the case

with Mr. Anderson, however, AMC/Jeep's efforts to cross examine on this point were blocked by the trial court.

(Id.,

at 1266; R. 3043).
D.

AMC/Jeep's Case.

AMC/Jeep began its case on October 27, 1983.
Before AMC/Jeep called its chief expert, however, the trial
court heard plaintiffs' objections to two films to be introduced through that expert.

One film was of a CJ5 and was

intended to rebut plaintiffs' evidence purporting to prove
that CJ5s roll over under certain emergency situations.

The

film demonstrated the CJ5's stability when subjected to
extreme emergency situations.
1566; R. 3343, 3347-3343).

(T., 10/27/83, at 1561, 1565-

The second film was similarly

intended to rebut plaintiffs' theory that Jeeps roll more
often than other cars, or that Jeeps are the only vehicles
that would have rolled under the circumstances of the plaintiffs' accident.

Unlike plaintiffs, however, AMC/Jeep was

precluded from presenting its evidence, the court ruling that
neither film was admissible.

(I^»#

at

1571, 1576; R. 3353,

3358).
AMC/Jeep then proceeded to call Edward Heitzman, a
mechanical engineer with extensive experience in the field of
automobile safety.

(id./ at 1577-1587; R. 3359-3369).

Through Mr. Heitzman, AMC/Jeep attempted to introduce a film
showing non-Jeep vehicles undergoing certain maneuvers with
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"outriggers" attached,0

for the purpose of rebutting plain-

tiffs' film which had shown a Commando equipped with
"outriggers".

Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Anderson, had tes-

tified that but for the outriggers the Commando in his film
would have rolled over.
2706).

(T., 10/25/83, at 913-926; R. 2698-

Mr. Heitzman testified, however, that, in his

opinion, Mr. Anderson's film did not illustrate situations in
which the Commando would have rolled.
1674-1676; R. 3457-3459).

(T., 10/28/83, at

Mr. Heitzman would then have

utilized his film to illustrate to the jury the difference
between a vehicle with outriggers "rolling" and a similarly
equipped car not rolling.

The film would also have rebutted

plaintiffs' testimony that only Jeeps, as opposed to more
common vehicles, would roll over in emergency situations.
AMC\Jeep needed these films in order to illustrate Mr.
Heitzman's point that many types of vehicles —
Jeeps and certainly not just Commandos —

not just

subjected to the

conditions illustrated in plaintiffs' films will roll over.
The films would have shown that, in fact, other vehicles
subjected to the same type of tests would have rolled over.
(T., 10/28/33, at 1746-1750; R. 3529-3533).

The court,

however, refused to permit the introduction of appellants'

Outriggers are attached to a test vehicle in order to
restrain it from rolling over completely. An expert's eye
and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers
would have rolled over but for the outriggers. (T.,
10/23/83, at 1744; R. 3527).
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film "because it's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because
they involve other vehicles which the jury would have to take
into consideration as to how it was done, the comparisons,
the whole works

"

(Id., at 1746-1747, 1750; R, 3529-

3530, 3533).
AMC/Jeep then called Dr. Charles Warner, a
mechanical engineer and automobile accident consultant, to
reconstruct the accident and to give his opinion that the
characteristics of the Commando had nothing to do with the
extent of plaintiffs1 injuries, that virtually any automobile
would have roiled under the circumstances presented in this
case, and that the injuries suffered by plaintiffs were not
caused by the fact that the accident vehicle happened to be a
Commando.

A crucial aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his

study and reconstruction of the probable movements of
plaintiffs inside the vehicle during the course of the
accident.

(T., 10/31/83, at 1956-1961; R. 3743-3748).

In

support of this testimony Dr. Warner had prepared a series of
photographs demonstrating his opinion.
3748).

(.Id-/ at 1961; R.

The trial court, however, sustained plaintiffs'

objection to this demonstrative exhibit on the ground "that
the probative value is limited at least because of the
photographs not being representative of just what did happen
to the vehicles."

(Id., at 1967; R. 3754).

AMC/Jeep had, of

course, based many of its objections to plaintiffs' evidence
on precisely this ground.

The only difference was that the
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trial court overruled AMC/Jeep's objections but sustained
those made by plaintiffs.
Dr. Warner was next to testify with respect to
certain tests he performed on an exemplar vehicle —
Commando.

a

The film showed a Commando undergoing certain

emergency maneuvers with outriggers attached and would have
demonstrated that the Commando is a stable vehicle.

The film

would also have demonstrated Dr. Warner's opinion that the
Commando will remain upright when subjected to realistic
emergency situations.

AMC/Jeep also intended to introduce a

film, through Dr. Warner, demonstrating rollover and the type
of damage that typically occurs during rollover.
1976; 3764).

(lj3.-# at

The two films were shown in chambers (icl. , at

1979-1983; R. 3767-3771), plaintiffs objected to both, and
the trial court ruled that both were inadmissible on the
grounds that they were "not probative of any issues except
perhaps the test which was made ...."
3774).

(.Id- at 1986; R.

Again, no explanation was offered by the court as to

why plaintiffs' film —

which showed a Commando performing

certain extreme raaneuvers that one could reasonably expect to
encounter, but of course showed roll overs whereas the Warner
film showed none —

presented probative evidence while the

Warner film did not.
Dr. Warner was also asked to testify as to his
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs inside the
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Commando during the course of the accident to rebut plaintiffs' contention that the Commando's roof was defective and
that it had crushed during the course of the accident causing
plaintiff Steven Whitehead's back injury.
10/24/83, at 663-664; R. 2441-2442).

(See, e.g., T.,

The trial court,

however, excluded each and every exhibit offered to
demonstrate this testimony.

(T., 10/31/33, at 2009-2011; R.

3797-3799).
AMC/Jeep then made a proffer, in chambers, of Dr.
Warner's testimony with respect to plaintiffs' failure to use
seat belts.

Dr. Warner would have testified that had plain-

tiff Steven Whitehead

"been using the seat belt in all prob-

ability he would not have received the spinal injury that he
did receive."

(I_d., at 2018; R. 3806).

The trial court

again ruled, however, that no evidence of seat belts would be
admitted.

As the trial court put it:

"to speculate what the

seat belt might have done in this type of situation is just
something that the jury ought not do, and they will not have,
under my ruling, the obligation to consider. ... Therefore,
there will be no more evidence in this case with regard to
seat belts.
from there."

I want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll go
(id.., at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808).

Dr. Warner was next asked to express his opinion
with respect to the "buckling" experienced by the Commando
during the course of the accident.

Dr. Warner had examined

the actual accident vehicle and had prepared an exhibit that
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demonstrated his opinion that the Commando had been in a
prior accident.

It was Dr. Warner's opinion that the prior

accident had caused damage to the Commando which resulted in
a weakening of its structural integrity.

This weakening, he

concluded, in turn contributed to the damage suffered in the
accident.

(JCd., at 2024; R. 3812).

The trial court

sustained plaintiffs' objection to this demonstrative exhibit
as well, (id., at 2026; R. 3814), even though Dr. Warner had
actually testified without objection to all of the information in the exhibit.
E.

Closing Argument.

Finally, after a three-week trial during which the
record reflects plaintiffs were unrestrained in their presentation of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, AMC/Jeep was
severely restricted by the court's rulings limiting their
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses, virtually all of
AMC/Jeep's' demonstrative evidence had been excluded and
their witnesses hamstrung by the court's rulings limiting
their testimony, the ultimate effects of the trial court's
rulings were noted in closing argument:
(1)

Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to argue (a)

that AMC/Jeep had offered "No positive proof.

None at all.";

(T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4582); (b) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring
no evidence, none at all," (jLd., at 33; R. 4583); and (c)
that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce of engineering data" (id., at 35; R. 4585); and
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(2)

Counsel for defendant Variable Annuity Life

made the following flatly incorrect statement to the jury:
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing
exactly what they had done, even to the
height of the outriggers off the ground;
why didn't they go out and get a
Commando, put some outriggers on there
and go do some testing of their own? Why
didn't they come in here and tell you,
'We have done the same kind of tests that
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same
number of degrees of steer in on a
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn
over'; why didn't they do that? I'll
tell you why: They were afraid to do it.
They didn't dare do it. Because they
knew that Commando would turn over.
(Id., at 109; R. 4659).
AMC/Jeep had, of course, done precisely what counsel asserted had not been done.

AMC/Jeep had obtained an

exemplar vehicle, a Commando, had tested it in the very
respects stated in the above quotation, and proffered
evidence of the results of those tests, both in the form of
testimony and in the form of demonstrative motion pictures,
but the tests were systematically and erroneously excluded by
the trial court.

AMC/Jeep's motion for a mistrial based upon

the subsequent false, misleading and prejudicial arguments of
opposing counsel was nevertheless denied.

(^Id., at 193, 197;

R. 4743, 4747).
Following these arguments the jury returned a
Special Verdict finding:

(1) that the Commando was defective

to the extent that it was unreasonably dangerous to the
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purchaser or user; (2) that the defective condition of the
Commando was a proximate cause of plaintiff Steven
Whitehead's injuries; (3) that AMC/Jeep was 70% at fault for
the injuries sustained by plaintiff Steven Whitehead; and (4)
that general and special damages totalled $1,638,125.00.
1359-1361).

(R.

The trial court then entered judgment in accord-

ance with the Special Verdict, (R. 1362-1364), and denied
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
or in the Alternative for a New Trial (R. 1569-1574, 16421644).

This appeal followed.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep is predicated

upon the theory of strict products liability set out in
Section 402A, Restatement: (Second) of Torts, as adopted by
this Court in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.
2d 152 (Utah 1979).

The elements which a plaintiff must

prove under Section 402A are:
(1) That defendant sold the product at issue in the
case —

Section 402A(1);
(2) That such product was in a defective condition;

that is, a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer —

Section 402A(1), and Comment (g);
(3) That such product was unreasonably dangerous;

that is, dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
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the ordinary knowledge common in the community as to its
characteristics; Section 402A(1), and Comment (i);
(4) That the product was defective and unreasonably
dangerous at the time it left the seller's hands —

Section

402A, Comment (g);
(5) That the plaintiff is the ultimate consumer or
user of the allegedly defective product; Section 402A(1);
(6) That the product's defective and unreasonably
dangerous condition caused the plaintiff physical harm

—

Section 402A(1);
(7) That the defendant is engaged in the business
of selling the allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous
product —

Section 402A(l)(a); and
(8) That the allegedly defective and unreasonably

dangerous product is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold —

Section 402A(l)(b).

Instead or requiring plaintiffs to prove the
elements listed above, however, the trial court permitted
plaintiffs, over AMC/Jeep's objections, to proceed against
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and prejudicial evidence and expert
testimony wholly unrelated to the sole issue raised by
plaintiffs' claim against AMC/Jeep:

Whether plaintiffs'

Commando was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time
it left the hands of AMC/Jeep because it rolled over while
traveling on an interstate highway at 55 miles per hour when
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struck off-center from behind by a station wagon traveling 70
miles per hour.

In fact, the only things proved by

plaintiffs at trial were:
(1)

That "Jeeps/1 as a class of vehicles including

Commandos/ will roll over under certain mechanically
controlled conditions not normally encountered even under
emergency conditions; and
(2)

That when "Jeeps" do roll over, an unre-

strained passenger in such a vehicle will be injured.
These facts are as irrelevant to this lawsuit as
they are undisputed.
(1)

What plaintiffs failed to show v/as:

That Jeeps in general, and the Commando in

particular, are any different in their resistance to roll
over than the vast majority of vehicles on the road;
(2)

That the "ordinary consumer" had any reason to

expect that the Commando or any other vehicle would not roll
over under the particular circumstances of the accident made
the basis of this lawsuit; and
(3)

That plaintiffs had any reason to expect that

they could escape serious injury in che event of a roll over
absent the use of available seat belts to protect them.
As AMC/Jeep's evidence would have demonstrated (had
it not been excluded by the trial court) and as AMC/Jeep's
cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses would have
revealed (had that cross-examination been permitted):
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(1)

Most vehicles subjected to the tests reflected

in plaintiffs1 films would have rolled over under those
conditions;
(2)

Virtually any vehicle subjected to the

collision made the subject of this lawsuit would have rolled
over under those circumstances; and
(3)

That an unrestrained passenger in any vehicle

which rolls over will suffer serious injuries, whether or not
the roof collapses, because the occupants of a vehicle in
motion tend to remain in motion after a collision until they
are stopped by something —

whether the roof, the road or the

windshield.
In order to prove that a product is "in a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer" and "unreasonably
dangerous", the plaintiff in a design defect case will
normally present evidence comparing the allegedly defective
product to other products placed on the market at
approximately the same time to show that the allegedly
defective product does not meet the standards reflected in
the industry in general.

Such comparisons are generally

referred to as "state-of-the-art" or "industry standards"
evidence.

See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442,

447 (10th Cir. 1973).

Plaintiffs in this case, however,

offered no such evidence.

Instead, they offered and were

permitted to display to the jury one film after another
showing "Jeeps", and only "Jeeps", rolling over and over and
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over in response to mechanically-induced test programs•
Plaintiffs1 experts were then permitted to testify, without
any foundation whatsoever, that "other vehicles" would not
have rolled over under the circumstances presented, and
AMC/Jeep was precluded from either cross-examining
plaintiffs' witness on that subject or from presenting their
own "industry standards" evidence to rebut it.

As a result,

the case was submitted to the jury, and the jury was
permitted and, indeed, required to decide it based upon
evidence in a vacuum.
The trial court's errors which require reversal of
the judgment on the verdict can be broken down into the
following categories: (i) the trial court permitted
plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence;
(ii) the trial court limited improperly AMC/Jeep's cross
examination of plaintiffs' experts; (iii) the trial court
excluded substantial portions of AMC/Jeep1s evidence; (iv)
the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for mistrial based
on improper closing arguments made by opposing counsel; (v)
the trial court excluded ail evidence relating to the
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seatbelts; and
(vi) the trial court denied AMC/Jeep's motion for directed
verdict based on its statute of limitations defense.
point will be addressed in turn.
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POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE IRRELEVANT AND
INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE.
The issue in this case is not whether, in the
abstract, Jeeps in general or even Commandos in particular
roll over too easily.

This is not an administrative proceed-

ing to determine whether AMC/Jeep should be required to
recall and modify its utility vehicles based upon such an
alleged defect even if it were found to exist.

The sole

issues in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep were (a) whether
the plaintiffs' 1972 Commando was defectively designed and
unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands of the
manufacturer because it rolled over when struck from behind,
on an interstate highway,

by a vehicle traveling

approximately 70 miles per hour, and (b) whether the alleged
design defect was one proximate cause of plaintiffs'
injuries.
Products liability under Section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of Torts, does not remove the requirement of
causation from a lawsuit.

See Section 402A(1), Restatement

(Second) of Torts; Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d
1301, 1303 (Utah 1981).

Even plaintiffs' own expert noted

that while the Jeep may have a defect, the defect "may not
have anything to do with this particular accident."
10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714).

(T.,

Plaintiffs in this case were,

nevertheless, allowed to "prove" their case against AMC/Jeep

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generatedOCR,
26may-contain errors.

by introducing evidence that was wholly irrelevant to the
issues presented.
Plaintiffs1 evidence primarily showed Jeep CJ5s,
not Commandos, overturning under conditions wholly dissimilar
to the conditions of plaintiffs' accident.

The conditions

and maneuvers depicted in the films were never shown to bear
any relation to the conditions and maneuvers experienced by
plaintiffs and their Commando during the accident and this
evidence was almost certainly misunderstood by the

jury and

given extraordinary weight since it was the only evidence
they were permitted to hear.

Under the circumstances of this

case, the admission of such evidence is reversible error.
Plaintiffs' absolute reliance on irrelevant
demonstrative evidence is clear.

Even before trial began,

plaintiffs moved the trial court to allow them to exhibit "a
certain pictorial movie developed by Dynamic Science, Inc.
for the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety."

(R. 1128).

AMC/Jeep opposed plaintiffs' motion, noting: (1) that the
testing represented in the film bore no relation to the
circumstances of plaintiffs' accident; (2) that the Dynamic
Science testing had involved 400 test runs while the film
showed only six of them; (3) that the film's use of slow
motion effects was misleading; (4) that the film showed only
CJ5s and not Commandos; (5) that the CJ5s in the film were
"manned" with anthropomorphic dummies which portrayed
unrealistically and violently the movement of humans during a
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rollover; and (6) that on the whole the film's prejudicial
impact outweighed its value as demonstrative evidence.
1207-1220).

(R.

The trial court brushed aside appellants'

objections, however, taking the view that any problems with
the film went to its "weight" rather than its admissibility.
(T., Abstracts from Transcripts of Trial, 10/17/83, at 60,
62; R. 4863, 4865).
The Insurance Institute Film was shown to the jury
in conjunction with the testimony of Mr. Noettl.

Although

Mr. Noettl had never tested a Commando and had experience
primarily with other "Jeep vehicles" he was, nevertheless,
permitted to express the opinion that the "Jeep" is easier to
overturn than a "passenger car."

(Id., at 1262; R. 3039).

(T., 10/26/83, at 1132-1183, R. 2960-2961).

In fact, Mr.

Noettl's opinion with respect to the Commando was based
almost entirely on his experience with the CJ5 and other nonCommando vehicles.

(id., at 1189; R. 2966).

AMC/Jeep

interposed a continuing objection to this testimony based on
the fact that a CJ5 was a different vehicle than a Commando
and that Mr. Noettl was incompetent to express an opinion as
to the Commando.

(jEd., at 1191; R. 2963).

Indeed,

plaintiffs' own witness had admitted earlier in the trial,
for instance, that the CJ5' s v/heel base was 20 inches shorter
than the Commando's wheel base and that a longer wheel base
makes it

more difficult to roll a vehicle.

at 672-675; R. 2450-2453).

(T., 10/24/33,

Moreover, a longer wheel base
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means that more and faster steer must be "dialed into" a
vehicle in order for it to negotiate the same turn as a
vehicle with a shorter wheel base.

The objections were,

nevertheless, overruled and Mr. Noettl continued to testify,
without foundation, that the CJ5 and the Commando were
identical for purposes of discussing their handling
characteristics.
In addition, at the time the trial court viewed Mr.
Noettl's Insurance Institute film in chambers before it was
shown to the jury (.id., at 1206; R. 2983), plaintiffs'
counsel stipulated that: the film did not simulate the
conditions prevailing at the time of the accident.

(jCd./ at

1207; R. 2984).
Mr. Noettl subsequently described the maneuvers
shown on the film as "J-Turns" and "obstacle avoidance
maneuvers," (jLd., at 1195; R. 2972), neither of which were
shown, even remotely, to simulate the conditions of
plaintiffs' accident.

In fact, the tests themselves were run

with mechanical input into the CJ5 —
driver at all.

there was no human

Mr. Noettl also described the ignition

interrupt system that was installed in the test CJ5 in order
"to maintain the vehicle at constant speed" throughout a
particular test run.

(_Id., at 1231; R. 3008).

Of course,

there was no evidence that plaintiff Deborah Whitehead, the
driver of the Commando in this case, kept her foot on the
accelerator throughout the course of the accident.
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In fact

there was testimony that a vehicle making a turn like those
depicted in the film would normally slow down.
at 1693-1694; R. 3476-3477).

(T. 10/28/83,

The steering commands that were

mechanically induced for the tests were on the order of 588
degrees of steering input at a rate of 1562 degrees per
second.

(Id., at 1233-1234; R. 3010-3011).

There was

testimony that, due to the Commando's longer wheel base, 736
degrees (or two complete revolutions of the steering wheel)
would have to be dialed into a Commando in order to induce
the same type of maneuver, (T., 10/27/33, at 1657-1659; R.
3439-3441), and that steering input rates of 1300 to 1600
degrees per second are "beyond human capabilities."

(T.,

10/28/83, at 1689; R. 3472). There was no evidence that
Deborah Whitehead negotiated anything resembling two complete
revolutions of the Commando's steering wheel during the
course of the accident, or even that the Commando's steering
wheel was mechanically capable of two complete revolutions.
Indeed, plaintiffs' experts had previously admitted that they
had "no way of knowing" what steering movements were made by
Deborah Whitehead during the course of the accident.

(T.,

10/25/33, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737).
There was also testimony that the CJ5 shown in the
film had been modified substantially in an attempt to
compensate for the removal of instrumentation and the
placement of test equipment in the vehicle, (T., 10/26/83, at
1257-1258; R. 3034-3035), that the tires on the test CJ5 were
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"specially prepared" to accentuate rollover, and that the
tests were "completely unrealistic."

(T., 10/28/83, at 1694-

1698; R. 3477-3481; T., 11/1/83, at 2216-2217; R. 4008-4009).
It was also clear that the film had been edited and
manipulated to highlight the instances in which a CJ5
actually rolled over.

Mr. Noettl would later admit, for

example, that 400 "runs" of the CJ5 were made by Dynamic
Science but that only six would be shown in the film (^id., at
1214; R. 2991), and that the tests were run with mechanical
input into the Jeep (i.e., there was no human driver).
Another witness familiar with the Insurance Institute test
depicted in the film testified that five hundred runs of the
CJ5 were made by Dynamic Science and that there were only
eight roll overs in those five hundred runs.
at 1682; R. 3465).

(T., 10/28/83,

AMC/Jeep's objections to the film were

nevertheless overruled and the film was shown to the jury.
(Id.).
Two other films of CJ5s rolling over were presented
to the jury in connection with the testimony of Mr. Anderson.
AMC/Jeep's strenuous objection to these films was identical
to its objection to Mr. Noettl*s film.
106-107; R. 4909-4910).

(T., 10/25/83, at

The trial court overruled these

objections, however, stating only that: "I'll let you get at
it any way you want to by cross examination or whatever.
I'm going to admit it, I'll overrule your objection with
respect to those films."

(Id., at 109; R. 4912).
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But

In addition to the films of CJ5s rolling over, the
trial court permitted plaintiffs' automotive safety
consultant, Mr. Shaw, to introduce and testify regarding a
chart purporting to show the so-called "roll over threshold"
of a Commando,

AMC/Jeep objected to the chart for the reason

that it was based entirely on information Mr. Shaw had
obtained in testing CJ5s.
2449-2457).

(T., 10/24/83, at 671-679; R.

The trial court overruled the objection and Mr.

Shaw was permitted to utilize the exhibit to bolster his
opinion as to the "roll over threshold" of the Commando.
(•Id., at 687-694; R. 2466-2472).
As even this brief overview of plaintiffs'
demonstrative and expert testimony reveals, the sum and
substance of plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep was dependent
upon the following syllogism:

(1) Jeeps are unreasonably

dangerous because they roll over too easily; (2) the Commando
is a Jeep; (3) therefore, the Commando is unreasonably
dangerous.

The trial court committed reversible error in

permitting plaintiffs to present this theory to the jury
because, as the record reflects:

(a) the Commando is

materially different from other Jeeps, particularly the CJ5,
and (b) even assuming material similarity between the
Commando and other Jeeps, the maneuvers depicted in
plaintiffs' films bore no relation to the circumstances of
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plaintiffs' accident,

and were so extraordinary in character

that most vehicles would have rolled over under the
conditions presented.

The only thing demonstrated by

plaintiffs' films was that some of the CJ5s tested rolled
over under the conditions depicted in the films —

a fact

that was not an issue in this lawsuit.
The utilization of experimental evidence in a trial
of this nature is fraught with danger.

As one court recently

put it: "The problem presented by the use of experiments is
the danger of misleading the members of the jury who may
attach exaggerated significance to the test.

See generally,

The fact that plaintiffs' films bear no relation to the
circumstances of plaintiffs' accident is shown most clearly
in the following colloquy between plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson,
who exhibited most of the films, and counsel for AMC/Jeep:
Q. Is there any way you can help us
as to what steering movements Mrs.
Whitehead may have put into that vehicle
at any point that we're talking about?
A. No. ...
Q. And is there anything that would
say Mrs. Whitehead didn't put turning
movement of more than 180 degrees into
her steering, more or less?
A. ... I couldn't say.
Q. So whether the vehicle took an
erratic path and was skidding, or what in
the world it was doing through there, you
can't help us, as far as your opinion?
A. No. ...
(T., 10/25/83, at 956-957; R. 2736-2737). In short,
plaintiffs' films were exhibited purely for the purpose of
showing that "Jeeps" rolled over under the conditions
depicted in the films — a fact that was not in issue in this
lawsuit.
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McCormick on Evidence, Section 202 (2d Ed. 1972)."

Barnes

v. General Motors Corp., 547 F. 2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977).
Because of this special danger, courts have developed a
strict rule under which the use of experiments, like those
offered by plaintiffs in this case, is limited to those
situations where there is "a foundational showing ... that
the tests were conducted under conditions substantially
similar to actual conditions."

Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,

558 F. 2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1977).

Courts consistently

place "the burden ... upon the partiy offering evidence of
out-of-court experiments ... to lay a proper foundation
demonstrating a similarity of circumstances and conditions."
Barnes, 547 F. 2d, at 277.

See also Renfro Hosiery Mills Co.

v. National Cash Register Co., 552 F. 2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir.
1977) (applying North Carolina law); Weaver v. Ford Motor
Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1974) affd. 515 F. 2d
506 (3rd Cir. 1975); Jones v. Stemco Manufacturing Co., Inc.,
624 P. 2d 1044, 1047 (Okla. 1981); Sanchez v. Haddix, 95
Wash. 2d 593, 627 P. 2d 1312, 1314 (1981); Goodman v. Carson,
84 Ariz. 177, 325 P. 2d 819, 821 (1958).
Haynes v. American Motors Corporation, 691 F. 2d
1268 (8th Cir. 1982)(applying Arkansas law), illustrates the
trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs' evidence of
experiments performed on non-Coramando vehicles in situations
admittedly different from those which led to plaintiffs'
accident.

The plaintiff in Haynes sued the defendant for
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injuries suffered when her Jeep CJ5 overturned on a rainslick highway.

The jury returned a judgment in favor of the

defendant and the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow her to introduce
several television commercials depicting several models of
"Jeeps" in off-road situations.

It was the plaintiff's

contention that these commercials constituted actionable
misrepresentation because they led her to believe that her
CJ5 would not roll over when subjected to the conditions of
the accident.

The Court of Appeals held that the films were

properly excluded by the trial court, stating:
A number of the commercials dealt with
the Jeep Cherokee, and thus had no
relevance in this case, which involves a Jeep CJ-5. Those commercials dealing
with the CJ-5 also had little relevance
since they depicted the CJ-5 in off-theroad settings, climbing steep hills and
traversing rough terrain. In contrast,
[the plaintiff's] accident occurred when
her CJ-5 skidded off rain slick pavement
and into a ditch. ... The trial court
properly excluded these commercials,
which would have served merely to confuse
the issues before the jury and the court
properly refused to allow plaintiffs'
expert to comment on the commercials.
691 F. 2d, at 1271.
Plaintiffs' films in this case suffered from
precisely the same defects as plaintiffs' films in Haynes
interestingly enough, plaintiffs' expert in Haynes was the
same Robert Anderson who testified for plaintiffs in this
case.

Here, as in Haynes, the trial court should have
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excluded plaintiffs' irrelevant films because they "served
merely to confuse the issues before the jury." See also
Barnes v. General Motors Corp./ 547 F. 2d, at 277.
These cases highlight the trial court's error in
this case in permitting plaintiffs to make their case against
AMC/Jeep with irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence and
testimony.

As in the cases discussed above, plaintiffs'

evidence merely demonstrated the correctness of a fact not in
dispute, i.e., that "Jeeps," in general, roll over in certain
situations having no bearing on the particular circumstances
of plaintiffs' accident.

The films and opinions offered by

plaintiffs' experts related to different vehicles subjected
to artificial testing and should have been excluded because
they bore no "substantial relation" to the actual vehicle and
conditions involved in plaintiffs' accident, and were likely
to be misunderstood by the jury and given exaggerated weight
when the evidence was, in fact, of no probative value
whatsoever.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BLOCKING
AMC/JEEP'S EFFORT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS.
The trial court's error in admitting plaintiffs'
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence alone would support this
Court's reversal of the judgment in this case.

This error

was compounded, however, by the trial court's consistent
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refusal to allow AMC/Jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs1 experts in any meaningful way.
The explicit point repeatedly made by plaintiffs'
experts was that "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles, overturned
much more readily than other vehicles, and that non-Jeep
vehicles would not have overturned under the circumstances of
plaintiffs' accident.

(T., 10/20/83, at 558-560; 10/24/83,

at 672-679, 688; 10/25/83, at 106-108, 894, 896, 897, 10391040; R. 2331-2333, 2450-2457, 2466, 4909-4911, 2674, 2676,
2813-2819).

"Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, were

consistently and explicitly represented as being unreasonably
dangerous because of their alleged tendency to overturn "as
distinguished from some other car."
2331-2332).

(jCd*# at 558-559; R.

Specifically, plaintiffs' automotive safety

expert, Mr. Shaw, was allowed to testify, without foundation,
that "there's no doubt that this vehicle is much more prone
to roll over than some others."
2495).

(T., 10/24/83, at 717; R.

Similarly, plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson testified without

foundation that "Jeeps" handled more poorly as compared to
other vehicles, (T., 10/25/83,

at 896; R. 2676), and

plaintiffs' Mr. Noettl testified that "it was very difficult
to turn a passenger car over."
3039).

(T., 10/26/03, at 1262; R.

There can be no doubt that plaintiffs' case depended

on convincing the jury that the Commando, as a "Jeep," overturned in circumstances in which "some other car" would not
have overturned.

The trial court erred, however, in blocking

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
- OCR,
37 may
- contain errors.

AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs'
experts regarding the foundation for those opinions and to
explore the relationship of that evidence to the circumstances of plaintiffs' accident.
Examples of the trial court's improper restriction
of AMC/Jeep's right to cross examine plaintiffs1 witnesses
occur throughout the trial transcript.

On cross-examination,

AMC/Jeep inquired of plaintiffs' Mr. Anderson whether he had
"had occasion to investigate any accident where something
besides a Jeep rolled over and hurt somebody."
1001; R. 2730).

(.Id., at

After the witness responded that he had,

however, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objection when
AMC/Jeep attempted to inquire into such occasions.

(Id.).

The trial court also sustained plaintiffs' objections to
questions regarding what other vehicles would do if subjected
to the circumstances depicted in the films introduced through
Mr. Anderson, (.id., at 1001-1005; R. 2780-2784), and whether
other vehicles can be rolled on a level surface with driver
input.

(jEd./ at 1018; R. 2797).

In each instance, the trial

court ruled that the question was irrelevant; consequently,
plaintiffs' theory that "Jeeps" are unreasonably dangerous
when compared to "other vehicles" was allowed to go
unchallenged because AMC/Jeep was not permitted to inquire
how "other vehicles" would perform under the circumstances of
plaintiffs' accident or under the CJ5 tests shown in Mr.
Anderson's films.
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AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of plaintiffs1 Mr.
Noettl was similarly restricted by the trial court.

Mr.

Noettl testified, on direct examination by plaintiffs'
counsel, that "it was very difficult to turn a passenger car
over."

(T., 10/26/83, at 1262; R. 3039).

To test Mr.

Noettl's knowledge about rolling passenger cars, AMC/Jeep
asked him: "What experience have you had in trying to roll
over a passenger vehicle."
court stated:

Plaintiffs objected and the trial

"I don't want to get into testing all other

kinds of vehicles, because we've got enough problems with
one.

So, I'm going to sustain the objection."

1266; R. 3043)(emphasis added).

(Id., at

AMC/Jeep also asked Mr.

Noettl whether he thought some other vehicle would have come
out of plaintiffs' accident unscathed, but the trial court
sustained plaintiffs' objection to that question as well.
(I_d. , at 1275; R. 3052) .
The practical effect of the trial court's restriction of appellants' right of cross-examination was to allow
plaintiffs' theory of the case to go unchallenged.
Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify repeatedly and
without foundation that "Jeeps" performed poorly in
comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was prohibited
from exploring the basis for that comparison.

The trial

court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination of
plaintiffs' experts v/as, therefore, reversible error.
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In State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630
(1953), this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court
based, in part, on the trial court's erroneous limitation on
cross-examination, stating that "[t]here is no other
instrument so well adapted to discovery of the truth as
cross-examination, and so long as it tends to disclose the
truth it should never be curtailed or limited."
at 637.

265 P. 2d,

"It is fundamental that once a witness testifies as

an expert, he subjects himself to the most rigid kind of
cross-examination, including searching questions concerning
his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge, and the
basis of his opinion", Ross v. Colorado National Bank of
Denver, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P. 2d 882, 887 (1969), and "unduly
harsh limitation on cross-examination can amount to
prejudicial error."

N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele

Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F. 2d 415, 421 (2nd Cir.
1978).

Accord In re Compensation of Bales, 294 Or. 224, 656

P. 2d 300, 306 n.4 (1982); Samuel v. Vanderheiden, 277 Or.
239, 560 P. 2d 636, 639 (1977); Bott v. Wendler, 203 Kan.
212, 453 P. 2d 100 (1969); Hope v. Arrowhead and Puritas
Waters, Inc., 344 P. 2d- 428, 433 (Cal. App. 1959); Brazee v.
Morris, 65 Ariz. 291, 179 P. 2d 442, 444 (1947).
•The recent case of Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich,
580 P. 2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), has particular significance when
compared to the facts in this case.

The plaintiff in
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Todorovich was injured while driving an automobile manufactured by the defendant and the plaintiff's theory was that he
was injured due to a defectively designed seat in the
automobile.

At trial, the plaintiff's expert testified with

respect to the failure of the automobile seat and to alternative safer designs and methods of construction.

When the

defendant attempted to inquire on cross-examination about
federal seat design standards, however, the line of questions
was blocked by the trial court.

On appeal, the V7yoming

Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, in
part on the basis of the trial court's limitation of the
defendant's cross-examination, stating:
At this point in the trial counsel for
Chrysler was confronted with the problem
of cross-examination of an expert witness
for the plaintiff who had stated his
opinion as to the proper method of
designing and manufacturing the part that
failed. ... Fairness to Chrysler in such
a situation demands that it be afforded
reasonable opportunity to test by searching questions the knowledge, competency
and qualifications of such an expert
witness. ... Having offered his expert
opinion the expert witness exposes himself to interrogation which ordinarily
would have no place in the cross-examination of a factuaT witness, but the expert
exposes himself to the most searching
kind of investigation into his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge and
the reasons for his opinion, including
the facts and other matter upon which it
is based.
580 P.2d, at 1133 (emphasis added).
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The facts in this case closely parallel the facts
in Todorovich.

Plaintiffs' experts repeatedly expressed

their opinion that "Jeeps" rolled over in situations where
other automobiles would not•

Yet, in virtually every

instance where AMC/Jeep attempted to cross-examine on this
point, the trial court sustained plaintiffs' objections.
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts was
erroneously curtailed by the trial court and its judgment
should accordingly be reversed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING
SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF
AMC/JEEP'S EVIDENCE.
The first two Points in this brief illustrate the
unfair advantage accorded plaintiffs by the trial court in
permitting them to introduce irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence and then blocking AMC/Jeep's cross-examination
with respect to that evidence.

Compounding those errors and

removing any vestige of fundamental fairness from the proceedings, however, the trial court then systematically barred
the introduction by AMC/Jeep of virtually all of its
demonstrative evidence offered to rebut the unfounded implications raised by plaintiffs' experts.
The trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's evidence
is as startling as it is unprecedented.

Before AMC/Jeep even

called its first engineering expert, the trial court heard,
in chambers, plaintiffs' objections to two films that would
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be offered in conjunction with that expert's testimony.
AMC/Jeep*s expert, Edward Heitzman, whose extensive experience in the field of automotive safety and design made
him singularly qualified to testify regarding the comparisons
and tests relied upon so heavily by plaintiffs, intended to
rebut plaintiffs1 evidence, suggesting that the Commando is
unsafe because CJ5s rolled over in plaintiffs' films, by
exhibiting films of a Jeep CJ5 undergoing certain maneuvers
and remaining upright.

The purpose of the films was to

illustrate Mr. Heitzman's testimony: (1) that the tests
depicted in plaintiffs' films did not represent realistic
emergency driving conditions; (2) that the mechanically
induced conditions reflected in plaintiffs' films would not
be duplicated by a human driver; and (3) that the CJ5 is in
fact a stable vehicle which can successfully negotiate
realistic emergency conditions.

When questioned by the trial

court as to the materiality of the films, counsel for
AMC/Jeep responded:
The materiality, your Honor, is that in
the course of this trial, the plaintiffs
have challenged the handling qualities of
the Jeep CJ5. And they say that it's an
unstable vehicle. And we think that this
test demonstrates graphically to the jury
that it's not an unstable vehicle, it can
do very vigorous maneuvers and do that
maneuver successfully.
(I_d., at 1565; R. 3347).

AMC/Jeep explained that it was not

admitting that tests of the CJ5 were relevant to the issue of
the Commando's characteristics, but rather offered the tests
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to rebut evidence suggesting that the CJ5 was an unstable
5
vehicle. (Id., at 1566; R. 3348).
The trial court
ruled that defendants' films of the CJ5 were not admissible,
however.

(Id../ at 1571; R. 3353).

Mr. Heitzman's second

film demonstrated that virtually any vehicle will roll over
when subjected to the conditions depicted in plaintiffs'
films.
Stripped of his demonstrative evidence, Mr.
Heitzman nevertheless took the witness stand, (id.., at 1577;
R. 3359), and through his testimony attempted to rebut plaintiffs' films.

Mr. Heitzman's testimony was severely and

unquestionably undermined, however, by his inability to
demonstrate his opinions with his own CJ5 films.
AMC/Jeep next attempted to rebut the testimony of
plaintiffs' expert with respect to plaintiffs' film showing a
Commando, equipped with "outriggers", undergoing certain
tests, and Mr. Anderson's testimony for the plaintiffs that,
but for the outriggers, the Commando in the film would have
rolled over.

(T., 10/28/33, 918-926; R. 2698-2706).

Mr.

Heitzman testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Anderson's film

5
If one party is permitted to introduce irrelevant and
therefore inadmissible evidence, the general rule "is that
the opponent may reply with similar evidence whenever it is
needed for removing an unfair prejudice which might otherwise
have ensued from the original evidence." Wigmore on
Evidence, Section 15, pp. 304-307. See also, Dewey v. Funk,
211 Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722, 724-726 (1973); Wynn v. Sundquist,
485 P.2d 1085, 1090-1091 (Or. 1971); Mills v. Memphis Sales
Manufacturing Co. , 251 F. Supp. 458, 460 TN.D/Miss". 1966) .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
- OCR,
44 may
- contain errors.
Machine-generated

of the specially equipped Commando did not illustrate situations in which the Commando would have rolled.

An expert's

eye and ear can discern when a vehicle equipped with outriggers would have rolled over but for the outriggers, (id.,
1744; R. 3527), and Mr. Heitzman testified that, in fact, the
Commando shown in Mr. Anderson's film would not have rolled
over had the outriggers not been attached.

(T., 10/28/83,

1674-1676; R. 3457-3459).
The basis for Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard
was the fact that the outriggers on plaintiffs' Commando were
set too low, preventing that vehicle from even approaching a
situation in which actual roll-over would have occurred.

To

demonstrate Mr. Heitzman's opinion in this regard, AMC/Jeep
attempted to introduce a film of its own showing certain
vehicles undergoing test maneuvers with outriggers attached,
more appropriately, far enough off the ground so that when
the roll-over was induced the viewer could see quite clearly
the point at which the outriggers actually prevented the
roll-over from occurring.

The introduction of this film was

likewise blocked by the trial court, however, in spite of the
fact that Mr. Heitzman was later cross-examined extensively
with respect to his judgment that plaintiffs' film did not
demonstrate a Commando rolling over, (Ld.# 1824; R. 3607),
and Mr. Heitzman's ability to respond to such crossexamination was seriously undermined by the trial court's
exclusion of the outrigger film.
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AMC/Jeep also intended to utilize the outrigger
film to rebut plaintiffs' evidence that "Jeeps11 are more
likely to roll over in emergency situations than "other
vehicles."

AMC/Jeep especially needed this film to

illustrate Mr. Heitzman's point that many vehicles will roll
over when subjected to the mechanically induced tests
illustrated in plaintiffs' films.

Indeed, it was absolutely

essential to AMC/Jeep's defense of plaintiffs' products
liability claim that it be permitted to show that the
Commando, in fact, compared favorably to other vehicles.

The

film was excluded by the trial court, however, "because it's
irrelevant, and it's irrelevant because they involve other
vehicles which the jury would have to take into consideration
as to how it was done, the comparisons, the whole works."
(.Id., 1746-1747, 1750; R. 3529-3530, 3533).

The trial court

thus refused to permit Mr. Heitzman to rebut the testimony of
plaintiffs' experts with his own films even though
plaintiffs' experts had been allowed to illustrate their
opinions with extremely graphic and prejudicial films showing
clothed dummies being thrown from vehicles during
mechanically induced maneuvers incapable of being duplicated
by human beings in realistic emergency situations.

The

distinct impression left with the jury, later capitalized on
by opposing counsel during closing argument, was that
AMC/Jeep did not have any demonstrative evidence to rebut or
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even answer the several films presented by plaintiffs'
experts,
AMC/Jeep made one last attempt to present its case
by calling Dr. Charles Warner, a mechanical engineer and
consultant, to testify about the motion of the accident
vehicle and of plaintiffs therein during the course of the
accident made the basis of this lawsuit, and to give an
opinion regarding the design of the Commando.
1829; R. 3612).

(T., 10/28/83,

Specifically, it was Dr. Warner's opinion

that the Commando was not defective and that its design did
not cause plaintiffs' accident or injuries.

(j[d.,

at

1873-

1874; R. 3656-3657).
Dr. Wa-rner had studied the actual accident vehicle
and the accident scene extensively and offered his opinion as
to the probable movement of the Commando during the course of
plaintiffs' accident.
3741).

In addition,

vehicles —•

(T., 10/31/83, 1941-1954; R. 3728Dr. Warner had also obtained exemplar

a Commando and an Oldsmobile similar to the

automobile driven by defendant Larry Anderson which struck
plaintiffs' Commando from the rear —

and had performed

certain tests with those vehicles in an attempt to
reconstruct plaintiffs' accident.

(J^l*' ^t 1937-1938; R.

3724-3725).
A critical aspect of Dr. Warner's testimony was his
opinion regarding the movement of plaintiffs* bodies during
the course of the accident.

It was Dr. Warner's opinion that
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plaintiffs' movement within the vehicle during the course of
the accident, rather than the fact that the vehicle happened
to be a Commando, actually caused plaintiff Steven
Whitehead's injury.

(.Id., 1957-1967; R. 3744-3754). Dr.

Warner had taken a series of photographs depicting human
beings sitting in the exemplar vehicle, a Commando, and
positioning themselves as Dr. Warner testified plaintiffs
were most probably positioned during the course of the
accident.

The photographs were essential to the jury's

understanding of Dr. Warner's testimony.

The trial court

nevertheless excluded the photographs on the basis "that they
have no probative value, that the probative value is limited
at least because of the photographs not being representative
of just what did happen to the vehicles."
3754).

(I_d., at 1967; R.

Of course, this was the same objection made by

AMC/Jeep with respect to virtually all of plaintiffs'
demonstrative evidence, but it was only when AMC/Jeep attempted to present its own case that the trial court suddenly
became concerned that the demonstrative evidence represent
"just what did happen to the vehicles."

(See also Id., at

2009-2011; R. 3797-3799).
Dr. Warner was also prepared to demonstrate his
testimony regarding occupant movement and damage during a
rollover with a film showing several vehicles rolling over.
(.Id., at 1985; R. 3773).
as well.

The trial court excluded this film

(Id., at 1986; R. 3774).
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Dr. Warner also testified that plaintiffs' injuries
were due, in part, to the fact that their Commando had been
involved in a prior accident which had compromised the integrity of the Commando's passenger compartment and had
aggravated the injuries suffered by plaintiffs.
2024; R. 3812).

(I_d., at

Dr. Warner had personally examined the

accident vehicle before reaching this conclusion and had,
thereafter, prepared an exhibit to demonstrate his testimony
in this regard.

The trial court sustained plaintiffs' objec-

tion to this exhibit as well.

(jEd., at 2026; R. 3814).

AMC/Jeep's final attempt to present demonstrative
evidence to the jury was in the form of a film prepared by
Dr. Warner of an exemplar vehicle, a Commando, undergoing
certain tests and maneuvers with outriggers attached.

The

film had obvious probative value and would have been used to
rebut the testimony elicited by plaintiffs in connection with
the film of their exemplar.

(I_d. , at 1973; R. 3781).

The

trial court excluded the defendants' film, however, stating
only that "I believe that [it] is not probative of any issues
except perhaps the test which was made . . . . "
3774).

(_Id«/ 1986; R.

The trial court's statement is simply inexplicable in

light of the fact that plaintiffs had previously been allowed
to introduce a film of their own exemplar Commando.
The foregoing catalogue of the trial court's exclusion of virtually all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence
illustrates plainly the unfair advantage granted by the trial
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court to the plaintiffs in this case.

Not only were plain-

tiffs permitted to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory
demonstrative evidence, not only was AMC/Jeep precluded by
the trial court from cross-examining plaintiffs1 witnesses
with respect to that evidence, but also when AMC/Jeep attempted to rebut plaintiffs' case it was forced to do so
without the aid of its films and other demonstrative
evidence.
^•

AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence Should have
been Admitted to Rebut Plaintiffs' Irrelevant
Evidence.

The limitations imposed by the trial court on the
testimony of AMC/Jeep's experts was prejudicial error requiring reversal of the judgment against AMC/Jeep.

Virtually all

of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence would have been used to
rebut the theory, never proven, but so graphically implied by
plaintiffs' films and the trial court's erroneous admission
thereof:

that all "Jeeps" are the same, that "Jeeps," as a

generic type of vehicle, roll over much more frequently than
other vehicles, and that the Commando is consequently a
defective vehicle.

AMC/Jeep's films would have shown (1)

that Jeeps remain upright when subjected to realistic
emergency situations; (2) that plaintiffs' film of their
exemplar Commando did not illustrate a roll-over of that
vehicle; and (3) that plaintiffs* tests of CJ5s undergoing
mechanically induced maneuvers were unrealistic and
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misleading in that they demonstrated test maneuvers few
vehicles could perform successfully.

The admission of

AMC/Jeep's films was essential if AMC/Jeep was to have any
hope of rebutting the evidence that had erroneously been
admitted by the trial court during plaintiffs' case in chief.

AMC/Jeep's rebuttal evidence was admissible under
the rule, stated at note 5, supra, that if one party is
permitted to introduce irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible evidence, his opponent may reply with similar evidence
to remove any prejudice which might have ensued from the
original evidence.

The exclusion of defendants' films was,

therefore, reversible error.
In Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Company, Inc., 487
F. 2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 415 U.S. 978 (1974),
the plaintiff sued the defendant, on a strict liability
theory, for an injury incurred when her hand was crushed in a
machine manufactured by the defendant.

As in this case, the

plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant's machine was
more dangerous than other such machines and the defendant
presented contrary evidence that its machine met the standards of the industry.

On appeal the Seventh Circuit found

the admission of the defendant's evidence proper on the
ground that "[t]he plaintiff opened this matter during the
presentation of her case in chief.

Having done so, she
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cannot complain of [defendant's] attempt at rebuttal."

487

P. 2d, at 600.
The settled rule that "[a] party eliciting evidence
cannot object to the same kind of evidence introduced on
behalf of the other party," Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or. 71,
559 P. 2d 1275 (1977), has been expressed in many contexts
substantially similar to this case.

The plaintiff in C.F.

Church v. Golden, 429 P. 2d 771 (Okla. 1967), for example,
was burned when his toilet seat, manufactured by the defendant, caught on fire.

It was the plaintiff's theory that the

toilet seat was defectively designed making it highly flammable and the plaintiff's experts testified regarding experiments performed on similar toilet seats.

The defendant's

experts then testified about similar experiments which they
had performed and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant.

The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the

experiments performed by the defendants' experts should not
have been admitted.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed,

however, stating:
Plaintiffs entire case was predicated on
the theory that the covering on the
toilet in question contained a highly
inflammable chemical known as cellulose
nitrate. He offered testimony of experts
regarding experiments made in substantially the same manner as those made by
defendant's experts. Under such circumstances it was not error to admit the
evidence of defendant's experts on the
point.
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429 P. 2d, at 775.

See also Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling

and Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P. 2d 619

(1969);

Leger Construction, Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P. 2d 212,
214-215 (Utah 1976).
In each of the cases cited above, as in this case,
the plaintiff introduced expert testimony and demonstrative
evidence tending to prove his theory that the defendant's
product was defective, and in each of these cases the appellate court found that the defendant must be permitted to
rebut such evidence by introducing similar tests of his own.
The common sense rule enunciated in these cases underscores
AMC/Jeep's argument that its tests of CJ5s and of the exemplar Commando, as well as all of its other demonstrative
evidence, should not have been excluded by the trial court
once plaintiffs had opened the door to such testimony in
their own case in chief.
B

•

AMC/Jeep's Demonstrative Evidence was Relevant
to Show the State-of-the-Art.

Even had plaintiffs not "opened the door" to the
issue of industry standards with respect to roil-over characteristics, AMC/Jeep's evidence was admissible under settled
principles of products liability law.

As the Court stated in

Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F. 2d 442, 447 (10th Cir.
1976):

"[T]here is 'general1 agreement that to prove

liability under Section 402A [Restatement (Second) of Torts]
the plaintiff must show that the product was dangerous beyond
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the expectation of the ordinary customer.

State-of-art

evidence helps to determine the expectation of the ordinary
consumer.

A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the

safety features which are incorporated in automobiles today."
This Court adopted Section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of Torts, in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel
Co., 601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979), and courts in other states
that have adopted this standard agree that "state-of-the-art"
or "industry standards" evidence is relevant in design defect
6
cases like this one.
The court in Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.
v. Day, 594 P. 2d 38 (Alaska 1979) cert, denied 454 U.S. 894
(1981), stated, for example, that "[wjhile not, strictly
speaking, a defense in a products liability action, state of
the art may be considered in determining whether a product is
defective."

594 P. 2d, at 45.

See Traynor, The Ways and

Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.
L. Rev. 363, 367, 370 (1967).
Similarly, in Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697
F. 2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982), a products liability case

Some courts exclude evidence of the state of the art in
manufacturing defect cases because the plaintiff in such
cases need only show that the product does not conform to the
manufacturer's specifications to prove it is defective. See
Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F. 2d 112, 115
(4th Cir. 1981). When the issue is a defect in design,
however, state of the art evidence is generally held to be
admissible. Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F. 2d
1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1982); Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.
2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976).
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under Section 402A, the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries
when their mobile home, manufactured by the defendant, burst
into flames.

The plaintiffs in Reed, like plaintiffs in this

case, offered evidence that their motor home was more
dangerous than motor homes manufactured by other companies.
The defendant then sought to rebut this evidence, as AMC/Jeep
did in this case, by offering evidence that its motor home
was as safe as other motor homes.

The defendant's state-of-

the-art evidence was admitted by the trial court, and the
plaintiffs appealed after the jury returned a verdict against
them.

The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's state-

of-the-art evidence was properly admitted stating:
[T]he majority rule is that state of the
art evidence is admissible in design
defect cases. ... Section 402A and the
South Carolina Courts require the plaintiff to show both that the product is
defective and that it is 'unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer or user given
the conditions and circumstances that
foreseeably attend use of the product.1
The majority of courts have found in
design defect cases, as opposed to
manufacturing defect cases, that state of
the art and industry standards are
relevant to show both the reasonableness
of the design and that the product was
dangerous beyond the expectations of the
ordinary consumer.
697 F. 2d, at 1196 (citations omitted).

See Porter v.

American Optical Corp., 641 F. 2d 1123, 1140 (5th Cir. 1931)
(applying Louisiana law), cert, denied 454 U.S. 1109 (1931);
Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 134 Ariz. 208, 655 P.
2d 32, 36 (1932).
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This case, like the cases cited above, is a design
defect case.

This Court, like the courts quoted above, has

adopted Section 402A requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the product in question is both defective and unreasonably
dangerous.

The rule stated in these cases is, therefore,

persuasive, and the trial court's exclusion of all AMC/Jeep
evidence relating to the state-of-the-art was erroneous both
because such evidence would have rebutted similar evidence
presented by plaintiffs and because such evidence was independently relevant to AMC/Jeep's' defense that the Commando
in question was neither defectively designed nor unreasonably
dangerous.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER
A MISTRIAL BASED ON IMPROPER CLOSING
ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING COUNSEL.
As reflected in the preceding sections of this
Brief, the trial court blocked virtually every attempt by
AMC/Jeep to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts and to rebut
the evidence offered by those experts tending to suggest that
the Commando in this case was defective and unreasonably
dangerous resulting in the injuries sustained by plaintiffs.
Without doubt, AMC/Jeep possessed and offered the demonstrative evidence to rebut the testimony of plaintiffs' experts,
but the trial court excluded virtually all that evidence on
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the objection of opposing counsel.

It was, therefore, im-

proper and prejudicial for opposing counsel to argue during
closing arguments to the jury:
positive proof. None at all."

(1) that AMC/Jeep had "No
(T. 11/3/83, at 32; R. 4532);

(2) that "They [AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all,"
(ijd., at 33; R. 4583), and (3) that AMC/Jeep's experts failed
to bring "an ounce of engineering data."
4585).

(^Id./ at 35; R.

Opposing counsel (in this instance, counsel for Larry

Anderson, building upon the improper arguments of plaintiffs'
counsel) reached the height of impropriety when he made the
following statement to the jury:
Why didn't Jeep, having all of the test
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing
exactly what they had done, even to the
height of the outriggers off the ground;
why didn't they go out and test a
Commando, put some outriggers on there
and go do some testing of their own? Why
didn't they come in here and tell you,
'We have done the same kind of tests that
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same
number of degrees of steer in on a
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell
you why: They are afraid to do it. They
didn't dare do it. Because they knew
that Commando would turn over.
(Id.., at 109; R. 4659).

Of course, AMC/Jeep had put outrig-

gers on a Commando and offered films of the tests conducted
on that Commando, but those films were excluded by the trial
court on the basis of objections from opposing counsel.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 57 -

It requires no authority to establish that lawyers
have a duty to present their case to a jury without misstating material facts or relying on facts not in evidence.
Professional conduct, as well as fundamental notions of fair
play and justice, require that counsel refrain from the type
of misrepresentation made by opposing counsel in this case.
The court in State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P. 2d 277,
280 (Idaho App. 1983), recently quoted with approval the
following statement of the rule from the American Bar
Association Standards, The Defense Function Section 7.8(a)
(1971):
In closing argument to the jury the
lawyer may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.
It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer
intentionally to misstate the evidence or
mislead the jury as to the inferences it
may draw.

There are often circumstances in which
counsel may be entitled to argue to the
jury that they should draw an inference
adverse to the prosecution as the result
of its failure to bring forth some particular item of evidence or to call as a
witness someone who has a special relation to the facts of the case. But it is
a form of misrepresentation, and therefore improper, for counsel to argue that
the evidence was not presented because it
had been excluded by the court or is
inadmissible. A lawyer who has successfully urged the court to exclude evidence
should not be allowed to point to the
absence of that evidence to create an
inference that it does not exist.
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(Emphasis added); see also Pritchard v. State, 673 P. 2d 291,
294 n.l (Alaska App. 1983) (Singleton, J., dissenting); Rizzo
v. United States, 304 F. 2d 810, 829 (8th Cir. 1962).
That rule is directly applicable here.

Opposing

counsel knew that AMC/Jeep had offered a film showing a
Commando undergoing extreme turning maneuvers and not rolling
over.

Counsel also knew that AMC/Jeep had offered extensive

additional demonstrative evidence to support its case.
Counsel knew this because they had viewed such evidence in
chambers at the time it was excluded by the trial court at
their instance.

It was, therefore, misleading and

plainly

improper to argue that AMC/Jeep failed to bring "an ounce of
engineering data" or that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to offer such
evidence.
In the context of this trial, opposing counsels'
closing arguments were extremely prejudicial.
recently stated:

As this Court

"The proper remedy for prejudicial attorney

misconduct is to order a new trial."
P. 2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982).

Nelson v. Trujillo, 657

This is precisely the remedy

sought by AMC/Jeep in this appeal.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL
EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE PRESENCE OF
AND PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO UTILIZE
AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS."
It is undisputed that plaintiffs' Commando was
equipped with seat belts and that plaintiffs were not wearing
their seat belts at the time of the accident.

Prior to
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trial, however, plaintiffs submitted a Motion in Limine "to
preclude the defendants or their witnesses or attorneys from
mentioning the subject of seat belts or the use or nonuse of
seatbelts at the trial of this case."

(R. 1274-1294).

AMC/Jeep submitted an opposing memorandum, (R. 1425-1464),
and the trial court heard argument on the question of the
admissibility of seat belt evidence, in various contexts,
throughout the trial.

In each instance, however, AMC/Jeep

was precluded from introducing evidence on the availability
and plaintiffs' non-use of their seat belts.
Initially, the trial court ruled that, at least for
opening statements, neither party could refer "to 'seat
belts' or the availability, or the lack thereof, or the lack
of use thereof."

(T., Abstracts from Transcript of Trial,

10/18/83, at 156; R. 4959).

Later that same day, and in the

face of plaintiffs' basic theory that the Commando was defectively designed by MAC/Jeep

and was, therefore, unreasonably

dangerous, the trial court ruled that the fact that plaintiffs had access to seat belts would not be admitted to show
that the Commando was properly designed.

(T., 10/18/83, at

12; R. 1763).
The trial court subsequently compounded its erroneous exclusion of seat belt evidence, however, when it
ruled that AMC/Jeep could not cross-examine plaintiffs'
experts with respect to the presence of seat belts in the
accident vehicle, even though those experts were testifying
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that the Commando was an unsafe vehicle.

(T., Abstracts from

Transcript of Trial, 10/24/83, at 38; R. 4891).

Finally, a

proffer was made to the trial court by AMC/Jeep's expert
witness, Dr. Warner, that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead
"been using the seat belt in all probability he would not
have received the spinal injury that he did receive."
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806).

(T.,

The trial court, nevertheless,

ruled that no evidence regarding seat belts would be admitted
in the trial, summarizing the basis for its ruling as
follows:
"[T]o speculate what the seat belt might
have done in this type of situation is
just something that the jury ought not
to, and they will not have, under my
ruling, the obligation to consider. ...
Therefore, there will be no more evidence
in this case with regard to seat belts.
I want everybody to leave it alone, and
we'll go from there."
(Id., at 2019-2020; R. 3807-3808).

The trial court's exclu-

sion of all evidence relating to the presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seat belts was prejudicial error.
^'

Plaintiffs' Failure to Utilize Available Seat
Belts Contributed to their Injuries, and
Constituted a Failure to Mitigate their
Damages.

The trial court's exclusion of any evidence relating to plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts
was error.

Although this Court has yet to rule on the issue,

the so-called "seat belt defense" has been accepted in a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
- OCR,
61 may
- contain errors.
Machine-generated

substantial number of jurisdictions that have addressed the
question.
In Utah, it is proper for the jury to consider the
faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they "have united
as concurrent proximate causes of an injury" in strict
liability cases.

Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P. 2d

1301, 1303 (1981).

AMC/Jeep's experts were prepared to

testify that had plaintiff Steven Whitehead been wearing his
seat belt at the time of the accident "he would not have
received the spinal injury that he did receive."
10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806).

(T.,

AMC/Jeep would have offered

further evidence that plaintiffs' failure to utilize the
available seat belts was a breach of plaintiffs' duty "to use
the degree of care which an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent
person would have observed for his own safety under the
circumstances."

Lindquist v. Kennecott Copper Company, Inc.,

30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P. 2d 1182, 1185 (1973).
It is difficult to deny that, in the current
climate of consumer awareness and in light of repeated
government and industry-sponsored campaigns urging citizens
to "buckle up for safety," a reasonably prudent person acts
unreasonably when he fails to use an available seat belt
before venturing onto the highways.

One commentator has

noted the objective fact that "the use of seat belts would
reduce serious injuries resulting from automobile accidents
by thirty-three percent, and could save up to twelve thousand
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lives annually,"

Note, The Seat Belt Defense;

A

Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested
Approach for the Courts, 56 Notre Dame Lawyer 272, 281
(1980).

The court in the seminal case of Bentzler v. Braun,

34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626, 640 (1967), put it this way:
"On the basis of ... experience, and as a matter of common
knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or
should know of the additional safety factor produced by the
use of seat belts."
From the common sense proposition that it may be
unreasonable for one to fail -co use available seat belts, it
is properly within the jury's purview to determine whether
the plaintiff in a particular case has met his" duty of due
care.

As the court noted in Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill.App.

2d 1, 234 N.E. 2d 329, 331 (1968):
The use, or non-use of seat belts, and
expert testimony, if any, in relation
thereto, is a circumstance which the
trier of facts may consider, together
with all other facts in evidence, in
arriving at its conclusion as to whether
the plaintiff has exercised due care, not
only to avoid injury to himself, but to
mitigate any injury he would likely
sustain.
See also Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444, 323 N.E. 2d 164,
167 (1974)-.

Under these settled principles, and under the

rule announced by this Court in Mulherin, the trial court
should have admitted AMC/Jeep's evidence and expert testimony
to prove that plaintiff Steven Whitehead's failure to utilize
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his seat belt "united" with any fault of AMC/Jeep "as concurrent and proximate causes of" his injury.
Courts which do not subscribe to this Court's view,
as

expressed in Mulherin, that comparative fault principles

may apply to a strict products liability case, prefer to
classify a plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts as a
breach of the duty to mitigate damages.

The language most

often quoted in this regard is as follows:

As Prosser has indicated, the plaintiff's
duty to mitigate his damages is equivalent to the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which precludes recovery for any
damages which could have been eliminated
by reasonable conduct on the part of the
plaintiff (Prosser, Torts [4th ed.],
Section 65, pp. 422-424). Traditionally
both of these concepts have been applied
only to postaccident conduct, such as a
plaintiff's failure to obtain medical
treatment after he has sustained an
injury. To do otherwise, it has been
argued, would impose a preaccident
obligation upon the plaintiff and would
deny him the right to assume the due care
of others (Kleist, Seat Belt Defense —
An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 Hastings
L.J. 613, 616). We concede that the
opportunity to mitigate damages prior to
the occurrence of an accident does not
ordinarily arise, and that the
chronological distinction, on which the
concept of mitigation of damages rests,
is justified in most cases. However, in
our opinion, the seat belt affords the
automobile occupant an unusual and ordinarily unavailable means by which he or
she may minimize his or her damages prior
to the accident. Highway safety has
become a national concern; we are told to
drive defensively and to 'watch out for
the other driver'. When an automobile
occupant may readily protect himself, at
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least partially, from the consequences of
a collision, we think that the burden of
buckling an available seat belt may,
under the facts of the particular case,
be found by the jury to be less than the
likelihood of injury when multiplied by
its accompanying severity.
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168,

This view is supported

by Section 465, comment c, Restatement (Second) of Torts,
dealing with the causal relation between harm and plaintiff's
fault, which states that damages may be apportioned
where the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff is found not to contribute in
any way to the original accident or
injury, but to be a substantial contributing factor in increasing the harm
which ensues. There must of course be
satisfactory evidence to support such a
finding, and the court may properly
refuse to permit the apportionment on the
basis of mere speculation.
Pursuant to this rule, courts will admit evidence
of nonuse of seatbelts when the defendant can demonstrate, by
competent and satisfactory evidence, the extent that the
plaintiff's injuries could have been avoided by wearing a
seat belt.

Garrett v. Desa Industries, Inc l; 705 F. 2d 721,

725 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v.

Volkswagen of America, Inc.,

445 F. Supp 1368, 1372-1373 (£.D. Va. 1978); Insurance
Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 52 U.S.L.W. 2598
(Florida Supreme Court; April 12, 1984);

Spier v. Barker,

363 N.E. 2d, at 166.
Whether viewed as a species of comparative fault
under Mulherin or as a failure to mitigate damages, the jury
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in this case should have been permitted to consider the fact
of plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts.
Acceptance of the so-called "seat belt defense" will not
undermine in any way the rights of plaintiffs to recover for
injuries caused them by others.
recovery in and of itself.

The defense is not a bar to

The burden remains on the

defendant to prove, first, that it was unreasonable for the
plaintiff not to use a seat belt, and, second, that the
plaintiff would not have received some or all of his injuries
had he used the seat belt.

Only if AMC/Jeep were able to

convince the jury of both prongs of its defense would the
jury have reduced plaintiff Steven Whitehead's recovery by an
appropriate amount.
B.

The Jury Should have been Permitted to
Consider the Fact that the Commando was
Equipped with Seat Belts.

AMC/Jeep was also denied any opportunity to present
evidence of the simple fact that the Commando in this case
was equipped with seat belts.

Such evidence would have been

presented separately from evidence of plaintiffs' nonuse of
the seat belts and would have been utilized to show that the
Commando was designed safely and properly.
The case of Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978), is directly on point.

As

in this case, the plaintiff in Wilson was injured when his
vehicle overturned during an accident.

As in this case, the
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plaintiff asserted that his vehicle was defective in design
because the roof collapsed during the rollover causing a compression fracture of his spine.

As in this case, the defen-

dant sought to introduce evidence that the vehicle was
equipped with seat belts in order to defend the "whole
automobile."
The court in Wilson, however, admitted the defendant's evidence that the accident vehicle had been equipped
with seat belts for the purpose of determining whether the
automobile was defectively designed, relying upon the simple
and logical proposition that the jury would have to determine
"whether the auto as a whole was defective and unreasonably
dangerous",

445 F. Supp. at 1371, and that the jury could

not properly fulfill its function in this regard if it was
not permitted to take into consideration the presence of a
safety device, seat belts, that were designed to restrain the
plaintiff and prevent, or at least minimize, injury.
As in Wilson, the trial court in this case should
have permitted the jury to consider the presence of seat
belts in the Commando.

As in Wilson, plaintiffs in this case

claim that the Commando, the "whole vehicle," is defective
because it rolled over and collapsed upon them.

MAC/Jeep1s

evidence would have shown that the seat belts were installed
to guard against this type of injury, among others, and that
the Commando was rendered safer by the presence of the seat
belts.

'
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The relevance of evidence of the availability of
seat belts to the issue of the Commando's design cannot be
doubted•

The trial court's ruling in this case, however,

restricted the jury unduly and permitted it to consider only
a part of the Commando in deciding whether the Commando/ as a
"whole vehicle," was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
The result was absurd and prejudicially erroneous for it is
impossible to design a "crashworthy" vehicle which will
protect its occupants from serious injury in the event of an
accident without including in that design the most fundamental safety feature of all —

seat belts.

The judgment of the

trial court must therefore be reversed.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
JEEP CORPORATION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER TO
INCLUDE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
AND IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF AMC/JEEP BASED ON SUCH DEFENSE.
Plaintiffs named American Motors Sales Corporation
and Jeep Corporation as defendants in their Second Amended
Complaint filed July 31, 1980.

(R. 84-37).

Defendant Jeep

Corporation answered on November 11, 1980 (113-114).
Defendant American Motors Sales Corporation answered on
September 12, 1983.

(R. 993-995).

The critical difference

between the two answers was that the answer of American
Motors Sales Corporation contained the following defense:
"The complaint is barred by Section 78-15-3, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended."

(R. 994). On September 12, 1983,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated-OCR,
68may-contain errors.

the same day the Answer of American Motors Sales Corporation
was filed, Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for leave
to amend its answer to include a defense based on Section 7815-3 (R. 983-989).

The trial court denied the motion "on the

basis that the motion was not timely made, the amendment of
the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of
the trial date which the Court feels is unjustified under the
facts and circumstances."

(R. 1271-1272).

After trial had

been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved for a directed verdict based
on Section 73-15-3.

It was pointed out to the trial court

that this defense had been pleaded by American Motors Sales
Corporation in its initial pleading, but the trial court
denied the motion.
A.

(T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775).

The Trial Court Should Have Granted Jeep
Corporation's Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule
15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Jeep Corporation moved the trial court for permission to amend its answer to assert a defense based on Section
78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated.

That section provides that

products liability actions are barred if brought "more than
six years after the date of initial purchase for use or
consumption...."
Plaintiffs1 Commando was manufactured by Jeep
Corporation in December, 1971 (T., 10/25/83, at 930;
R. 2710), for sale by American Motors Sales Corporation
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during the 1972 model year.
October 6, 1979 —

Plaintiffs' accident occurred on

more than six years after the date the

Commando was initially purchased.

AMC/Jeep contends that

plaintiffs' accident occurred "more than six years after the
date of initial purchase for use or consumption" and their
claims are thus barred by the terms of Section 78-15-3.

This

defense raises a purely legal question based on undisputed
facts and was raised contemporaneously by the Answer of
American Motors Saleg Corporation.

The trial court should

have granted Jeep Corporation's Motion to Amend under the
liberal standards of Rule 15(a).
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party in the circumstances presented by this case, and that "leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires."

In Lewis v.

Moultree, 627 P. 2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that
"[t]he rule in this state has always been to allow amendments
freely where justice requires, and especially is this true
before trial."
486 P. 2d 1045,

(Quoting Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165,
(1971) (emphasis in original)).

In the

same case, this Court clarified the "justice" which the
liberal amendment rule is meant to further:
Some tempest has been raised about the
court allowing the plaintiff to make
tardy amendments to pleadings. In doing
so, he [the trial judge] wisely and
properly stated: 'the pleadings are
never more important than the cause that
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is before the court ...• There can be no
prejudice in this case because we'll give
ample time to answer . . . . ' This is in
harmony with what we regard as the correct policy: of recognizing the
desirability of the pleadings setting
forth definitely framed issues, but also
of permitting amendment where the interest of justice so requires, and the
adverse party is given a fair opportunity
to meet it,
627 P. 2d, at 98 (emphasis added), quoting Thomas J. Peck &
Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc.,

30 Utah 2d 137, 515 P.

2d 446 (1973) .
The trial court's denial of Jeep Corporation's
Motion to Amend ignores this Court's liberal construction of
Rule 15(a).

Most importantly, the trial court's statement,

in its order denying the Motion to Amend, that "the amendment
of the answer would cause an undue burden upon the plaintiffs
and other defendants and would result in the continuance of
the trial date" is plainly belied by the fact that American
Motors Sales Corporation interposed precisely the same
defense in its Answer.

(R. 994). It can hardly be said that

any party would have been prejudiced by Jeep Corporation's
interposing a defense that was properly and contemporaneously
interposed in the answer of American Motors Sales
Corporation.

The issue was before the trial court and

"justice required" that Jeep Corporation be allowed to amend
its answer so that it might accord with the answer of its
affiliated corporation.
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Eastridge v. Fruehauf Corporation, 52 F.R.D. 129
(W.D. Ky. 1971) (applying Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which is identical to the Utah rule), demonstrates
the proper approach to a motion to amend an answer to add a
statute of limitations defense.

The plaintiff in Eastridge

sued the defendant for personal injuries allegedly incurred
on account of the defendant's negligence.

Sometime after he

had filed his original answer, the defendant moved the trial
court for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) so that he
might add a defense based on a statute of limitations.
trial court granted the Motion to Amend, and noted the
following:
Statute of limitations are designed
primarily to assure fairness to
defendants; they promote justice by
preventing surprises through revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber
until the evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared; in other words the defense
was designed to protect citizens from
stale and vexatious claims.
The merits of this defense in the instant
action are unimportant at this time;
however, the purpose and legislative
intent involved in the enactment of this
affirmative defense have a very worthy
objective and accordingly, depending on
the surrounding circumstances, such
purpose should not be treated with
indifference.
Where no prejudice results to the adverse
party, the Statute of Limitations can be
subsequently pleaded in an amended
answer, and there is no waiver of such
defense if the answer is properly amended
to include it.
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The

52 F.R.D., at 131.

See also Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.

2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1977); American Air Filter Company,
Inc. v. Industrial Decking and Roofing Corp., 82 F.R.D. 681
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) .
The sound reasoning of the court in Eastridge is
directly applicable to this case.

Utah's interests in

protecting manufacturers against "stale and vexatious claims"
is given voice in Section 78-15-3 and should not have been
"treated with indifference" by the trial court.

Particularly

in light of the fact that the issue was properly before the
trial court in the Answer of American Motors Sales
Corporation, there was no justification for the trial court's
denial of Jeep Corporation's Rule 15(a) motion.

Such denial

was an abuse of discretion which deprived Jeep Corporation of
the possible protection of Section 78-15-3 and v/hich requires
that the trial court's judgment be reversed.
B.

The Trial Court Should have Granted
AMC/Jeep's Motion for Directed Verdict
Based on the Statute of Limitations.

After the trial had been concluded, AMC/Jeep moved
for a directed verdict based on the limitations period contained in Section 78-15-3.

As has been noted above, this

issue was squarely presented in the Answer of American Motors
Sales Corporation.
the trial court.

The motion was denied without comment by
(T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-4775).
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The

trial court's action in this regard is in derogation of
Section 78-15-3.
As quoted above, the limitations period in the Utah
Product Liability Act bars actions brought "more than six
years after the date of initial purchase for use or
consumption..•."

Plaintiffs' Commando was manufactured in

1971 for sale in the 1972 model year.
more than six years later, in 1979.

The accident occurred

Under the plain language

of Section 78-15-3, plaintiffs' action against AMC/Jeep was
time barred.

The trial court's failure to direct a verdict

on this ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment
should therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for six independently sufficient reasons:
First, a new trial is required because the trial
court erred in permitting plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant
and inflammatory evidence;
Second, a new trial is required because the trial
court compounded its first error by blocking AMC/Jeep's
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts;
Third, a new trial is required because the trial
court capped its evidentiary errors by excluding virtually
all of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence;
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Fourth, a new trial is required because the trial
court erred in failing to grant AMC/Jeep's motion for a
mistrial based upon opposing counsels' closing arguments
which stated that AMC/Jeep was "afraid" to produce the very
demonstrative evidence that had been previously excluded by
the trial court;
Fifth, a new trial is required because the trial
court erroneously excluded all evidence relating to the
presence of and plaintiffs' failure to utilize seat belts;
and
Sixth, entry of judgment in favor of AMC/Jeep is
required because the trial court erred in failing to direct a
verdict based on AMC/Jeep's statute of limitations defense.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 1984.

ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR

C. Keith Rooker
Patricia W. Christensen
Thomas B. Green
Attorneys for Appellants
American Motors Sales
Corporation and
Jeep Corporation
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants,
and

:

Case No. 196 95

AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION
and JEEP CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and STEPHEN WHITEHEAD

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Stephen and Deborah Whitehead brought action to recover damages for severe injuries sustained in an automobile accident occurring October 16, 1979, on Interstate 15 within Utah
County.

At the time of the accident, Deborah Whitehead was driving

a Jeep Commando manufactured and sold by American Motors Corporation
and Jeep Corporation.

Stephen Whitehead was a passenger in the Jeep

Commando which was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsnobile driven
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by Larry Anderson who was employed by Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company.

Named as defendants were American Motors Corporation

and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) on the theory of strict product
liability; Larry Anderson on a negligence theory; and Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) on the theory of vicarious
liability.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The action came to trial on October 17, 1983, before the Hon*
J. Robert Bullock sitting with a jury.

During the course of trial,

plaintiff Deborah Whitehead settled her case against all the defendants and the Court dismissed her complaint with prejudice.

After

three weeks of trial, the issues of liability and damages related
to plaintiff Stephen Whitehead were submitted to the jury.

On

November 4, 1983, the jury found that the Jeep Commando, as manufactured by defendant AMC/Jeep, was defective to the extent that
it was unreasonably dangerous to the purchaser or user, and that
the defective condition of the Jeep as manufactured by the defendant
was a proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiff Stephen Whitehead
upon rollover of the vehicle on October 16, 1979.

Judgment was

entered on the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Stephen Whitehead
and against all defendants in the total amount of 51,638,125.00.
Based upon the answers of the jury apportioning the fault among the
defendants, for purposes of contribution and claims and cross-claims
between the defendants, AMC/Jeep was deemed 70% at fault, Larry
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Anderson and VALIC were deemed 30% at fault, and no fault whatsoever was attributed to Deborah Whitehead.
November 8, 1983.

(R. 1362-1364),

Judgment was entered

Upon considering extensive argu-

ment and submitted briefsf the court denied AMC/Jeep's Motion for
Judgment n.o.v., or in the Alternative for a New Trial.

(R. 1642-

1644).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment of the
lower court against defendants American Motors Corporation and Jeep
Corporation.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Set forth below is a concise statement of facts giving rise
to the cause of action heard by the lower court.

Respondent em-

phatically refutes the material purported to be a Statement of
Facts within Appellant AMC/Jeep's brief for the reason that it is
not in actuality a "statement of facts" but is an extremely argumentative, lengthy and repetitious presentation of AMC/Jeep's version of the trial proceedings.
The facts are these.

On October 16, 1979, on a clear after-

noon, Stephen Whitehead and his wife of one year Deborah Whitehead
were driving a Jeep Commando south on Interstate 15 near Orem,
Utah County, Utah.

Although the vehicle was borrowed, Deborah

Whitehead had driven it several times before.

Stephen Whitehead

had just completed his working day and the couple had arranged to
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meet at a commuter parking area along the freeway.

Because Deborah

had prepared Stephen's dinner for him, she drove the vehicle while
Stephen rode as a passenger in the right front seat.

(R. 2145-2147,

2155).
While driving approximately 50-55 miles per hour, the Whitehead's
vehicle was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsmobile driven by Larry
Anderson.

(R. 2147, 2151).

The Oldsmobile was moving at a speed

of approximately 65-70 miles per hour.

The right front of the

Oldsmobile contacted the left rear of the Whitehead vehicle.
Commando went out of control and rolled over.

The

(R. 2151, 2152).

As a result of the collision and roll-over, Deborah Whitehead
received multiple head and limb lacerations as well as various
bruises and abrasions.

(R. 2152).

Stephen Whitehead was severely injured.

He sustained injury to

his spinal chord at the thorasic level of T-ll, (approximately
four inches above the belt level), abrasions over his shoulders and
upper portion of his back, associated tenderness over the left
shoulder, abrasions on his hands and shins, and a severely broken
leg (femur bone).

The injury to the spinal chord rend.ered Stephen

Whitehead paralyzed from the waist down, permanently a paraplegic.
(R. 2254-2257).

Testimony related to the extent of Stephen

Whitehead's injuries comprised nearly an entire day a trial and
over 100 transcript pages.

(R. 2195-2249, 2254-2313).

Naming Larry Anderson as defendant, plaintiffs filed their
original complaint on November 21, 1979, and through amended complaint, subsequently added Anderson's employer VALIC and AMC/Jeep.
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(R. 7-8, 84-87)•

Trial commenced on October 17, 1983, and judgment

was entered November 8, 1983.

(R. 1362-1364).

The trial court

denied AMC/Jeep's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
or in the Alternative for a New Trial.

(R. 1642-1644).

POINT I
AMC/JEEP'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PRE-TRIAL
RULINGS EXPLAINS MANY OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS
OF TRIAL ERROR.
A.

Many Of The Trial Court's Pre-Trial Rulings Were Based
On AMC/Jeep's Failure To Make Discovery.

Appellant AMC/Jeep assigned as error many of the trial
court's rulings on the admissibility of AMC/Jeep's evidence.
Appellant's complaint would be better made if it could cite to the
record where it laid an adequate foundation for the admissibility
of such claimed rejected testimony or evidence or if it would provide, by citation to the record, the relevant explanation made by
the court or the objection of opposing counsel for the rejection
of such evidence.

Set forth below is a brief account of the

court's pre-trial rulings and basis for those rulings.
On March 5, 1981, plaintiff-respondent filed its first set of
interrogatories.

(R. 117-128).

When AMC/Jeep failed to respond

within thirty days as required, plaintiff contacted by phone and
mail AMC/Jeep's attorneys requesting a response.
filed.

No answers were

Thereafter, plaintiff submitted a Motion to Compel on July

6, 1981.

(R. 131-135).

Plaintiff submitted, on September 16,

1981, a First Set of Interrogatories to Jeep Corporation and an
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identical set of Interrogatories to American Motors which constituted the second set of Interrogatories to American Motors.
238-256).

No answers were received.

Two months later, on November

12, 1981, plaintiff again filed a Motion to Compel.
261).

AMC/Jeep failed to respond.

(R.

(R. 257-

A full nine months later, on

August 4, 1982, plaintiff filed a Third Motion For Order Compelling
Discovery.

(R. 584-588).

One year and five months had elapsed

since plaintiff originally submitted its interrogatories.

Finally,

on August 16, 1982, Jeep Corporation filed answers to interrogatories;
however, the answers of Jeep Corporation were totally specious.
In essence, only six of the 43 interrogatories were answered.
(R. 614-636).

Immediately, on August 20, 1982, plaintiff filed a

Motion to Strike Answer, or in Alternative, Motion to Compel.
(R. 641-644).

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Motion For Protective

Order on September 3, 1982, to bar other defendants from taking
the deposition of plaintiff's experts before plaintiff was able
to obtain answers to interrogatories or even the name of AMC/Jeep's
expert.

(R. 656-658).

After exhausting all possibilities of getting cooperation
from the defendant, and in utter exasperation, plaintiff obtained
a hearing before Judge Allen B. Sorensen, the original trial
judge assigned to the case.

On October 29, 1982, Judge Sorensen

heard the plaintiff's motions.

(R. 5007).

At the hearing, attorney

for AMC/Jeep stated to the court that "they [the client] say they
have nothing more than what they have given . . . " Judge Sorensen
stated,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"All right. I will make an order. I will
give you 90 days to get it. If it's not
done — that is 90 days — if it's not
done in that time I will sustain objections
to any evidence from your client on the
issue raised that the evidence touches
upon." (R. 5011).
Judge Sorensen and counsel present then proceeded to work
through the interrogatories individually issuing an order with respect to each one.

(R. 5015).

Judge Sorensen issued an order

similar to that set forth above (90 days) regarding each question
and in addition, stated, "I will have you give them all available
information or reasonably retrievable information as regards the
model 1972 only."

(R. 5018).

AMC/Jeep was ordered to answer many

of the interrogatories within 30 days.

(R. 5034, 5047, 5049).

Setting forth one example, interrogatory number 12 requested
information as to whether Jeep Corporation had determined the approximate center of gravity for Jeep Commandos.
sponded:

Jeep Corporation re-

"Center of gravity figures for the Commando vehicle can

no longer be found."

Upon reviewing the question and answer, the

court stated, "If they can't be found, I don't suppose he can introduce it." Counsel for plaintiff interjected, "Your Honor, the
only thing we ask there is if he has got an expert who's going to
come in here at a later date and testify to the center of gravity,
we want that precluded."

The Court then stated, "[I]f that answer

remains, he is not going to call a witness to answer that and put
that stuff before the jury."

Counsel for plaintiff urged the Court

to appreciate the possibility that AMC/Jeep might bring in an expert to testify regarding the center of gravity, saying "well, we
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computed it after the answers to interrogatories,"

To which the

Court responded, "If he does that, I will order he give you that
information 90 days before trial."

(R. 5036).

In essence, the Court ordered AMC/Jeep to answer some interrogatories within 30 days, some within 90 days, and in no case would
AMC/Jeep be allowed to submit evidence related to the interrogatories asked not given to plaintiff 90 days before trial.
On December 29, 1982, 60 days after the first hearing before
Judge Sorensen, a hearing was held again.

Counsel stated:

Now we are now to December 29, 1982, 60
days later, and we still do not have any
of the information that the Court ordered
Mr. Jensen to provide to us within 30 days.
(R. 5059).
The Court continued through each individual interrogatory not
yet answered by AMC/Jeep.

In addition, the Court ordered that no

expert of AMC/Jeep could be allowed to testify unless the name and
address were provided to opposing counsel within 30 days from hearing, i.e. by January 29, 1983.

(R. 5079, 5080).

On October 7, 1983, ten days before trial, AMC/Jeep had still
failed to comply with the Court's discovery orders and plaintiff,
through a Motion In Limine, moved the Court to prohibit defendant
AMC/Jeep from introducing any evidence pertaining to those certain
interrogatories that defendant failed and purposely refused to answer
in defiance of the Court's rulings.

Plaintiff's Motion In Limine

was comprised of 30 pages wherein plaintiff painstakingly set forth
for Judge Bullock each of plaintiff's interrogatories, AMC/Jeep's
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answer, Judge Sorensen's specific order, any supplemental answer
by AMC/Jeepf and plaintiff's subsequent motion related to defendant's
failure to substantively respond,

(R. 1063-1093),

[See Appendix

for copy of Plaintiff's Motion In Limine].
In pre-trial conference that same day, October 7, 1983, Judge
Bullock considered the plaintiff's motion that defendants be prevented from raising matters to which they failed to respond in their
answers to interrogatories.
between Court and counsel.

The matter was discussed at length
The Court ruled that the defendant

AMC/Jeep could cross-examine, but that based upon its failure to
comply with discovery orders, AMC/Jeep was not to raise any new facts
which had not been supplied to counsel through response to interrogatories.

Judge Bullock conceded, however, that where the same facts

were introduced by plaintiff's witnesses and defendant's witnesses
arrived at a different conclusion, those opinions would be admissible.

(R, 1365).

Plaintiff objects strenuously to defendant AMC/Jeep's total
failure to inform the Supreme Court of these many and material pretrial motions and orders related to AMC/Jeep's case.

It is impos-

sible for the Court to appreciate the rulings of the trial court
without the benefit of knowledge of the entire proceedings.
Briefly, the following subject areas were the objects of discovery sanctions by the trial court, in that AMC/Jeep was precluded
from introducing related evidence based upon its failure to provide
information by way of claiming irrelevancy, vagueness, overbreadth,
or by specifically answering in the negative that the requested infor-
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mation did not exist.

In sum, through multiple court orders by two

trial court judges, AMC/Jeep was precluded from introducing test
results, testimony, or evidence related to:
1)

safety or lack of safety of the Commando as affected

by (i) rollbars, (ii) roofs and doors, and (iii) general instability causing rollovers;
2)

results of any AMC/Jeep's investigation into acci-

dents, injuries or fatalities related to the Commando;
3)

any plans, blueprints, drawings or specifications

related to the 1972 Jeep Commando;
4)

information concerning the center of gravity of the

Jeep Commando as it may relate to rollover propensity or any
other driving or steering characteristic;
5)

testing related to the handling qualities and

characteristics of the Jeep Commando;
6)

testing which may have been performed pertaining

to directional stability or handling characteristics of the
Jeep Commando for years 1966-73;
7)

operational directional stability or handling

characteristics;
8)

the track width, wheelbase, suspension system and

cab enclosure of the Jeep Commando;
9)
mando.

any test driving done by AMC/Jeep of the Jeep Com1

For specific questions, answers, motions, orders and supplemental orders, see Appendix, setting forth plaintiff's Motion In
Limine, R. at 1063-1092, Transcript of Proceedings before J*
Sorensen, December 29, 1982, R. at 5057-5072, and plaintifffs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Interrogatories
to defendant
American Motors Corporation, R. at
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^oo^o/i/:

B.

Sanctions Imposed By The Trial Court As A Result of
AMC/Jeep's Failure To Make Discovery Were Entirely
Appropriate And Supported By Statutory And Case Law,

The trial court's authority to impose sanctions based upon a
party's failure to comply with court orders pertaining to discovery
is established through Rule 37(b)(2) and (d) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure:
RULE 37. FAILURE TO MAKE DISCOVERY: SANCTIONS
(b) Failure to Comply with Order.
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which
Action is Pending.
If a party . . . fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery,
. . . the court in which the action
is pending may make such orders . . .
as are just, and among others the
following:
* * *

(B) An order refusing to
allow the disobedient party to support
or oppose designated claims or defenses,
or prohibiting him from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
* * *

The failure to act described in this
subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is
objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order
as provided by Rule 26(c). (Emphasis
added.)
The trial court's authority to impose sanctions where there
is a failure to cooperate in discovery proceedings is authority not
only expressly conferred by statute but implicit in facilitating
a trial court's duty to control proceedings.

When a party demon-

strates a callous disregard of its responsibilities in discovery,
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the trial court's choice of even extreme sanctions, such as dismissal of the action, is not an abuse of discretion.

Discovery pro-

cedures are meaningless unless violation entails a penalty proportionate to the gravity of the violation.

Sanctions must be avail-

able to the trial court in appropriate cases where a party fails
to comply with discovery orders, not merely to penalize those whose
conduct may be deemed to warrant such sanction, but also to deter
those who might be tempted to such conduct in absence of such a
deterrent.

When a party has displayed a bad faith approach to dis-

covery, it is not only proper, but imperative, that sanctions be
imposed to preserve the integrity of judicial process and due process for other litigants.
In the instant case, the trial court imposed sanctions pursuant to subsection (B) of Rule 37(b)(2).
Even more stringent sanctions imposed by the trial court have
been upheld by the Utah Supreme Court.

In W. W. & W. B. Gardner,

Inc. v. Park W. Village, 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), the plaintiff
served the defendant a first set of interrogatories.

Eight months

later and again one month later, plaintiff served a third set of
interrogatories along with requests for production and a request
for admission of facts.

Defendant failed to respond and, there-

fore, plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment as a sanction
pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
motion was noticed for September 20, 1976.

On September 15,

1976, defendant served its response to the first set of interroga-
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tories (10 months late), its response to the third set (one and a
half months late) and its answers and objections to the request for
admissions of facts (one and a half months late).

The trial court

found, inter alia, that defendant's failure to respond to discovery
was without excuse or justification and that the failure to respond
had caused delay in the prosecution of the case.

The trial court,

imposing the most severe sanction, ruled that pursuant to Rule
37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment by default should
be entered against the defendant on the ground of defendant's persistent failure to respond timely or properly to discovery requests.
The Utah Supreme Court, upon review, noted that in Utah, the
rule allowing for dismissal permitted its invocation regardless of
the reason for the failure to respond to discovery.

The court fur-

ther held that the trial court had discretion as to which sanction
should be imposed.

It sustained the trial court's ruling.

In G. M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534
P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's ruling to dismiss the action based upon defendant's failure
to adequately respond to interrogatories:
Sanctions for refusal to comply with an
order of court or for failure to respond
are set out in Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and are
discretionary with the court.
A discretionary determination may be "reviewed" only in the case of a "gross," "clear,"
"plain," "palpable," or "manifest" abuse
of discretion.
In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 306 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah
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1964), the offending party failed to comply with a pretrial discovery
order to produce documents.

The trial court granted summary judg-

ment against the offending party solely for disobeying that order.
The Utah Supreme Court held:
Whether the failure to comply with the
court's order has been willful and whether
the circumstances are so aggravated as to
justify the action taken is primarily for
the trial court to determine. Unless it is
shown that his action is without support
in the record, or is a plain abuse of discretion, it should not be disturbed.
Court imposing even the most severe sanctions as a result of
a party's failure to make discovery rely upon the United States
Supreme Court decision in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747
(1976) (per curiam).

There, respondents, plaintiffs in an anti-

trust action, failed for 17 months to respond to the satisfaction
of the other parties or to the court to hundreds of interrogatories.
In the face of stern admonishment by the trial court, further delays occurred, yet the trial court refrained from imposing sanctions since all parties were attempting to reach a settlement.
Moreover, respondents, at whom the discovery was directed, changed
counsel and claimed that the transition hindered their ability to
comply.

Finally, a frustrated trial judge dismissed their action

finding "flagrant bad faith" and "callous disregard" of their
responsibility.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's

dismissal, concluding that in view of extenuating circumstances,
there was insufficient basis for the trial court's action.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In re

Professional Hockey Anti-trust Litigation, 531 F.2d 1188 (3rd Cir.
1976) .
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of
Appeals, ruling that the imposition of sanctions was a discretionary decision of the trial judge which must be left undisturbed in
the absence of a flagrant abuse of discretion.

The Court criti-

cized the traditional leniency of the judiciary as improperly
founded on the principle that parties will, if given one more
chance, comply with requests long ignored.

In a major change of

direction, the Court insisted that unconditional impositions of
these sanctions are crucial in deterring "other parties to other
lawsuits" from willingly flouting the "discovery orders of other
district courts."

427 U.S. at 643.

In Votour v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Case No. 79-4686
CA (L) 01 B (Fla. 15th Judicial Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1983), the court
ultimately struck the defense pleadings and entered a default
judgment.

Over a two-year period, plaintiffs had sought pretrial

discovery of crash tests and related material aimed at showing
defendants' actual knowledge that the design safety features of
crash bars and lower leg protection were available, desirable, and
feasible.

Defendants steadily blocked or sought to evade a series

of orders by the trial court granting plaintiffs1 motions to compel
and sanction orders to induce defendants to disclose the relevant
information.
Judge Wessel specifically singled out defendants1 failure to
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respond to orders requiring them to produce crash tests and blueprints of engine guards.

The Court held that although striking

defendants1 pleadings and granting a default judgment was a drastic
sanction, it was nonetheless appropriate for flagrant violations
of the discovery mechanism.
This court must conclude that the defendants1
actions have been evasive and deceptive.
They have been willful and deliberate and
they have been in bad faith and their
actions have been merely calculated to delay,
obfuscate and avoid legitimate disclosures
and to turn the process for discovery in
these courts into an endurance contest, and
a total waste of judicial time and effort.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has so held.

In Adams v.

J. W. Jones Construction, 703 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1983), the court,
applying identical procedural rules, held that where a party willfully fails to comply with the rules of discovery, dismissal with
prejudice is proper.
Appellate courts routinely and properly uphold the sanctions
imposed by trial courts as a result of one party's failure to disclose.

See e.g. Binyon v. Nesseth, 231 Kan. 381, 646 P.2d 1043

(1982); Independent Mfg. Co. v. McGraw-Edison, 6 Kan. App. 2d 982,
637 P.2d 431 (1981); Owen v. F. A. Buttrey Co., 627 P.2d 1233
(Mont. 1981); Drickerson v. Drickerson, 604 P.2d 1082 (Alaska 1972).
It is axiomatic that the trial court is granted broad discretion in dealing with the imposition of discovery sanctions.

See

Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. App. 1982);
JR Construction Co. v. Paddock Pool Const. Co., 128 Ariz. 343, 625
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P.2d 932 (Ariz. App. 1981); Wong v. City and County of Honolulu,
665 P.2d 157 (Ha. 1983); State v. Mai, 54 Or. App. 334, 634 P.2d
1367, aff'd 656 P.2d 315 (1981); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319
(Alaska 1970).
In Matter of Estate of Mora, 611 P.2d 842 (Wyo. 1980), the trial
court ordered that witnesses or exhibits not named or listed within
specified time would not be admissible.

The appellate court upheld

exclusion of evidence since "after two years in which to prepare
for trial, the time set by the court for submission of instructions
cannot be said to be unreasonable.

Mora failed to comply with the

time table set forth in the court order.
nor an abuse of discretion.

The order was not arbitrary

[citation omitted]."

The restrictions placed on AMC/Jeep by the trial court were
by no means the most severe sanctions available to the trial judges.
Many trial courts, faced with a similar factual situation, have ruled
just as the trial judge did in the instant case.
In Fouche v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 646 P.2d
1020, review granted 659 P.2d 766 (Idaho App. 1982), the appellate
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the mechanic's accident reconstruction testimony where
such expert testimony from the mechanic had not been timely disclosed in response to a continuing request for discovery.
In Sequoia Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Halec Construction Co., 117 Ariz.
11, 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. App. 1977), the appellate court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, in a suit for injuries
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sustained when a rollover protection structure on a leased tractor
collapsed, in excluding testimony as to experiments performed
with the tractor on the grounds that such testimony constituted a
last minute surprise and would work a severe prejudice to other
parties who had utilized every discovery procedure available to be
fully prepared for every eventuality*
The only question before this court related to the pretrial
rulings restricting AMC/Jeep is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in making those rulings.

As supported by Utah statute,

Utah case law and opinions handed down by countless high courts from
other jurisdictions, the trial court in the instant case did not
as a matter of law, abuse its discretion in imposing moderate sanctions as a result of AMC/Jeep1s continuous failure to comply with
discovery orders.
Upon appellate review, the function of the
reviewing court is not to put itself in the
place of the trial court and to determine
with hindsight what sanction, if any would
have been most appropriate; . . . [citations
omitted]. In the case at Bar, the trial
judge dealt with the counsel; he was in a
position to assess the [defendant's] claim
of abuse of discovery; and he was in a position to better estimate whether the [defendant's] improper conduct was prejudicing
the [plaintiff's] efforts at trial. We
cannot conclude as a matter of law, that
the trial judge abused his discretion . . .
Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 715 (Wyo. 1980).

See also Kelly

Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Sovereign Broadcasting, Inc., 606 P.2d
1089 (Nev. 1980).
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Finally, in the instant case is found the unique circumstance
of having had two trial judges rule on AMC/Jeep's failure to make
discovery.

The pretrial rulings on October 29, 1982r and December

29, 1982f were rendered by the Hon. Allen B. Sorensen and upon his
retirement, the pretrial rulings related to discovery were rendered
by the Hon. J. Robert Bullock just prior to trial.

In both instances

the trial judges felt it necessary to compel AMC/Jeep tc comply with
discovery orders and upon its failure to do so, issued the appropriate
sanction.

This cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE
PROPER.

The appellants have criticized the trial court's evidentiary
rulings under three points, generally stated as Point I, regarding
the introduction of irrelevant and inflamatory evidence; Point II,
claiming the trial court prevented the defendants AMC/Jeep from crossexamining plaintiff's experts; and Point III, regarding claimed exclusior
of substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's evidence.

The appellants'

arguments are tainted by the failure of the appellants to give
the foundational basis for the court's rulings in each instance
and for taking substantial license with the record.

The only way

in which the respondents can address these blatant assertions of
error is to take each specific contention and address it as it
was raised in the appellant's brief.
A.

That we will do as follows:

Appellant's Objections To The Admissibility Of The
Dynamic Science Film.

The first assertion of the appellants is that the Dynamic
-19-
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Science film prepared for the Insurance Institute of Highway
Safety was irrelevant and referred to conditions and maneuvers
never shown to bear any relationship to the accident.

The appellants

fail to refer to the foundational background to the introduction
of this film.

The record will disclose that a Motion in Limine

was made by the plaintiffs on October 7, 1983.

The court and all

of the parties were given an opportunity in advance of trial to
review the movie developed by Dynamic Science.
The appellants quote extensively from their own objections
to the introduction of the film addressed to the plaintiffs'
Motion in Limine.

The quotation from its own objection is misleading,

since the manner in which the film was introduced in this case
was vastly different than the commentary made in the appellants1
objection, which it now quotes as authoritative.

For example, a

preview was held before the court with counsel and outside the
presence of the jury, (R. 2982) and the portions of the film
showing the movements of dummies in the machine were deleted and
the film portrayal presented to the jury was drastically edited.
Mr. Noettl testified that the CJ-5 on the film demonstrated
handling reactions substantially similar to the manner in which
the Jeep Commando would respond under circumstances and conditions
prevalent in this accident.

Mr. Noettl's qualifications regarding

experience, his technical training, his knowledge of the jeep
vehicle, and the creation of the film in question was thoroughly
and carefully laid over fifteen pages of transcript (R. 2951
through 2966).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the course of that testimony Mr. Noettl was required to
tell of the handling characteristics of the CJ-5, CJ-6 and CJ-7.
This Court should bear in mind that the Commando vehicle in this
case is basically a CJ-6 and there is no dispute as to that
nomenclature.

Mr. Noettl indicated that there was virtually no

difference between the parameters effecting the rollover character!
of the CJ vehicle shown in the film and the subject Jeep Commando.
He testified,
"there were* virtually no differences in my
opinion between those parameters, that is
the width of the track, the dimensions you
would get when you measure the center line
of one tire to the center line of the tire on
the other side, the front and rear, and the
height of the center of gravity of the vehicles."
(R. 2962).
He stated that in his opinion the rollover characteristics of the
CJ-5 were the same as the rollover characteristics of the Jeep
Commando.

(R. 2964 and 2987)

He indicated that many tests were

made of the vehicle, but the tests that were appropriate for
conditions basically similar to that giving rise to this litigation
were the J Turn and the obstacle avoidance maneuver.

(R. 2972)

Adequate foundation was laid to show that Mr. Noettl knew the
circumstances and conditions of this accident, had visited the
scene of the accident, had seen photographs of the vehicle taken
shortly after the accident and he, himself, had been qualified as
an expert accident reconstructionist and an expert on the jeep
vehicle.

The witness testified that the film was material, for

it demonstrated the rollover threshhold of the Jeep Commando
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under circumstances similar to that which occurred on the day and
place of the accident.

The handling characteristics of the Jeep

in the film were further related to the accident by the testimony
of Mrs. Whitehead and by the subsequent testimony of Messrs. Shaw
and Anderson.
Mr. Noettl said that of the four hundred test runs made of
the jeep vehicle, seventy to eighty percent were to check out
instrumentation.

(R. 2991)

Only six runs were made to develop

its rollover characteristics and those runs, as edited to the requirements of the court, were shown to the jury.

(R. 2992)

The

jury was specifically instructed that the plaintiff did not
contend that the dummy sitting in the vehicle in one portion of
the film represented the movement of people in real life, nor the
movement of passengers inside the vehicle.

(R. 2993)

The film

demonstrated that the CJ-5 in a J-turn maneuver on a straight
highway would roll over at 22 miles per hour.

(R. 2994)

In the

obstacle avoidance maneuver, the machine rolled over at 31 and 32
miles per hour.

(R. 2994)

Mr. Noettl testified that because of

its handling and its rollover propensity, the 1972 Jeep Commando
was defective at the date of manufacture.

(R. 2995)

He testified

that the Jeep Commando vehicle would operate identically to the
CJ-5 shown in the film.

(R. 2968, 2969)

Mr. Noettl testified

upon cross examination regarding the J-turn and obstacle avoidance
maneuvers and how they related to ordinary traffic circumstances
one experienced every day and he stated, "I would say, based on
our testing, all the testing I have done, that the likelihood of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the vehicle rolling over is veryf very high when doing those
types of maneuvers."

(R. 3010)

Cross examination was intense

and lengthy, but did nothing to shake the opinion of the expert
that the Jeep Commando was defective when manufactured and his
last statement to Mr. Jensen was, "If a vehicle has the same
track width and the same height and center of gravity, it will
exhibit very closely the rollover threshhold exhibited by the CJ
vehicles-"

(R. 3025)

Mr. Noettl testified that if it weren't for the rollover
propensities of the vehicle as demonstrated by the film, the jeep
would not have rolled upon the relative speed impact of 15 miles
an hour between the Oldsmobile of Mr. Anderson and the Jeep
driven by Mrs. Whitehead.

(R. 3030)

The rollover propensity of

the CJ vehicle shown in the film and which had been tied to the
Jeep Commando in the accident had met the evidentiary foundational
requirement.

How the appellants can contend after reading the

transcript of Mr. Noettl1s testimony that he was allowed to testify
without foundation that the CJ-5 and Commando were identical for
purposes of handling characteristics, is beyond belief.

If ever

there was an adequate foundation laid for the admission of this
testimony and the presentation of the film, it was in this case.
Not only is there an adequate foundation, it might be said that
the foundation was overwhelming and it certainly went to the
heart of the issue.

Relevancy cannot be a factor.

The objection

of the appellants in this case is simply without merit.
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The appellants would have the Court prefer the view of
AMC/Jeep's expert Heitzman over the view of the plaintiff's
experts, Noettl, Shaw and Anderson.

Appellants presume that the

jury and the Supreme Court are compelled to discard the plaintiff's
expert testimony and believe that proffered by the appellants.
If that were so, then, of course, the appellants would be entitled
to judgment; however, the law is to the contrary:
Where there is a discrepancy in the testimony
rendered by witnesses the fact finder must
decide which account is the most accurate and
on appeal the Supreme Court must review the
facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979).
In regard to the admission of evidence, such as the film in
question, broad latitude is given to the trier of fact.

All evi-

dentiary matters were contested and certainly those which went to
the heart of the question upon which there is opposing expert
opinion, were contested.

It is for this reason that the trial

court's view of the testimony is so distinctly superior and so
highly valued at the appellate court level.

Our Court has said:

In situations where exercise of discretion is
appropriate considerable weight should be
given to determination of the trial court due
to the trial court's close involvement with
the parties, the witnesses and the total
circumstance of the case.
Barber v. Calder, 5 22 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974).
Our court is not alone in its interpretation of the rulings of
the trial court.

The position of the Utah court is the general

rule which has been effectively stated as follows:
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Considering the full record we do not have
the definite confirmed conviction that the
court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of the relevant factors that is required
to reverse the judgment,
Wilson v. Volkswagen of America/ Inc./ 561 F.2d 506.
All of the arguments made by appellants regarding the film are
arguments to the weight of the testimony.

The flaws in the film as

viewed by the appellants were covered by the testimony of appellants'
experts and, in fact/ most of the appellants' quotes to the record
are not from the testimony of plaintiff's experts but from the
testimony of the defendants' expert/ consequently, the jury had a
full view of the relevance and materiality of the testimony and
could attach such weight as it desired to the testimony of the
plaintiff's expert/ vis-a-vis, the testimony of the defendants'
expert.
The repeated assertions that the film was "especially prepared" to accentuate rollovers and that the tests were "completely
unrealistic" is not testimony of the plaintiff's expert but is
testimony of the defendants' expert, which the jury was free to
believe or disbelieve and which would materially affect the believability of the plaintiff's experts and in particular Mr. Noettl.
Arguments that four hundred "runs of the CJ-5 were made but only
six were shown" is deceptive when the record shows that full
revelation was made to the jury that 80% of the runs were made for
the purpose of testing equipment and not for the purpose of testing
the vehicle and that only six of the runs shown in this Dynamic
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Science film were related to rollover propensities,

(R. 2994)

All of those rollover propensity film tests were shown to the jury
as edited to meet the admissibility requirements laid down by the
trial judge.
The appellants rely heavily upon Haynes v. American Motors,
691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982).

The difficulty with that reliance

is that the view is inapropos to the issue in this case.

In

Haynes, Jeep T-V commercials were offered for the purpose of showing
actionable misrepresentation, not for the purpose of showing handling
characteristics.

The commercials were of another vehicle which the

plaintiff did not contend was similar.

The key, of course, is the

fact that the question of admissibility is based upon the foundation that is laid, not upon the witness who is testifying.

The

court in Haynes was probably right in its ruling, but there can be
no correlation of the facts in Haynes to the facts in this case
regarding the foundation laid for the admissibility of the testimony or the point to which the testimony was to be admitted.

We

simply say the Haynes case is not in point.
To summarize the arguments of the plaintiff in regard to the
defendants' Point I, it could be said that the motion for the
introduction of the film was made in advance of trial, the film
itself had been in the hands of AMC/Jeep prior to coming into the
possession of the plaintiff, the film was shown to all counsel in
advance of trial and was reviewed by the court, not only before
trial but immediately prior to the exhibition to the jury.
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All

objections were made and appropriate rulings were made to avoid
misleading or inflaming the jury, so that the film as seen by the
jury was directly material and relevant.
The arguments made by the appellants herein are primarily to
the weight of the testimony, vis-a-vis the relevance and materiality of the testimony.

Every issue which it contends affected the

believability of the film was covered by the appellants1 experts
who were given broad license by the court to interpret, criticize
and impugn the film and its relationship to the issues involved in
this litigation.
B.

The admission of the film was not error.

Appellant's Contention That The Trial Court Failed To
Allow AMC/Jeep To Cross-Examine Plaintifffs Experts.

The theme of this point, as presented by the appellants,
stretches the parameters of propriety.

The appellants apparently

believe, for a reason unexplained in the argument, that the trial
court "consistently refused to allow AMC/Jeep to cross-examine
plaintiff's experts in any meaningful way."

(Appellants' Brief p.

37) The appellants' denegration of the trial court is further aggravated by their comment "indeed, AMC/Jeep contends that the trial
court abandoned any pretext of impartiality during the course of
the trial and the jury was permitted to hear only one side of this
case."

(Appellants' Brief p. 3)

The court in this case was one of the state's most experienced
and respected jurists. His position in legal circles and his
prominence among his colleagues, both before and after appointment
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to the bench, is known to every practicing lawyer and judge in the
state.

Does one assume by appellants1 comments that the judge was

motivated by something other than facts and the law?
On pages 36 and 37 of their brief, the appellants make a complaint that plaintiff was allowed to make a comparison between the
Jeep and another passenger car and that the appellants were denied
a similar right.

The appellants refer the court to R. 2331-2332 in

support of this contention.

The fact is that the reference is to a

voir dire examination by the appellants1 counsel wherein any comparison made was as a result of his questions.

Furthermore, the issue

in that particular scenerio was whether the collision between the
Oldsmobile and Jeep would have a particular affect upon a Jeep and
if so, why.

The issue was not as suggested by the appellants, a

hypothetical comparison between Jeeps and passenger cars in general.
The appellants' Point II is disjointed, and topics are intermingled, however, again on page 37 of appellants1 brief, they complain of being "blocked" on cross-examination.
The references shown on page 37 of appellants' brief are not
to the record but apparently to the transcript pace numbers.

A

simple purview of the record cited by appellants will demonstrate
that appellants' counsel was not blocked on voir cire and crossexamination.
AMC/Jeep was allowed to voir dire Officer Knight on three separate occasions during plaintiff's direct examination (R. 2327-2329;
2332-2333; 2342-2343) and to cross-examine four times covering 19

-28-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pages (R. 2346-2352, 2357-2361, 2363-2370, 2373-2374).

There was not

one objection to appellants' cross-examination that was sustained.
In regard to the plaintiff's expert Anderson, the appellants
requested voir dire once (R. 2680-2681) and cross-examination covered
101 pages of transcript.

(R. 2709-2797, 2818-2827, 2832-2833).

The

court allowed the appellants great latitude in examination and
nothing in the record could be considered a "block".
We have heretofore referred to Mr. Noettl's testimony and have
demonstrated the sizeable amount of examination afforded the appellants.

To put it in terms of specifics, however, the record shows

that cross-examination covered 41 pages.
3057-3058).

(R. 2998-3025, 3043-3053,

This cannot be considered a "block".

Furthermore, it

should be remembered that the other defendants were also allowed extensive cross-examination.
In regard to the plaintiff's expert Shaw, the appellants were
allowed to voir dire four times.
transcript pages.

Voir dire by AMC/Jeep covered 15

AMC/Jeep's extensive cross-examination of Shaw

resulted in over 114 transcript pages.

(R. 2438-2439, 2449-2457,

2471-2472, 2484; R. 2496-2565, 2591-2624, 2634-2643).
To illustrate AMC/Jeep's contention of blockage of crossexamination as it speficially relates to Mr. Shaw's testimony, AMC/Jeep
refers the Court to the testimony between 672 and 679 (R. 2450-2457).
The fact is, on 672 (R. 2449), Mr. Jensen commenced a voir dire examination authorized by the court and which ended voluntarily on page
679 (R. 2457).

The court was lenient and tolerant of the questions
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asked.

Plaintiff's only objection to the extensive voir dire examin-

ation now complained of by the appellants is registered on R. 2454.
that objection was overruled.
Unfortunately for AMC/Jeep the responses developed by this
voir dire examination clearly developed that the CJ-5 and the CJ-6
(Commando) were identical.

How that constitutes a "block" is

beyond comprehension.
Taking up the appellants' next example of blocking crossexamination, they cite to R. 4909 which refers to a preliminary
hearing before trial wherein the admissibility of Noettl's film was
discussed.

The reference is properly under the appellants' Point

I, but since it has been raised under Point II, suffice it to say
that the colloquy is primarily regarding the appellants' objection
to the admissibility of the Noettl film and to a great extent is
between Mr. Hanni, counsel for Anderson, and Mr. Jensen.

The court

allowed extensive argument after which the court, having fairly
considered the admissibility of the film, stated, "Well, I'll let
you get at it any way you want to by cross-examination or whatever,
but I'm going to admit it.
respect to those films."

I'll overrule your objection with

How counsel can describe this as "blocking"

meaningful cross-examination is likewise a mystery.
Reference to page 894 of the transcript shows no objection
whatever (R. 2674).

Likewise, page 896 (R. 2676).

Likewise page

897 (R. 2677); pages 10, 1040 (R. 2818, 2819) is recross-examination
by Mr. Jensen. The record as cited by the appellants shows total
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latitude on the part of the court.
The court allowed cross-examination to the edge of contempt.
As hereinafter discussedf the court granted the respondent's pretrial
motion ordering the litigants not to mention seat belts or restraints
until certain foundation evidence was proffered to the court.

The

appellants now contend that the enforcement of that ruling was a
"block" to cross-examination.

On page 1040 (R. 2819), counsel for

appellants purposely and in direct contravention of the order of
the court granting the plaintiff's Motion in Limine, stated:
MR. JENSEN: You mentioned restraints.
are you talking about?"
MR. HOWARD:
that.

What

Now your Honor, I object to

THE COURT SUSTAINED.
MR. JENSEN:
Honor.
THE COURT:

We'll make a proffer, your
Yes.

Counsel for appellants then recognizing the violation and catching
the sensitivity of the court, proceeded no further along that line.
He was given the opportunity to make a proffer, which he did not
make.

The examination violated the preliminary ruling of the court

and any examination along this line before that jury would have
been prejudicial error.

All of the parties knew it and counsel for

the appellants had to recognize that he was on dangerous ground.
How does that constitute "blocking" the appellants from crossexamining in a "meaningful way"?

Does "meaningful way" mean to
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violate the rulings of the court or to infuse reversible error into
the record?
The substance of the "explicit point" complained of by the
appellants on page 37 cf their brief has shown that they all fit in
the same category of testimony elicited by the appellants themselves or from objections sustained by the court because of violation of the court's rulings, but under no circumstance was an
objection sustained that the appellants did not have adequate
opportunity to address, given an opportunity to present contrary
evidence or make a proffer of proof.

A good many of the objections

complained of occurred on appellants1 "voir dire" examination.
None of the citations made by the appellants show any abuse of the
appellants by the trial court, but to the contrary, demonstrate
patience and tolerance with appellants' counsel by the trial court
beyond that which the appellants deserved and which might have been
reasonable.

If there is any fault to be levied against the trial

court it was its continued patience with appellants' counsel under
circumstances that bordered on contempt.

This cannot constitute a

deprivation of a right to cross-examine.
Counsel again refers to the record at 3043 as being indicative
of the court's blocking meaningful cross-examination.

Again we

are back to the same area of the record referred to in appellants'
Point I.

Mr. Jensen is cross-examining the witness.

It is he who

wants to have the witness go into other vehicles, not the plaintiff.

In his cross-examination he is asking questions such as "Is

it difficult to roll over utility vehicles?"

(R. 3043)
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Over ob-

jections, the witness is allowed to state:
Q. Mr. Noettl, you indicated that it was
difficult to roll over a passenger vehicle?
A. Yes, under the conditions I think I tried
to describe, a flat surface, steering input,
only, yes,
Q. What experience have you had in trying to
roll over a passenger vehicle?
MR. JOHNSON:
vancy.

Object on the basis of rele-

THE COURT: I don't want to get into testing
all other kinds of vehicles, because we've
got enough problems with the one. So, I'm
going to sustain the objection.
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to roll
over utility vehicles?
MR. JOHNSON: Object, without the same conditions. If he wants to make a point as it
relates to similar vehicles under the circumstances THE COURT: Yes, I'm going to require that
you define the question MR. JENSEN: I don't know how I get through
the credibility, Your Honor, of a man who
says something about one vehicle and we can't
look at anything he's done or knows about
other vehicles. We'll submit it.
•

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to permit it, and
subject to a motion to strike if it doesn't
go to credibility.
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to turn
over, roll over, utility vehicles?
A. Well, in my opinion the difficulty would
be increased, would be more than the CJ
vehicles. Probably somewhat less than a
passenger car, though. It would be somewhat
less difficult than a passenger car.
Q,

In the same range?
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A.

As what?

Q.

As the CJ, same range of difficulty?

A. I don't know if I understand your
question. Maybe MR. JOHNSON: I might be totally oblivious to
it, but if this goes to credibility, I cannot
see it.
THE COURT: All right. You'll have your
opportunity for a motion to strike, but you
may proceed.
MR. JENSEN:

All right.

Q. (By Mr. Jensen) You say it's more difficult to roll over some other utility vehicle
comparing a CJ to another utility vehicle in
its class?
A.

That would be my opinion, yes.

Counsel goes on and continues to examine the witness through
page 3052.

The court overruled every objection made by the plaintiff

but one, and that was to the question of an occupant protection
standard that was not in effect at the time of the accident and to
which Mr. Jensen was attempting to cross-examine.

Except for that,

the cross-examination was entirely in favor of the appellants and
to the greatest part over the objection of the plaintiff.

To now

accuse the court of blocking the appellants' meaningful crossexamination is incredible.
In the interest of brevity, because the factual contentions
have been addressed, be it said that arguments of the appellants in
regard to this point are simply that.

The appellants have failed

to show by one reference to the record that there was any failure
of the court to give fair treatment to the appellants.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rulings of

this court in this regard on evidentiary matters are adequately
cited under Part A above; however', rulings of appellate courts in
this area are legend to the effect that the trial court has broad
discretion:
The Supreme Court accepts the version of
facts of a party in whose favor a jury
verdict was rendered and reviews evidence and
all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom
in light most favorable to him.
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344 (1965), 400 P.2d 570.
The trial court has broad discretion in
rulings admitting or rejecting evidence in
the course of a long and difficult trial and
those orders will not be disturbed unless
clear abuse of discretion appears and prejudice results therefrom.
Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halel Construction Co., 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz.
1977).
Addressing the Todorovich case referred to on page 40 of the
appellants' brief (Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123
(Wyo. 1978)) the respondent respectfully suggests that the case
is not in point.

Certainly one could not quarrel with the conclusion

reached by the Wyoming Supreme Court, however, there is nothing
in that case which is similar.

The respondent respectfully suggests

that in Todorovich, there was no violation of a previous ruling of
the court by Chrysler's counsel.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming simply

said that the issue had been raised by the plaintiff and to which
the respondent Chrysler had a right to cross-examine.

Furthermore,

the issue was a defectively designed seat which went directly to
the question of causation, vis-a-vis the seat belt question which
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the court in this case had determined not to be related to proximate
cause or to mitigation of damages.

See respondent's argument Point

IV infra.
In the cross-examination of Mr. Noettl by Mr. Jensen that we
have already referred to and which is again referred to in
appellants1 brief as R. 3043f Mr. Jensen is allowed to re-cross
the witness, which he did for twelve pages of transcript and
which he augmented by a re-re-re-cross-examination.

He was

allowed to ask every question related to his theory of the case
except he was prevented from cross-examination of Mr. Noettl in
regard to Federal Safety Standard 298.

The reason that he was

denied permission to go into Standard 208 is that it was outside
of the scope of direct examination.

The plaintiff had not referred

to it in any of the questions asked of Mr. Noettl or of any other
witness.

Further, it was in contravention of the Pretrial Order

pertaining to internal retention devices, e.g.

safety belts.

By

a left-handed technique, counsel fcr the appellants was attempting
to interject the failure of Mr. Whitehead to use a safety belt,
notwithstanding the fact that he had been repeatedly warned by
the court to stay away from that issue, in light of the court's
ruling on the Motion in Limine.

Knowing that Standard 208 related

to restraint systems and seat belts and knowing further that the
trial court did not understand that fact, the colloquy which appellants claim as a blockage of meaningful cross-examination is as
follows:
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Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Well, you told Mr. Hanni
that you thought there were practically no
safety standards applicable, that may be
overstating it, that there were relatively
few federal standards that applied to utility
vehicles and a lot or more that applied to
passenger vehicles. Now, is there something
besides brakes and roofs?
A. Yes. A Standard 208, which covers
occupant protection, doesn't apply to the
utility vehicles, door retention standards.
Q.

1972?

A.

It does not, yes, apply.

Q.

What are you talking about?

A. Well, I am trying to tell you what
standards that I can speak of from memory
would not apply to the vehicle that we are
talking about.
Q. But I don't understand this last standard
you are talking about. What was that pertaining to?
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I object on the
basis of relevancy.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

THE WITNESS: The standard I was talking
about was the 208 Occupant Protection
Standard, probably wasn't in effect in the
form it is today, and it doesn't apply, to my
knowledge, to utility vehicles, is all I am
saying.
Q. (By Mr. Jensen)
refer to?
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

The 208, what does that

Objection.

All right.

MR. JOHNSON:

May we approach the bench?
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THE COURT: All right. Just a minute. Hold
your answer. And counsel/ approach the
bench/ please.
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was
held between counsel and the Court at the
bench.)
THE COURT: The objection to the last
question is sustained, you may proceed.
The court was informed at the bench conference that Standard
208 related to seat belts and was obviously pursuaded that the
intent of appellants' counsel in this regard was in direct contravention of the previous ruling of the court and in contravention of
the court's admonition to the lawyers in advance of the hearing,
"Therefore there will no no more evidence in this case with regard
to seat belts.
from there."

I want everybody to leave it alone and we'll go
(R. 3807-3808)

Notwithstanding this very clear

admonition, appellants attempted to open the door to that very
subject from which he was prohibited.
In summary, the appellants' contention under this point is without|
merit and the references made to the record are in substance specious
The inference against the trial court is unprofessional and inaccurate.

Every citation made by the appellants supports the proposition

'3L
v
if

that the trial court bent over backwards to give appellants' counsel
every opportunity to expound his theory of the case, even to the ex-

,^

tent of allowing him to extend the boundaries established as the
law of the case.
C.

Appellants' Contention That The Trial Court Erred In
Excluding Certain Of AMC/Jeep's Evidence.

The respondent takes some small umbrage against the bald
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assertions made by appellants to the effect that the trial court
was incompetent or corrupt, e.g. the following language from
appellants' brief:
The first two points in this brief illustrate
the unfair advantage accorded plaintiffs by
the trial court in permitting them to introduce irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence and then blocking AMC/Jeep's crossexamination with respect to that evidence.
Compounding those errors and removing any
vestage of fundamental fairness from the
proceedings, however, the trial court then
systematically barred the introduction by
AMC/Jeep of virtually all of its demonstrative evidence offered to rebut the unfounded implications raised by plaintiffs'
experts. Appellants' Brief p. 42.
That paragraph is an unwarranted attack on the integrity of
the trial court.
Suffice it to say that Parts A and B have been adequately
addressed and frailties of the respondent's arguments revealed.

In

Point III appellants take issue of the court's refusal to allow the
Heitzman film.

In doing so the appellants again fail to point out

the court's pre-trial rulings relating to plaintiff's Motion in
Limine.

Those combination motions comprised some thirty pages and

in effect pointed out the interrogatories propounded to the defendants and the specious and evasive answers made by the defendants.
Those motions also pointed out that three Motions to Compel had
been made prior to the Motion in Limine and notwithstanding the
fact that the court had ordered the defendants to answer all of the
questions therein specified in the motion, defendants had failed
and refused to do so.

(See R. 1063 through 1093.)

-39-
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To the question

of the admissibility of films, most of which was covered by
Heitzman's testimony, Judge Sorensen had previously specifically
barred the admissibility of such testimony by reason of the failure
of the appellants to respond to the interrogatories.

These matters

are addressed clearly in Point I above and have been set forth as
the basis for the court's rulings.
Were not Heitzman's film objectionable for other reasons, it
was properly barred by the court for the reasons specified in Point
I above, to-wit: that the plaintiff was never advised that Heitzman
as the defendants' expert, nor of the tests that he had made for
Jeep which it deemed apropos to the instant case.
The colloquy concerning the offering of that film commences on
Record page 3336 wherein Mr. Mandelbaum, co-counsel for the
appellants AMC/Jeep, has called Mr. Heitzman and proposes to introduce the film with that witness.

The court excused the jury and

the interchange between court and counsel takes place over some
twenty pages of transcript.

(R. 3339 through 3358)

The substance

of the objection made by the respondent and cross-claimants was
that the film was not relevant to the questions involved in this
case.

It was not designed to demonstrate the handling characteristics

of the 1972 Commando.

In substance, it was a test made by Mr.

Heitzman, presumably at the instance of Jeep, concerning the
handling characteristics and qualities of numerous other vehicles
whose handling characteristics AMC/Jeep contended was worse than
the Commando.

Presumably Mr. Heitzman was going to say that other

vehicles were worse and he had some movie portrayals of vehicles
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manufactured by other companies that failed to perform adequately
to certain tests to which they were subjected by Mr. Heitzman.

The

film was totally objectionable for that reason alone, since the
question of manufacturing or design defects in other vehicles was
not at issue.

Even if one conceded, arguendo, that all of the

vehicles portrayed in Mr. Heitzman's film were defective, that
would not relieve AMC/Jeep from liability to the plaintiff in this
case.

The question before the jury and the court was whether the

Jeep Commando which was the subject of this litigation was defective and whether such defect rendered it unreasonably dangerous.
In the October, 1983 hearing before Judge Sorensen regarding
the plaintiff's Motion to Compel, the following exchange took place
involving questions propounded about tests of the vehicle conducted
by AMC/Jeep:
MR. JENSEN: I think that is what they try
to say, "due to the fact that records relating
to this subject would be quite old it is
possible that some records relating to this
subject had been destroyed."
THE COURT:

That is an equivocal answer.

MR. JENSEN: Let's try again, let's try
again, I agree.
THE COURT: Don't equivocate.
a yes or no.

It's either

MR. HOWARD: Is the court ordering him to
answer the question?
THE COURT: You have either got to answer them
or you haven't got them. You should be able
to take care of 17 in thirty days.
MR. JENSEN:

Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, I will give you thirty days
to respond to Interrogatory 17. Are we making
Digitized
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AMC/Jeep never answered Questions 17 or 18.

In the pre-trial

motion to Judge Bullock (R. 1084) plaintiffs moved the court that
defendants be precluded from introducing any evidence regarding
testing on the Jeep Commando and further be restricted from introducing any testimony or evidence with respect to the handling
qualities and characteristics of the Jeep and the applicable safety
standards and criteria used by Jeep in the design of the Commando.
When the matter of the test came up Mr. Mandelbaum said they
didn't answer the questions concerning the tests conducted by Mr.
Heitzman because they were not made at the instance of AMC/Jeep but
rather at the request of the law firm of Joslin and Treat, who had
the work done at the request of the general counsel of American
Motors Corporation.

(R. 3341)

After that evasive reply and after

additional colloquy the court said:
What was the reason for not letting them know
that you had it prior to this time and furnish
them a copy or permitting them to see it?
Mr. Mandelbaum: There hasn't been any discovery
that we haven't seen any of the things their
experts have, (sic) We haven't shown them
anything our experts have. It wasn't requested
until.interrogatories, your Honor.
It appears that because AMC/Jeep did not submit even one
interrogatory to the plaintiff and, therefore, did not get
corresponding answers that fact is somehow an excuse for not
answering the interrogatories of the plaintiff and complying
with the court's order.

That type of reasoning is irrational.

The plaintiff pointed out that while the plaintiff had submitted to the defendants AMC/Jeep three sets of interrogatories,
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two had been evasively answered, which had been the subject of
three Motions to Compel, and one whole set of interrogatories were,
at the time of trial, still unanswered.

(R. 3343)

At the time

that Judge Sorensen ruled on this subject in October of 1983 and at
a time when everyone knew the gravity of the questions being asked
of AMC/Jeep, there could be no question regarding the importance of
these tests and the results that were obtained.

At the time of the

original argument which was set forth in the plaintiffs' Motion in
Limine, it was reiterated.

(R. 1081 through 1084, R. 3344)

Earlier,

in October, 1983, counsel for the plaintiffs asked Judge Sorensen
concerning the questions which he had ordered them to answer,
including this one, "Judge, what happens if they don't provide it?"
(The answers to the question.)

Judge Sorensen said, "I'll sustain

the objection to the introduction of it."

(R. 3341)

The matter

was further complicated because Interrogatory 18 went to the same
issue.

Interrogatory 18 said, "State whether Jeep Corporation or

Kaiser Jeep Corporation ever tested or evaluated the directional
stability or handling chacteristics of the Jeep Conmandc automobile
for the model year 66 to 73 under impact conditions•"

The response

of Jeep was, "Defendant is uncertain as to what type of testing
plaintiff is requesting."

In arguing that point to Judge Sorensen,

the court said, "That is a weasling answer, Mr. Jensen."

However,

the plaintiffs never got a better answer from AMC/Jeep despite the
court's ruling that better answers be provided.

In light of the

extensive argument made, both to Judge Sorensen at che time of the
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various Motions To Compel Answers and the Motion in Limine made
prior to the commencement of trial and in light of the more than
twenty page argument made to the court at the time the Heitzman
film was marked, the court was certainly within its right to make
the ruling it did in regard to the admissibility of the said film.
The court stated:
The Court: (R. 3353) I'm ready to rule and
I think in the context of all the circumstances and with respect to discovery pro. cedures which have heretofore been taken in
this case, I think the plaintiffs were entitled to have or to see the films and test
results before the trial pursuant to the
discovery interrogatories and in accordance
with the rules of civil procedure and consistent with the prior rulings of this court
and another division of this court, the films
are not admissible.
Mr. Mandelbaum:
to both films?

Your Honor, does that apply

The Court: That applies to the one with the
CJ-5. Now the other one rests on a different
principle, I think, and the question that I
have there is, the relevancy of it.
(R. 3353).
In the second film the question of relevancy concerned the
numerous portrayals of vehicles other than AMC/Jeep vehicles. The
court found that film to be irrelevant and certainly immaterial.
The court's ruling provoked additional argument by appellants'
counsel, to which the court generously and patiently listened.
Reading of the transcript shows Job-like patience on the part of
the court under strident protestations of the appellants' counsel.

-44-
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At the conclusion of additional argumentf which comprises almost
six pages of transcript, the court said, "Well, I think that my
ruling applies to both films. Okay, we'll call the jury back and
get on with the trial."

(R. 3358)

The films offered by Heitzman were simply inadmissible because
of appellants' violation of the orders of the court.

In addition,

the court determined that the films were not relevant.

The persuasive

effect of the film cannot be demonstrated or argued without its
admission in evidence.
Matters not admitted in evidence before the
trier of fact will not be considered on
appeal before the Supreme Court.
Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah
1983); In re Estate of Kropf, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978); Corbett v.
Corbett, 24 Utah 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970).
The appellants are simply hoisted with their own petard, and
rightfully so. They should not now be heard to complain about what
they deem the trial court's "systematically" barring the introduction of the appellants' demonstrative evidence.

The mischief of

the appellants' argument is that it fails to cite those portions of
the record giving rise to the court's ruling.

You would think from

reading the appellants' brief that the court willy-nilly ruled that
the plaintiffs' evidence was admissible and AMC/Jeepfs evidence was
not.

No contention could be further from the truth.
The second film which AMC/Jeep contends was erroneously re-

jected was that made by Dr. Charles Warner during the trial.
Warner's film was rejected for the same reasons applicable -o the
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Heitzman filn.

The film was first presented on October 31, 1983,

some thirteen days after the commencement of the trial. After
viewing the film, in camera, the plaintiffs registered the
following objections:
1.

The film was within the purview of interrogatories 17 and

13 and had never been specified to the plaintiffs.
been cut off by rulings of the court.

Discovery had

The appellants AMC/Jeep were

to have furnished all of said material within thirty days of Judge
Sorensen's ruling in October of 1983 and certainly no later than
ninety days prior to trial.
2.

The film was not illustrative of any of the issues in the

case, for it simply portrayed Dr. Warner driving the vehicle in and
out of a shed, taking it to the scene of the accident with a movie
camera fixed in place somewhere near the middle of the driver's
seat, ptesumably to reflect the scene that would have been visualize
by the driver.

One aspect shows the vehicle on a parking lot

maneuvering and coming to a stop.

On the fourth test he has outrigc

on, but there is no showing that the maneuvers in the parking lot
with the outriggers on were in any way illustrative of what had
taken place on the highway on the day of the accident.
no testimony concerning it.

There was

Dr. Warner did not know at what speeds

the turns were made and one could not tell by looking at the film.
(R. 3762)

The substance of the objection is reiterated again but

the colloquy between court and counsel regarding the Warner film is
indicative of the problem confronting the court related to the
offer of two films through Warner.

(R. 3763)

The films were
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Exhibits 174 and 175:
THE COURT:
the 174?

And when were these films made,

MR. JENSEN:
two days.

174 has been made within the last

MR. JOHNSON:
MR. HOWARD:
MR. HANNI:

Saturday?
Saturday.

October 29, 1983.

The film (Exhibit 174) made by the appellants with a 1972
Jeep Commando Exemplar was made on the Saturday thirteen days
after trial commenced and two days before Warner was offered as a
witness.

After seeing the film, the court ruled that it did not

have probative value and further said:

"I believe the test was not

timely made and is precluded under the rules that we have heretofore established,"

(R« 3774)

The other film (Exhibit 175) was made in 1969, but was of a
Ford vehicle showing people being thrown about as it was rolled
off of a ramp.

(R.

3765 through 3775)

The court viewed the film,

listened with patient understanding to the arguments of counsel and
ruled that Exhibit-175 was not relevant, had no probative value and
was, therefore, inadmissible.

(R. 3774)

It is not sufficient for the appellants to say the court
allowed the plaintiff's films but did not allow the appellants1
films.

There was a vast difference between the foundations laid by

the plaintiff for the admissibility of his film and that offered by
the appellants.

It is hardly in good taste to levy the blame for

the appellants' failure

of proof by taking one of the comments of
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the court out of context and labeling it as "simply inexplicable in
light of the fact that plaintiff had previously been allowed to
introduce a film of their own Exemplar Commando."

Reading of

Record 3761 through 3775 demonstrates that the court's ruling was
nothing but explicable.
The Supreme Court will not assume from appellants' argument
that the trial court has abused its discretion in its rulings on
admitting or rejecting evidence.

See Sequoia Mfg. Co. v. Halec Con-

struction Co., supra; Wilson v. Volkswagen of America; Inc., 561
F.2d 506; Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974).
Appellants cite Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., Inc., 487
F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973) cert denied 415 U.S. 978 (1974), for the
proposition that if the plaintiff offers evidence on a point, the
defendant has the right to rebut the testimony.

Contrary to the

commentary of appellant, the court in Walker, supra, acknowledged
that "state of the art" has no relevance to the defense of an action
founded on strict liability.

Walker, supra, at 600.

Further Walker

did not involve a failure of a party to comply with discovery orders
and did not involve tests conducted during trial.
Concluding, one cannot answer the assertions of the appellants
regarding what it deems to be the unfairness of the trial court,
except to say that arguments should be made on the basis of the
record not by characterizations impugning the motives of the trial
judge.

The plaintiff respectfully represents that the record

totally and fully supports the conclusions reached by the trial

-48-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court on evidentiary matters, including those argued under this
point of the appellants' brief•
POINT III
ARGUMENTS MADE BY COUNSEL OPPOSED TO AMC/JEEP
DID SOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
AMC/Jeep contends that statements by counsel at closing argument constitute reversible error.

The plaintiff does not quarrel

with the fact that counsel should, at all timesf conduct themselves
consistent with standards of professional conduct, however, one has
to take the argument of counsel for the defendants in light of all
of the facts that were presented to the court and to the jury.
Giving regard to the information available to opposing counsel
before this trial commenced, none of them had any knowledge of
tests or evidentiary data developed by Jeep that would in any way
explain Jeep's theory of defense•

Because the evidence proffered

by Jeep during the course of the trial regarding tests and the
results of tests was inadmissible, primarily because of the nefarious strategy and tactics of AMC/Jeep regarding their own anticipated evidence, appellants' counsel had a right to address the jury on
the basis of the state of the record, not on the basis of what
AMC/Jeep thought the record ought to be or on the basis of what the
record might have been had AMC/Jeep complied with the rules. This
Court has said that matters not admitted in evidence before the trier
of fact will not be considered on appeal before this Court.
v. State Dept. of Social Security, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983).
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Pilcher

Appellants label Mr. Hannifs argument as misconduct.

The answers

of the appellants to the interrogatories submitted by the plaintiff are absolutely consistent with Mr. Hanni's arcument and he had
a total right to make that argument.

It was not his duty to point

out the inconsistency between the appellants' responses to the interrogatories and their later claims of tests made during the course
of trial or closely thereto.
The mischief of AMC/Jeep's argument is its attempt by its
own methods, i.e. its failure to comply with discovery orders, to
control the scope of the plaintiff's argument.

By making proffers

of inadmissible evidence, AMC/Jeep deems itself authorized to
control the plaintiff's argument related to the weight of the
evidence.

In fact, it is clearly appropriate for counsel to

argue the weight of the evidence based upon the state of the record.

The best evidence offered by AMC/Jeep is found in that

introduced by them at trial and in the assertions set forth in their
answers to interrogatories that no such evidence was available.
Counsel was not compelled to rely upon appellant's assertions that
it possessed persuasive evidence; instead, counsel argued and the
jury reached its verdict relying upon the evidence presented at
trial.

It was entirely appropriate for counsel to present argument

related to the weight of the evidence.
The most that AMC/Jeep can say about Mr. Hanni's argument is
that it was vigorous.

Even so, the court's instruction to the

jury that arguments are not evidence and that they should rely
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upon the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence received
rather than upon the arguments of counsel, does all that is
necessary to put the argument of Mr. Hanni into proper context.
That admonition of the court is further amplified by Instruction Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 15.

In addition, the court/ at the outset

of the trial before the opening statements, advised the jury that
statements of counsel were not evidence in the case and not to be
considered as such.

At the beginning of the plaintiff's opening

statement, counsel for the plaintiff stated (R. 1768):
As the court instructed you yesterday, the
statements of counsel are not evidence in the
case and they are not to be deemed by you as
such. The lawyers are allowed tc make an
opening statement to aid and assist the jury
in understanding the case.
That statement, augmented by the instructions themselves, clearly
told the jury that the statements of counsel were nothing more than
argument.
Furthermore, AMC/Jeep is precluded from now claiming reversible
error as a result of counsel's closing argument by way of its failure
to timely object to the alleged prejudicial statements.

It is

fundamental that a party who objects to arcument must allow the court
an opportunity to cure the defect before the jury deliberates.
The court in Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank and Equipment Co., 9 3
N.M. 685, 604 P.2d 823 (N.M. App. 1979), held that alleged error,
with respect to plaintiff's attorney's remark during closing argument, was not preserved for review where defendant die not object
to such remark or request the judge to caution the jury.
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Defendant did not object to the above portion
of oral argument nor was the judge requested
to cauticn the jury. . . • The objection
to alleged improper argument must be specified and made known to the court so that
the court may intelligently rule thereon.
When that is not done, the proposition is
not properly reviewable on appeal. In any
event, the trial court has wide discretion
in controlling argument of lawyers in addressing the jury and absent a clear abuse of
discretion, it is not for us to interfere.
Grammer, 604 P.2d at 831; Unified School District No. 490 v.
Celotex Corp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 629 P.2d 196 (Kan. App. 1981);
Ingrum v. Tuscon Yellow Cab Co., 131 Ariz. 523, 642 P.2d 868 (Ariz.
App. 1981); Joly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 502 P.2d 362 (Wyo. 1972).
In Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041
(1976), the court held that the defendant had failed to preserve
his claim of error in regard to statements made by plaintiff's
counsel during closing argument where, although defendant objected
to such statements, the defendant failed to request a corrective
instruction.
The Utah Supreme Court has so held.

In Hill v. Cloward, 14

Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962), the court held that a party must
promptly object and move for a mistrial or ask for cautionary instructions where something occurs which that party deems prejudicial
The court further held that where the complaining party fails to
so object, he waives whatever rights may have existed to do so.
[CJounsel let the incident pass without
objection and without a request to rectify
any harm he thought had been done. Fair
play and good conscience required that he do
so at the earliest opportunity. It would
be manifestly unjust to permit a party to sit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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silently by, believing that prejudicial
error had been committed, proceed with the
trial to its completion, and allow the jury
to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see
if he wins, then if he loses, come forward
with a claim that such an error rendered
the verdict a nullity. . • . The court
will not countenance any such mockery of its
proceedings* If something occurs which the
party thinks is wrong and so prejudicial
to him that he thereafter cannot have a fair
trial, he must make his objection promptly
and seek redress by moving for a mistrial,
or by having cautionary instructions given,
if that is deemed adequate, of be held to
waive whatever rights may have existed to
do so*
Counsel for AMC/Jeep failed to timely object to any statements
made during closing arguments; therefore, AMC/Jeep is now precluded
from raising such an objection*

Notwithstanding, closing argument

of counsel was entirely appropriate in that counsel based its closing
argument entirely upon the stated record.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE RELATED
TO SEAT BELTS WAS PROPER AND WELL WITHIN THE
COURT'S DISCRETION.
The State of Utah has taken neither a legislative nor judicial stand on the issue of the use of seat belts.

There exists no

controlling or even helpful case law within this jurisdiction regarding the issue of admissibility of evidence related to the use
of seat belts; therefore, trial courts in Utah are compelled to
consider .rulings issued by other courts in various jurisdictions.
The law on the admissibility of seat belt evidence has been
in a state of flux.

The policy implications of the various rules
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have been roundly debated, with a resulting patchwork-quilt of
state law on the issue.

In some states such evidence is wholly

inadmissibile, on the theory that automobile manufacturers must
design a vehicle that is safe for those who, foreseeably, will
not wear seat belts.

In other states, the seat belt defense is

admissible under either a contributory negligence or mitigation
of damages rationale*
A. The Trial Court Ruled That Before Failure To Use A Seat
Belt Could Be Used As A Defense, It Would Have To Be
Shown That Plaintiff Knew Of The Availability Of Seat
Belts And Made A Conscious Decision Not To Use One.
In the instant case, counsel for plaintiff submitted a Motion
in Limine regarding the admissibility of seat belt evidence.
1274-1294)•

(R.

Defendant AMC/Jeep submitted memoranda in opposition

to plaintiff's Motion in Limine.

(R. 1425-1464).

On October 18,

1983, at the beginning of trial, the trial court ruled on plaintiff's Motion in Limine, granting the Motion in part:

no refer-

ence to seat belts was to be made on behalf of any party during the
opening statements.

The judge further ruled, however, that if

after the plaintiff's case any party wanted to introduce the subject of seat belts, they could made a proffer of proof at that
time out of the presence of the jury.

Judge Bullock advised all

counsel that when such a proffer was made, he would rule as to
the relevancy.

(R. 4959).

On October 24, 1983, counsel for plaintiff made a proffer to
the court that expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiff would
testify that even had the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead been utilizing seat belts, such use would not have prevented the injuries
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sustained and probably would have aggravated the injury.

(R. 4893).

Judge Bullock gave defendant AMC/Jeep the opportunity at that time
to make its proffer of proof regarding seat belt evidence.
AMC/Jeep declined to make such a proffer at that time.

Defendant

(R. 4894).

On October 31, 1983f AMC/Jeep made proffer that if its witness
were so asked, he would respond that, "Had he been using the seat
belt in all probability he would not have received the spinal injury
that he did receive."

(R. 3806).

Counsel for plaintiff Whitehead

notified the Court of the total failure to show that plaintiff
Whitehead, a passenger in a borrowed vehicle, even had notice of
the existence of seat belts in that vehicle, a 1971 Commando.
The trial court, based upon the voluminous memoranda submitted
by counsel and multiple opportunities for oral argument, ruled
as follows:
I've read the memoranda and some of the
cases with regard to seat belts, and my
conclusions are that there must be some
showing that Mr. Whitehead knew of the
seat belts and made a conscious decision
not to use them.
Second, there must be a duty to use the
seat belts, either statutorily or circumstantial; that is, as far as circumstances
are concerned, an awareness that under the
circumstances danger is likely to occur in
the vehicle which could be minimized by
the use of seat belts, some special circumstances.
And three, under the facts as I see them
in this courtroom from the testimony of
the witnesses, it — the question as to
whether or not the injury would have occurred
in this rollover, precisely the way that —
well, as the witnesses, some of them testified that it did, or that the use of seat
belts would have made any substantial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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difference, is a matter too speculative
for this jury to determine or to consider.
It's a highly speculative thing, especially
in view of the buffetting about, the question as to when the injury occurred, and the
fact that there isn't any question but that
the accident occurred and the injury to the
vehicle occurred.
And to speculate what the seat belt might
have done in this type of a situation is
just something that the jury ought not to,
and they will not have under my ruling,
the obligation to consider.
Therefore, there will be no more evidence
in this case with regard to seat belts. I
want everybody to leave it alone, and we'll
go from there.
(R. 3807-3808).
The seat belts in the Commando vehicle were under the seat and
as proffered by plaintiff's counsel, the plaintiff had no knowledge
that the vehicle was equipped with seat belts and accordingly,
could not have made a conscious decision not to use the restraints.
It must be remembered that the vehicle was a 1972 model and it may
well be expected by a reasonable person, that a vehicle of that age
would not have seat belts.

The court invited the defendants to

proffer contrary evidence; however, at no time was evidence proffered
by the defendants that the seat belts were visible or reasonably
accessible to the occupants therein.
As set forth hereinafter, the trial court's exercise of
discretion to exclude seat belt evidence was based upon similar
rulings within similar factual situations throughout a multitude
of jurisdictions.
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B.

There Must Be Imposed Upon A Plaintiff A Duty Before
Negligence Can Be Found And There Exists No Statutory
Nor Common Law Duty To Utilize A Seat Belt*

AMC/Jeep contends that plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt
was a breach of duty to use the degree of care a reasonable person
would have observed for his own safety.

In support, appellants

cite a Utah case decided under a totally dissimilar factual setting,
a railroad crossing incident unrelated to the seat belt issue.
Courts in most jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff has
no duty whatsoever to utilize seat belts.

The overwhelming

majority of states have determined that it is an automobile's
occupant who has the prerogative whether or not to utilize a seat
belt.
We do not adopt, at this time . . . that
an occupant of an automobile either knows or
should know of the additional safety factor
produced by the use of seat belts.
•

*

*

. . . [T]he issue of the social utility of
the use of seat belts is definitely not clarified
in the mind of the public and the courts. Doubts
remain as to whether seat belts cause injury,
and the real usefulness of the seat belt in
preventing injuries has not become public
knowledge.
•

*

*

The social utility of wearing a seat belt
must be established in the mind of the
public before failure to use a seat belt
can be held to be negligence. Otherwise
the court would be imposing a standard of
conduct rather than implying a standard
accepted by society. [Citations omitted].
Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 897 (w. D. Penn.
1975).
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In Hampton v. State Highway Commission, 498 P.2d 236 (Kan.
1972), the court considered the defendant's argument that in failing to utilize his seat belt, the plaintiff fell below that standard
required of a reasonable man in protecting his own safety:
Neither, we believe, was he falling below
the standard required of the reasonable,
prudent .nan. We have nothing before us on
which we could confidently base the finding
that the accepted community standard of
care requires one to buckle up routinely;
experience dictates to the contrary.
Although Utah has passed legislation related to the design,
installation and specifications of seat belts in vehicles operated
within the state, no statute exists which requires occupants to
utilize seat belts.

Many courts have construed statutes as

Utah's which set standards for belts, without an accompanying
statute requiring the use of seat belts, as implicitly and intentionally rejecting the passage of a statute requiring the use of
seat belts.

In Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W. 2d 293 (W.D. Penn.

1975), the court held that a statute which required an automobile
to be equipped with seat belts imposed no duty to wear such belts.
Absent a statutory requirement, there is no duty.
In 3ritton v. Doehring, 242 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1970)f the ccurt
stated:
In the absence of a statutory requirement
admission of evidence of non-use of available
seat belts can only be justified by resort
to common law principles under our established
rules of evidence. That is, by our taking
notice of studies demonstrating that seat
belts are effective protective devices in
our requiring their use. In view of the controversy which still surrounds the effectiveness of seat belts, particularly in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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those situations in which injuries may even
be attributable to wearing such seat belts,
we are unwilling now to accept such studies
as of decisive probative value. [Emphasis
in original].
In Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont.
1980)f the court was faced with issues identical to issues herein.
There was no statutory requirement that an automobile occupant
wear a seat belt nor was there any case law on the subject.
There, the plaintiff contended that the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions were in accord that there is no common law duty to
wear a seat belt, and absent a statute requiring the wearing of a
seat belt, negligence could not be predicated upon a failure to
do so.

Defendant therein contended that the use of seat belts to

mitigate the injury was a proper question.

The court then deter-

mined that:
. The overwhelming majority of the cases,
be they from contributory negligence states
or comparative negligence states, refuse
to penalize a plaintiff for not using seat
belts and have rejected the defense.
x

Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977); Barry
v. Coca Cola, 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273; Birdsong v. ITT
Continental Banking Co., 160 Ind. App. 411, 312 N.E. 2d 104 (1974);
Britton v. Doehrinc, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666 (1970); Brown v.
Case, 31 Conn. Supp. 207, 327 A.2d 267 (1974); Brown v. Kendrick,
192 So.2c 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Cierpisz v. Singletony 247 Md.
215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); D. W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244
So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); King Son Wong v. Carnation Co., 509 S.W.
2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1968); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226
A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C.
App. 1976); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W. 2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970);
Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 2d 65 (1968); Fischer j/>_
Mocre, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Nash v. Kamath, 21 Ariz.
Ape. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights,
52 Mich. App. 619, 217 N.W. 2d 900 (1974); Robinson v. Lewis, 254
Or. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co.,
88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719 (1975); Stallcup v. Taylor, 62 Tenn.
App. 407, 463
S.W.
416
(1970).
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The court in Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d
48 (Okia. 1976), expressly rejected the defendant's assertion of
a common law duty to use seat belts:
There is no common law or statutory duty
requiring the use of seat belts* . • .
Recent technological advances are not usually
inducted into doctrines of law, until such
time as they have been sufficiently tried,
proven and accepted for the purpose they
were intended* Historically, the seat belt
phenomenon is in its infancy. It is in a
state of influx*
It is clear that there exists no statutory nor common law duty
within the State of Utah to utilize seat belts when occupying a
motor vehicle.

Where no duty exists, a fortiori, no negligence

exists, and thus, imposed upon the plaintiff Stephen Whitehead was
neither a duty nor corresponding negligence.
C.

The Imposition Of A Duty To Use Seat Belts Lies With
The Legislature.

Courts refusing to impose a duty upon motorists to utilize
seat belts have routinely held that the responsibility of creating
such a duty lies with the legislature.
The United States District Court in Pennsylvania, in attempting to apply the law of the forum state, held:
We believe that the Pennsylvania courts
would follow the majority position and not
permit a defend.ant to assert a seat belt
defense. Until the legislature requires
drivers and passengers to use safety belts,
there is really no basis for such a defense.
Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Penn. 1976).
Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966), the court
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In

It may be that after further research by
various safety committees/ the law may be
changed to require the use of seat belts
and to affix some element of negligence for
failure to use same. This is not the law
today and it is not within the province
of this court to legislate on the subject,
regardless of what might be the thinking
of the individual members of the court.
The Congress of the United States has considered several bills pertaining to motor
vehicle and highway safety but in neither
bill as approved, has there been a mandatory
use of seat belts. [Emphasis added].
The court in Britton v. Doehring, supra, stated the need
for a fixed standard:
An occupant of a car involved in normal,
everyday driving should either be required
to wear a seat belt or he should not. That
determination should be left to the distinguished members of our State Legislature.
Most recently, in Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d
1511 (6th Cir. 1983), the court stated:
[T]he seat belt defense is complicated further by the peculiarly legislative nature
of the issue. The penalties to be attached
to seat belt non-use are uniquely amenable
to resolution by the state legislature.
Indeed a number of other state courts have
left to their legislatures the determination
of the evidentiary effect of a2plaintiff•s
failure to wear a seat belt.
E.g., Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668,
683 (Mont. 1980) ("In light of the history and the numerous legislative problems that must be considered to effectively extend the
seat belt rule of law we . . . reach the conclusion that to adopt
a seat belt defense when the legislature has failed to do so would
be ill-advised.") See also State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448
(Inc. 1981); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 ?.2d 48,
62 (Okla. 1976); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 396, 517 P.2d
458, 460 (1973); Britton v. Doehrinq, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So.
2d 666, 675 (1970); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S-.W. 2d 293, 301 (Mo.
App. 1970); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 238, 160 S.E. 2d 65,
73 (1968).
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Furthemore, the Utah legislature recently enacted a child restrain- law.

It may be argued that the legislature has considered

the subject and has limited its legislation to car restraints for
children.

That legislation has set the limit that the legislature

has been willing to extend the law.

It would be an abuse of author-

ity for this Court to impose its will upon the legislature and extend
the parameters beyond which the legislature has thus far been unwilling to go.
D.

The Duty To Mitigate Damages Cannot Arise Before The
Plaintiff Is Damaged.

The appellants are barred from raising mitigation of damages
as a defense.

Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense

which must be pleaded or it is waived.

Rule 8(c) and Pratt v.

Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977); Martin v. Porak, 638
P.2d 853 (Colo. 1981).

There is no such plea.

Jeep Corporation failed to raise mitigation of damages as an
affirmative defense in its original answer filed on October 31,
1980.

On September 12, 1983, Jeep filed a motion to amend its answer

to include several new defenses, including mitigation of damages.
On October 7, 1983, the motion was denied as not timely made.

(R.

1366).

(R.

84-87).

AMC did not file an answer for more than three years.

On September 17, 1983, (R. 993-995) it filed its answer

attempting to raise several new defenses.
on the proposed affirmative defenses.

The court did not rule

(R. 1366).

Assuming, arguendo, that such a defense had been properly raised'
this theory has been relied upon by defendants and routinely
rejected by courts throughout various jurisdictions.
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In Derheim v. Fiorito Co., 492 P.2d 1030 (Wash. 1972), the
trial court ruled, on plaintiff's motion in limine, that during
trial defendant was prohibited from making any reference to plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt.
assigned as errors.

Those pretrial rulings were

Specifically, the defendant asserted that

plaintiff's failure should have been admitted in mitigation of
damages or in proof of an avoidable consequence.

By way of offer

of proof, defendant offered testimony that plaintiff's injury
would not have been sustained if his seat belt had been properly
fastened.

After reviewing the diversity of court holdings, the

court in Derheim held:
We believe the cases in those jurisdictions
rejecting the "seat belt defense" are the
better reasoned cases. It seems extremely
unfair to mitigate the damages of one who
sustains those damages in an accident for
which he was in no way responsible, particularly when, as in this jurisdiction,
there is no statutory duty to wear seat
belts.
In Taplin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1198 (Kan. App. 1981), defendant
sought to introduce seat belt evidence on comparative negligence
and mitigation of damages theories.

The trial court sustained

plaintiff's motion in limine which had the effect of precluding
defendant from introducing evidence of plaintiff's failure to use
the available seat belt.

Citing Hampton v. State Highway Commission,

supra, the court reiterated:
While as a general rule one must use reasonable diligence to mitigate one's damages
once the risk is known [citation omitted]
one is not required to anticipate negligence
and guard against damages which might ensue
if such negligence should occur [citation
omitted].
-63-
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In short, there was no duty to use a seat
belt, either under the common law standard
of care or to mitigate damages.
After "[a] review of the civil war on this recent innovation
in tort law," the ccurt in Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co.,
544 P.2d 719 (N.M. 1975) held:
Due care in the use or non-use of a seat
belt is pre-accident conduct and does not
fall within the doctrine of "avoidable
consequences". As a result, evidence of
non-use of seat belt is irrelevant on the
minimization of damages. [Citations omitted].
Most recently, in Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 425 So.
2d 1147 (Fla. App. 1983), the court illustrated the practical
difficulties inherent in the mitigation of damages theory as applied
to the use of seat belts:
Mitigation of damages concerns a plaintiff's
conduct after an accident, not before.
Were we to admit evidence of non-use of seat
belts, we may well be obligated to admit
evidence of other pre-accident conduct dealing with safety issues. For example,
numerous studies have shown that standardsize cars are safer than compact or subcompact cars. Should a plaintiff be penalized
for not taking this safety factor into
consideration when purchasing a car? Further, hardtops are safer than convertible
tops. Is this for jury consideration and
for a court to instruct on?
...
We view such evidence of prior conduct as
a Pandora's box which we decline to open.
Furthermore, the prior regulation of conduct
is a matter for the legislature rather than
the courts to decide. [EMphasis added].
In its efforts to persuade the court that the failure to
use a seat belt constitutes a failure to mitigate damages, AMC/Jeep
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1301 (Utah 1981) as holding that the jury should "consider the
faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they 'have united as
concurrent proximate causes of an injury' in strict liabaility
cases."

(Brief of Appellants, p. 62). Respondent respectfully

submits that appellants are blatantly incorrect in their application of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Mulherin.
Appellants argue that even in the context of strict liability,
the relative fault of the plaintiff and the defendant should be
compared; however, in quoting the language of Mulherin, AMC/Jeep
fails to point out that such a comparison of fault is strictly
limited to any misuse of the product by the plaintiff or unreasonable use of the product with knowledge of the defect and awareness of the danger.

Mulherin, supra, at 1302-3. AMC/Jeep

failed to prove misuse of the vehicle (Stephen Whitehead was a
mere passenger) or unreasonable use despite knowledge of the vehicle's defects.

Misuse of the product and unreasonable use of the

product with knowledge of its defects are defenses which are wholly
inapplicable in the context of the use of seat belts. Addressing
this very issue, the court in Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., supra,
concluded that:
A seat belt defense is essentially a
claim of contributory negligence, since
the defendant is claiming that the injured
person's failure to use the seat belt was
unreasonable. Because contributory negligence is not a defense to an action based
on strict liability in tort, the seat belt
evidence is irrelevant and should be excluded.
Respondent submits that even in a comparative negligence context, the duty to mitigate damages cannot arise before the plaintiff is damaged:
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If the allegations of negligence are true,
appellee did nothing to cause the accident.
Should he be required to anticipate the
negligence of the appellants? We think
not. One's duty to mitigate damages cannot
arise before he is damaged. The failure to
minimize must occur after the injury. At
most the failure of the appellee to use the
seat belt merely furnished a condition by
which the injury was possible. It did not
contribute to or cause the accident. It
is well established in our court that if
the negligence merely furnishes a condition
by which the injury was possible, and a
subsequent act caused the injury, the existence of such a condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., supra.
E.

A Tort Feasor Must Accept The Plaintiff As He Finds Him.

Several courts have denied defendants the opportunity to intro
duce seat belt evidence based upon the rationale that the tort
feasor must accept the plaintiff as he finds him, whatever the
degree of vulnerability.

So found the Colorado Supreme Court in

Fischer v. Moore, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (Colo. 1973):
We conclude, as the court of appeals, that
the failure of the driver or passenger of
a motor vehicle to use a seat belt . . .
may not be pled as a bar to recovery of
damages in an action against a tort feasor
whose negligence provides the initiating
force and is a proximate cause of an injury
to a driver or passenger. [Citations omitted]
If we were to hold otherwise, the person
who was driving a Volkswagen, and not a
Mack truck, could be said to be more vulnerable to injury and, therefore, guilty of
contributing to his own injury as a matter
of law. Such a result would be contrary
to the entire "fault" philosophy which is
found throughout the law of tort. Under
the common law principles of tort law, it
is axiomatic that the tort feasor must
accept the plaintiff as he finds him and
may not seek to reduce the amount of damages
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by spotlighting the physical frailties of
the injured party at the time the tortious
force was applied to him. [Citations omitted]
Along similar lines of reasoning, the common
law dictates that the tort feasor may not
rely upon the injured party's failure to
utilize a voluntary protective device to
escape all or a portion of the damages which
the plaintiff incurred as a consequence
of the defendant's negligence. [Citations
omitted]
The court in Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co.f supra, simply

However trite it may bef we still hold to
the basic concept that a tort feasor takes
his plaintiff as he finds him.
F.

Testimony Related To Seat Belt Use Is Merely Conjectural
And Speculative.

The lack of statutory guidance, diversity of opinion found
within case law, and the variety of conclusions drawn by experts
with respect to the actual benefits of seat belt use have all worked
together to compel the denial of admissibility of seat belt evidence on the basis that such evidence would be merely conjectural
and speculative.
So, in this state of quandry, the plaintiff
and defendant could each have argued on the
merits of the use of seat belts, but each
argument would necessarily have been conjectural and of doubtful propriety. We
therefore dispose of the appellant's first
point argued on appeal by holding that the
trial court was not in error in refusing
to allow the defendant to offer to the jury
evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use
the seat belt as constituting a defense to
gross negligence on the part of the driver.
Brown v. Kendrick, supra, at 51. Courts precluding seat belt evidence could easily foresee the "battle of experts" each presenting
the relative merits and disadvantages of seat belts.
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A further problem bothers the courts, and
that is the effect of injecting the seat
belt issue into the trial of automobile
personal injury cases. The courts are concerned about unduly lengthening trials and
if each automobile accident trial is to provide an arena for a battle of safety experts,
as well as medical experts, time and expense
of litigation might well be increased.
Derhein v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 1035.

In addition, the experts

could not only routinely present general evidence related to seat
belt use, but would also attempt to speculate on the nature of the
injuries sustained in each accident.
[Ajllowing the seat belt defense will lead
to a veritable battle of experts as to what
injuries would have or have not been avoided
had the plaintiff been wearing a belt. At
best it would cause substantial speculation
by the trier of facts.
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
[T]he seat belt defense inevitably raises
problems of conjecture. Not only must the
jury determine what actually happened, it
also must determine what would have happened
if the seat belt had been used.
Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 139.

Furthermore, the circle

of speculation would be enlarged to encompass the area of apportionment of "damages.
The seat belt defense would soon become a
fortuitous windfall to tort-feasors and
would tend to cause rampant speculation as
to the reduction (or increase) in the amount
of recoverable damages attributable to the
failure to use available seat belts.
Fischer v. Moore, supra, at 460; see also Lafferty v. Allstate
Insurance Co., at 1150.
The relative merits of the use of seat belts and their causal
relationship to any plaintiff's actual injuries is simply too speculative to be placed in issue before a jury.
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G.

The Seat Belt Defense Is Inappropriate In The Context
Of Strict Liability,

Appellants' contentions based upon an alleged common law dutyf
mitigation of damages and comparative negligence are simply inappropriate in the context of strict liability*
Under Utah lawf strict liability can be defended on only two
bases:

1) misuse of the product by the user or consumerf and

2) unreasonable use of the product despite knowledge of the defect
and awareness of the danger.

Mulherin, supra.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in denying recognition of
the victim's negligence as a defense in strict product liability,
stated as follows:
Strict liability is an abandonment of the
fault concept in product liability cases.
No longer are damages to be borne by one
who is culpable; rather they are borne by
one who markets the defective product. . . .
We believe it is inconsistent to hold that
the user's negligence is material when
the seller's is not. . . . We hold that
the plaintiff's or the defendant's negligence
is irrelevant . . .
Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W. 2d 155 (S. Dak. 1977).
The Utah State Supreme Court's holding in Mulherin, supra, is
in accord with this case as well as others which have refused to
merge negligence principles with strict product liability.
There is absolutely no evidence which could lead to the conclusion that Stephen Whitehead misused the Jeep Commando; nor
under any circumstances of the facts, can it be shown that he had
knowledge of the Jeep's defective or unsafe condition and subsequently made an unreasonable use of the vehicle.

To assert the
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seat belt defense under the auspices of the comparative negligence
laws of the State of Utah is not appropriate in the factual circumstances of this case.
Mere specifically, the court in Vizzini v. Ford Mocor Co.,
supra, noted the inapplicability of the seat belt defense in a
strict liability context•
In our case, although the plaintiff sued
the manufacturer of the vehicle on claims
of negligence as well as strict liability,
the jury's verdict against the defendant on
I
liability was based on strict liability.
. . . Evidence of non-use of a seat belt
should be excluded, since it is akin to
a claim of contributory negligence, which
is not a defense in a strict liability case.
j
Similarly, in the instant case, the jury's conclusion, that dl
fendant AMC/Jeep was liable for its unreasonably dangerous producd
.

.

.

.

•

•

,

was based upon strict liability principle; therefore, the seat beli
defense is wholly inappropriate.
H

*

Point IV Conclusion.

j
f

As recently as January 25, 1984, an appellate court decided j
the issue of the admissibility of seat belt evidence and set fort*
its entire opinion in one paragraph:

j

[W]e would clarify our position as to the
issue of whether refusal to allow evidence
on the effect of appellee's failure to wear
his seat belt constituted reversible error.
We hold that it did not . . .
Volkswagen of America v. Long, 444 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. App. 1984).
In holding that evidence related to seat belt use was inadmissible under the facts and law applicable to this case, the trfl
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court's ruling was in accordance with innumerable courts throughout
a variety of jurisdictions.
In sum, other courts so holding have relied upon the following rationales:
1) There is no statutory requirement in
the forum state that seat belts be used.
2) There is insufficient justification
for a court to require the use of seat belts,
take notice of their effectiveness, and
impose a common law duty where none exists
statutorily.
3) The admission of such evidence of nonuse would permit the jury to "compare
the negligence" which is wholly inappropriate in a strict liability context.
4) The admission of such evidence creates
a situation wherein a plaintiff in a
vehicle with seat belts is penalized as
compared with a plaintiff in a vehicle not
so equipped.
5) Requiring seat belt use results in one
who is lawfully using the highways having
to anticipate that another driver may be
negligent; a plaintiff need not predict the
negligence of the defendant.
6) Permitting the jury to compare the
damages attributable to the negligence of
a defendant with that attributable to a
failure to use available seat belts would
allow the jury to enter into the realm of
speculation and conjecture.
7) Adoption of such a requirement may
conflict with traditional tort doctrines
such as comparative negligence, avoidable
consequences and mitigation of damages.
8) The decision to impose a prior restraint
on an individual's activity, i.e. to impose
a duty to utilize seat belts, is best left
to the legislature.
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9) Seat belts are not required in all
vehicles and defendant should not be entitled to take advantage of the fortitous
circumstances that plaintiff was riding
in a car so equipped.
10) It is a fact and persuasive that the
majority of motorists do not habitually
use their seat belts. ("Belt Use '16,"
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,
1976).
11) Admissibility of seat belt evidence
would lead to a battle of experts as to
the probability of injuries.
In view of the lack of unanimity on the beneficial effect of
seat belts, the lack of public acceptance, the considerations
set forth above, in the absence of any common law or statutory
duty and in absence of controlling case law, the trial court's
exercise of discretion to exclude the seat belt issue in no conceiveable manner constituted error.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS'
ATTEMPT TO RAISE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DEFENSE JUST PRIOR TO TRIAL.
Plaintiff filed and served an Amended Complaint on August 1,
1980, naming as defendants American Motors Corporation and Jeep
Corporation.

(R. 84-87).

The complaint set forth the date of the

cause of action as October 16, 1979.

(R. 84). Paragraphs 13 and

15 set forth the allegation that the vehicle, a 1972 Jeep, was
manufactured and sold by defendants in an unreasonably dangerous
condition.

(R. 86). Thus, in August, 1980, defendants had suffi-

cient information to establish any defense based upon the appropriate statute of limitations.
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The applicable statute of limitations defense is set forth
within Utah's Product Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1977).
Utah's Product Liability Act was enacted in May of 1977 and
applicable to those causes of action arising two years after its
promulgation, i.e. May, 1979. Based on the allegations in plaintiff's complaint of August, 1980, defendants could readily ascertain that the ten-year statute of limitations from the date of
manufacture was not applicable; however, the barring, of the action
based upon the six-year from the date of initial purchase limitation was a possibility.

If the vehicle in question were sold prior

to October 16, 1973, defendants could perhaps have pursued the
statute of limitations defense.
Nevertheless, defendant Jeep Corporation submitted its answer
on October 31, 1980, affirmatively alleging contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, alteration and misuse but failed to raise the
defense of statute of limitations.

(R. 113-114).

Defendant Ameri-

can Motors Corporation failed to answer plaintiff's complaint for
three years. On September 12, 1983, one month before trial, four
years from the initial cause of action and three years after the
complaint was filed against it, defendant American Motor Corporation submitted an answer which set forth the applicable statute
of limitations defense.

(R. 993-996).

Simultaneously, defendant

Jeep Corporation submitted a Motion For Leave to Amend Answer and
add the statute of limitations defense.

(R. 983-989).

In response,

plaintiff and the other defendants submitted Memoranda in Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Amend setting forth points and
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authorities relative to attempts to amend at such late date and
the corresponding prejudice to the plaintiff and other defendants
and waste of judicial efficiency.

(R. 1004-1013).

On October 18, 1983f at the beginning of trial, the trial
court ruled as follows:
1. The motion of the defendant, Jeep
Corporation, to amend their [sic] answer to allege
the defense of the Utah Products Liability
Act is denied on the basis that the motion
was not timely made, the amendment of the
answer would cause an undue burden upon
the plaintiffs and other defendants and
would result in the continuance of the
trial date which the Court feels is unjustified under the facts and circumstances.
(R. 1271-1272).
The trial court did not, however, totally preclude defendants1
opportunity to prove the applicability of the statute of limitations, but instead, ruled as follows:
2. The Court, however, will allow
the defendant, Jeep, to proffer such proof
at the time of trial as Jeep deems necessary
to preserve its record. The Court reserves
its ruling as to whether or not the defendant American Motors Corporation nay raise
the issue [of] the Utah Products Liability
Act and the attendant statute of limitations. (R. 1272).
Respondent Whitehead submits to this Court that defendants made
absolutely no proffer of proof related to the Product Liability
Act or statute of limitations during the entire course of trial;
therefore, the issue is waived.
Appellants AMC/Jeep made no mention whatsoever, nor offered
an iota of evidence, which would substantiate the applicability of
the product liability statute of limitations.

The pertinent por-
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tion of the Act limits action based upon the date of manufacture,
or upon the date of initial purchase.

At this point in time, all

parties to the lawsuit and the court below are yet without knowledge
concerning "the date of initial purchase for use or consumption."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977).
void of evidence on this issue.

The record is absolutely

(R. 4774-4775).

In Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the principle that where
an amended pleading would delay trial and the substance of the
amended allegation had been known a full year earlier, the trial
court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend.
Although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure tends to favor the granting
of leave to amend, the matter remains in
the sound discretion of the court. On
the facts presented, we are not convinced
that the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to grant the requested leave
to amend. An amendment would certainly
have delayed the trial and the substance of
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full
year earlier when plaintiff discussed it
in his deposition.
Westley, 663 P.2d at 94.
The defense of statute of limitations must be set forth affirmatively at the earliest possible stage of litigation.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 8(c),

As set forth above, the instant

action had been before the Court nearly four years before defendants raised the product liability statute of limitations. That
defense was available to the defendant at the early stages of litigation.
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The product liability statute of limitations defense was
passed by the Utah Legislature in 1977 and effective prior to the
service of pleadings upon defendants AMC/Jeep.

The defense sought

to be added to the defendants' Amended Answer was available to it
at the cutset of the case and the facts giving rise to such defense
were all set forth on the face of plaintiffs' complaint.

The

attempt zo raise the statute of limitations defense so late in litigation was absolutely without excuse and not in accord with the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure nor governing case law.
Although Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to amend pleadings, it is only by consent of the court in
its discretion.

The court below carefully considered the attempt

by defendants AMC/Jeep to add the statute of limitations as a defense and determined that such an amended answer, at that stage of
the proceedings was not timely made.
The determination made by the court below was based upon the
burden which would be placed upon all parties to the lawsuit were
a new defense allowed to be raised immediately prior to trial after
four years of discovery.

At that time, the plaintiff had incurred

in excess of $50,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenses directed at
preparation of the case against AMC/Jeep and the defendants
Anderson and VALIC who had filed crossclaims against AMC/Jeep, had
incurred large expenses in preparation of their contentions against
AMC/Jeep.

The trial was extremely complex, with numerous experts,

witnesses and parties whose schedules and preparations would have
had to ze adjusted, rearranged or repeated.

The length of the
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trial, nearly three weeks, the attendant difficulties of rescheduling on the court calendar, and costs of changing the trial date
would have been exhorbitant and wasteful.
While statutes of limitation are a means of judicial expediency, they too are subject to an application that is fair and just*
Such statutes ought not to be utilized to propitiate delay, waste of
judicial resources or visit catastrophic economic and time losses
on the parties who have relied on the defendant's waiver of a defense that had been available for years during the pendency of the
action.

Furthermore, such a defense should be raised when first

available and not because of timing for tactical or strategic
reasons.
There can be little question that to allow the amendment of
the answer just prior to trial would require and mandate extensive
discovery on behalf of the plaintiff.

All of the manufacturer's

documents relating to the date of manufacture would be required together with the documents relating to distribution of the vehicle
to an automobile dealer.

The evidence established that George

Mullner, the owner of the vehicle, who was Deborah Whitehead's
father, was not the original owner of the vehicle.

(R. 2105).

Documentary evidence relating to original purchase of the .vehicle
would be imperative to a decision of a fact finder.

In that regard,

plaintiff had the right to conduct depositions of witnesses establishing date of initial sale.

The postponement of such a costly

and complex trial after three years of preparation simply cannot
be justified in light of defendant's total failure to even proffer

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-77-

to the court that it had any evidence that the statute of limitation had expired when the action was commenced.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed this very issue.
In Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188
(Utah 1983), the defendant attempted to amend its answer, immediately prior to trial, to assert for the first time the statute of
limitations.

The trial court took the motion under advisement and

at the close of evidence, the court denied the motion to amend.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held:
As a general proposition, we will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to
amend, made at the commencement of or during trial, to assert the statute of limitations.
Staker, 664 P.2d at 1190.

See also Goeltz v. Continental Bank &

Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 209 P.2d 832 (1956); Farmers & Merchants
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Pulliam, 481 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1973);
Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1971).
In the Staker opinion, the Utah Supreme Court noted that:
The statute of limitations defense must
be pleaded as an affirmative defense in a
responsive pleading, or it is waived, Utah
R.Civ.P. 8(c) and 12(h), unless an amended
pleading asserting the defense is allowed
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a).
[Citations omitted]. A trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend is not reversible error unless the denial constitutes
an abuse of discretion. E.g. Girard v.
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); [Citation omitted].
In Staker, the court was not willing to reverse the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to amend its answer to add the
statute of limitations defense.

The court noted that the plaintiff
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had gone to the expense of discovery and preparation for trial in
reliance on defendant's answer filed over two years prior to trial.
As set forth above, plaintiff herein had prepared for trial for
nearly four years in reliance on defendants' answer.

The court in

Staker also noted that:
The essential facts upon which the statute
could have been asserted were known to the
defendant from the beginning. Defendant
alleges no surprise, discovery of new evidence relating to the defense, or other
justification for its delay in asserting
the statute of limitations.
Staker, 664 P.2d at 1190. The facts upon which the Utah Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
amend are identical to and perhaps even less persuasive than the
facts upon which the trial court in the instant case based its
decision.

In Staker, defendants requested leniency based upon

substitution of counsel two days before trial; no such possible
excuse existed in the instant case.

And while plaintiff relied

on defendant's answer for two years in Staker, plaintiff herein
relied and engaged in extensive trial preparation for four years
in which this defendant actively participated.
Clearly, in reliance upon its recent ruling rendered in Staker,
the Court must uphold the decision of the trial court in denying
defendants' motion to amend and subsequent denial of a directed
verdict based upon the statute of limitation defense which defendants failed to timely raise.

(R. 4774-4775).

Furthermore, the

defendants absolutely failed to bring in any evidence, when expressly given the opportunity by the trial judge, to establish the dates
of initial purchase of the vehicle in question.

Therefore, the
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nr
*

trial court was without evidence upon which a statute of limitations
defense may have been predicated.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff submits that this case was carefully and thorough!;
tried by experienced counsel to an experienced and erudite Court.
All issues of law were thoroughly briefed and argued under circumstances giving the Court ample opportunity for considered judgment.
The evidentiary rulings were made with deliberate care.

The atmos-

phere in the courtroom was calm and decorus and all counsel, litigants, witnesses and jury were treated with respect and courtesy.
The trial was conducted by court and counsel to the highest standards
of judicial procedure.

i

All litigants have been afforded their day

in court in accordance with the finest judicial tradition.

The ver-

dict of the jury and the rulings of the trial court should be affirmeij
Respectfully submitted,

JACKSON HOWARD, for:
^^X
/HOWARD, L£WIS & PETERSEN
0
$

^ ^ u r / ^ .

OHNSON, for:
S & PETERSEN
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants,

Case No. 19695

and
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION
and JEEP CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation

Appellants American Motors Sales Corporation and
Jeep Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AMC/Jeep"),
respectfully submit .this Reply Brief in answer to the new
matters set forth in the brief of plaintiffs-respondents
Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead.
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INTRODUCTION
On this appeal, AMC/Jeep seeks reversal of the
trial court's judgment on the grounds that the trial court
made incorrect and prejudicial rulings on questions of law
and with respect to the admissibility of certain evidence.
Specifically, AMC/Jeep argued in its opening brief to this
Court that the trial court erred (a) in permitting plaintiffs
to introduce irrelevant and inflammatory evidence (App. Br.
at 26-36); (b) in denying AMC/Jeep's fundamental right to
cross-examine plaintiffs1 witnesses (App. Br. at 36-42); (c)
in refusing to permit AMC/Jeep to rebut such evidence by
excluding substantial portions of AMC/Jeep's own evidence
(App. Br. at 42-56); (d) in denying AMC/Jeep's motion for
mistrial based on improper closing arguments by opposing
counsel (App, Br. at 56-59); (e) in refusing to permit appellant Jeep Corporation to amend its answer to include a statute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 68-73); (f) in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of AMC/Jeep in light of
their statute of limitations defense (App. Br. at 73-74); and
(g) in excluding all evidence relating to the presence of and
plaintiffs' failure to utilize available seat belts. fApp.
Br. at 59-68).
In their responsive brief, plaintiffs selectively
address a few of the errors cited by AMC/Jeep but wholly
ignore others-

For example, AMC/Jeep assigns error to the

admission by the trial court of three films showing Jeep
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CJ5s, not Commandos, overturning under artificially induced
conditions wholly dissimilar to the conditions of plaintiffs1
accident (App. Br, at 27-31)/ and a chart purporting to show
the so-called "roll-over threshold" of a Commando, but which
was, in fact, based entirely upon information obtained by
plaintiffs' expert in testing CJ5s.

(App. Br. at 32). In

their responsive brief, however, plaintiffs attempt to justify admission by the trial court of only one of the three
films.

No mention is made of the other two films or the

chart erroneously received in evidence by the trial court.
(Res. Br. at 19-27).
In defense of the trial court's limitation of
AMC/Jeep's right to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts, the
respondents' brief principally argues the volume of crossexamination permitted without directly addressing the prejudicial effect of the specific limitations raised in appellants' brief.

Respondents further attempt to distract the

Court's attention from the substantive errors below by deliberately mischaracterizing the tone and intent of appellants'
brief as a personal attack on the integrity of the presiding
trial judge.

Such, of course, is not the case.

The record

merely reflects that the court below misunderstood the legal
framework in which this case was presented, the elements of
plaintiffs' cause of action, plaintiffs' burden of proof,
AMC/Jeep's defensive theories, the relevance of defendants'
evidentiary proffers and the complete irrelevance of the
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majority of plaintiffs1 expert testimony.

(See App, Br. at

26-27).
Similarly, in their effort to defend the trial
court's exclusion of substantially all of AMC/Jeep1s demonstrative evidence, plaintiffs suggest that the exclusions
constituted "sanctions" imposed by the trial court for alleged discovery abuse by AMC/Jeep.

As the record clearly

reflects, however, no motion for sanctions was ever made by
plaintiffs and none of AMC/Jeep's evidence was excluded for
that reason.

In every instance, AMC/Jeep's evidence was

excluded based upon the trial court's failure to comprehend
its relevance.

The judgment below must be reversed and the

case remanded for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY PRE-TRIAL RULINGS
Plaintiffs attempt to defend the trial court's
evidentiary rulings against AMC/Jeep on the ground that such
rulings are, in fact, "sanctions imposed by the trial court
as a result of AMC/Jeep's failure to make discovery."

(Resp.

Br. at 11). Plaintiffs' arguments in this regard fail for
three independent reasons.

First, AMC/Jeep responded fully,

or objected to, all of plaintiffs' discovery requests.
Second, plaintiffs' discovery did not request from AMC/Jeep
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information relating to the demonstrative evidence erroneously excluded by the trial court.

Third, plaintiffs1 never

moved the trial court to sanction AMC/Jeep nor did the trial
court ever indicate that it was sanctioning AMC/Jeep for any
discovery abuse.
A.

Plaintiffs' Brief Fails to Present
the Complete History of the Pretrial
Proceedings in this Case — AMC/Jeep
Responded to all of Plaintiffs'
Discovery.

A comparison of AMC/Jeep's criticism of the trial
court's evidentiary rulings to plaintiffs' defense of those
rulings might lead the reader to wonder whether the parties
are speaking about the same trial.

AMC/Jeep's arguments

regarding the trial court's exclusion of virtually all of
AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence underscore the relevance of
such evidence both as rebuttal evidence and to show state-ofthe-art.

(Pet. Br. at 52-56).

Plaintiffs' arguments in

defense of the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evidence , on the other handf center on references to certain
pre-trial proceedings.

(Resp. Br. at 5-19, 38-49).

So the

record is crystal clear on this point, the Court should be
aware that the following portions of the record comprise all
of the interrogatories, motions and hearings regarding pretrial discovery in this case.

As is detailed in full below,

there is nothing in these pleadings and transcripts which
supports plaintiffs' charge that the trial cour:'s erroneous
evidentiary rulings are supported by pre-trial activity in
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this case:

(1) Plaintiffs1 first set of interrogatories -

March 4, 1981 (R. 128); (2) Plaintiffs' motion to compel
answers to interrogatories - July 6, 1981 (R. 134); (3)
American Motors' answers to interrogatories - July 20, 1981
(R. 216); (4) American Motors opposition to plaintiffs'
motion to compel - July 21, 1981 (R. 236); (5) plaintiffs'
second set of interrogatories - September 15, 1981, (R. 246,
256); (6) plaintiffs' motion to compel, referring to first
set of interrogatories already answered by American Motors November 12, 1981 (R. 257); (7) plaintiffs' motion to compel,
referring to second set of interrogatories - August 4, 1982
(R. 588); (8) AMC/Jeep's answers to second set of interrogatories - August 13, 1982 (R. 614); (9) plaintiffs' motion
to strike or to compel - August 20, 1982 (R. 641); (10)
AMC/Jeep's memorandum opposing motion to compel or strike September 14, 1982; (11) hearing before Judge Sorenson (T.,
10/29/82, at 1-49; R. 5006-5055); (12) hearing before Judge
Sorenson (T., 12/29/82, at 1-16; R. 5056-5072); (13)
AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers to interrogatories - January
25, 1983 (R. 755); (14) plaintiffs1 motion in limine October 7, 1983 (R* 1063); (15) minute entry regarding motion
in limine - October 7, 1983 (R. 1365); (16) transcript of
trial court's consideration of motion in limine, October 27,
1983 (T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576; R. 3337-3358).
Plaintiffs' recount of the pre-trial proceedings in
this case is as incomplete as it is misleading.
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For example,

plaintiffs fail to mention the pleadings numbered (2), (4) f
and (13) above.

The complete chronological recapitulation of

those proceedings that follows reveals an utter lack of
foundation for any "sanction," let alone a purported
"sanction" of the devastating magnitude that resulted from
the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings.
Plaintiffs filed and served their first set of
interrogatories to American Motors Corporation and Jeep
Corporation on or about March 4, 1981.

(R. 128). Plaintiffs

moved to compel answers to this set of interrogatories on
July 6, 1981.

(R. 134). Plaintiffs' neglect to point out to

this Court that American Motors provided /timely answers and
objections to this set of interrogatories on July 20, 1981.
(R. 216-233).

This response was completer comprising more

than 15 pages.

Plaintiffs also fail to note that American

Motors responded fully to their motion to compel on July 21,
1981.

(R. 236).
Plaintiffs served their second set of interrog-

atories on American Motors Corporation and Jeep Corporation
on September 15, 1981.

(R. 246, 256). Plaintiffs next: filed

a Motion for Order Compelling Discovery on November 12, 1981.
(R. 257). However, as the memorandum accompanying that
motion makes clear, plaintiffs' motion is directed entirely
to American Motors' answers to plaintiffs' first set cf
interrogatories.

(R. 259-265).

This first set of inter-

rogatories had already been answered by American Motors•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs did nothing with respect to its discovery of AMC/Jeep's information for the next seven months.
On August 4, 1982, however, plaintiffs filed a pleading
styled "Third Motion for Order Compelling Discovery."
588).

(R.

Here, for the first (not the third) time, plaintiffs

moved the trial court to compel answers to plaintiffs' second
set of interrogatories served on September 15, 1981.
AMC/Jeep responded by filing complete answers and objections
to this set of interrogatories on August 13, 1982.
636).

(R. 614-

Once again, AMC/Jeep's response was extensive, com-

prising some 21 pages.

Included in this response was a list

of 240 different drawings, blueprints and plans relating to
the design and development of the Commando.

(R. 632-635).

These drawings, blueprints and plans were made available to
plaintiffs and were completely responsive to plaintiffs1
interrogatories.
Plaintiffs next tactic, on August 20, 1982, was to
move to strike AMC/Jeep*s answers to both sets of interrogatories or, in the alternative, to compel.

(R. 641-642).

AMC/Jeep filed a memorandum opposing plaintiff's motion on
September 14, 1982.

(R. 671-642).

In that memorandum,

AMC/Jeep explained that many of plaintiffs' interrogatories
were not answerable by AMC/Jeep due to the fact that the
Commando vehicle at issue in this lawsuit was designed prior
to 1966 by a predecessor corporation and that many records
were either difficult to locate or no longer in existence.

- 8 -
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AMC/Jeep offered to allow plaintiffs' counsel to depose any
of its personnel who might have relevant knowledge.

That

offer was never acted on by plaintiffs.
At this stage of the pre-trial proceedings,
AMC/Jeep emerges as anything but the recalcitrant litigant
portrayed in plaintiffs' brief.

Ratherf AMC/Jeep had re-

sponded to all pending discovery and had responded fully to
plaintiffs' charges that those answers were inadequate.
B.

Plaintiffs' Interrogatories did not
Request Information Bearing on the
Demonstrative Evidence Erroneously
Excluded by the Trial Court.

Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had responded fully
to their interrogatories and motions, and despite the fact
that AMC/Jeep had offered to permit plaintiffs to interrocate
AMC/Jeep personnel to amplify such responses, plaintiffs
brought their complaints about AMC/Jeep's responses before
the trial court, Judge Sorenson presiding, on October 29,
1982.

At that hearing, the trial court, in an effort "to cut

the Gordian knot in this case right now," (T., 10/29/82, at
4; R. 5010)/ commenced reading the disputed interrogatories
one by one,

(1^3., at 9-49; R. 5015-5055 )•

Despite plain-

tiffs' dramatic assertions to the contrary, (see Resp. Br. at
5-19)f the net effect of Judge Sorenson's exercise is extremely difficult to determine.

As Judge Sorenson himself

noted during the course of this hearing:

"We are making a

terrible record here, a dreadful record.

I wouldn't want to
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be arguing it right as of now before an appellate court."
(Id., at 38; R. 5044).
Plaintiffs' contentions at the hearing centered
on their alleged inability to obtain from AMC/Jeep certain
information regarding the design and development of the 1972
Jeep Commando.

Plaintiffs never requested information either

with respect to Jeep CJ5 vehicles or with respect to films or
tests of other vehicles or even with respect to films or
tests prepared after 1972. Judge Sorenson comprehended fully
the limited scope of plaintiffs' interrogatories and
restricted his observations on many of the interrogatories as
follows:
I will have you give them all available
information or reasonably retrievable
information as regards the 1972 model
[Commando] only. Now that is all I can
do Mr. Howard.
(Ld., at 12; R. 5018; see also Ld., at 13-15; R. 5019-5021).
Judge Sorenson's limitation of his comments to "the 1972
[Commando] model only" is critical.

Judge Sorenson recog-

nized, and plaintiffs' arguments to Judge Sorenson emphasized, that plaintiffs' interrogatories sought only information regarding the design and development of the 1972
Commando*
The AMC/Jeep evidence which would later be excluded
by Judge Bullock was not responsive either to the letter of
plaintiffs' interrogatories or to the spirit of those interrogatories as interpreted by Judge Sorenson. As amplified in
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AMC/Jeep!s Brief, Judge Bullock excluded the following evidence proffered by AMC/Jeep, none of which relates to the
design and development of the 1972 Commando:

(1) a 1983 film

showing a 1979 model Jeep CJ5 undergoing emergency maneuvers
and remaining upright (T., 10/27/83, at 1557, 1559, 15631566, 1570-1571; R. 3339, 3341f 3345-3348, 3352-3353); (2) a
film showing six non-Jeep vehicles (a 1977 Datsun B-210
passenger car, a 1978 Toyota Corolla passenger car, a 1979
Chevrolet Chevette passenger car, a 1980 Toyota 4-wheel-drive
pickup, a 1981 Ford Bronco utility vehicle, and a 1982 Datsun
4-wheel-drive pickup) with different centers of gravity than
the Commando, showing that they all roll over under the same
maneuvers depicted in plaintiffs' experts1 films (IcL, at
1571-1572; R. 3353-3354; T. 10/28/83, at 1745-1746; R. 35283529); (3) a film showing exemplar vehicles —

a Commando and

an Oldsmobile similar to the automobile driven by defendant
Larry Anderson which struck plaintiffs Commando from the rear
—

undergoing certain tests intended to simulate plaintiffs'

accident (T., 10/31/83, 1937-1938; R. 3724-3725); (4) a
series of photographs depicting human beings in an exemplar
vehicle in positions similar to those plaintiffs found themselves in during the course of their accident (j^., at 19621967; R« 3749-3754); (5) a film demonstrating occupant movement and damage during rollover (idi. , at 1985; R. 3773); (6)
an exhibit demonstrating the fact that the accident vehicle
had been involved in a prior accident (id., at 2024-2026; R.
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3812-3814); and (7) a film showing an exemplar vehicle, a
Commando, undergoing certain tests and maneuvers with outriggers attached (_id. , at 1973; R. 3774).

None of this evidence

excluded by the trial court was responsive to plaintiffs'
interrogatories, because none of this evidence related to the
design and development of the 1972 Commando.

In fact, much

of it was relevant primarily as rebuttal evidence to issues
raised by plaintiffs' presentation of their case-in-chief.
Most certainly, plaintiffs have identified no interrogatory
and rio statement by Judge Sorenson which would have required
AMC/Jeep to produce these films, charts and photographs to
plaintiffs prior to trial.
C.

Plaintiffs Never Moved for, nor did
the Trial Court Impose, any Sanctions
Against AMC/Jeep.

Judge Sorenson continued his recitation of plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories on December 29, 1982.
At this point, plaintiffs' counsel asked Judge Sorenson for
sanctions based on an asserted failure by AMC/Jeep to comply
with plaintiffs' versions of what had occurred at the October
29 hearing.

(T., 12/29/82, at 3-6; R. 5059-5062).

Sorenson stated:

"All right, I will entertain your request

for sanctions if you will follow the rules/
5062).

Judge

(Td.,

at 6; R.

Plaintiffs responded that they "will make an ap- >

propriate motion for sanctions."

(_Id./ at 7; R. 5063).

No

such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs and no ruling concerning sanctions was ever made by the trial court in this
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case.

Judge Sorenson continued through plaintiffs' second

set of interrogatories, commenting along the way on the
opaqueness of plaintiffs' language:
I am going to make an observation as an
attorney, Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs'
counsel]/ not as a Judge: The English
language can be extremely treacherous,
and some of these interrogatories — this
is merely my observation as a student of
the language of the law — are not well
phrased in my opinion as a lawyer, not as
a Judge*
•• • •

There is an absence of specificity in
these interrogatories generally,
(Ld., at 10f 12; R. 5066, 5068).

In this respect, Judge

Sorenson qualified many of his comments in the following
fashion:

"I will grant you permission to seek the informa-

tion you seek by interrogatory number twenty seven after you
have clarified precisely what it is you are asking."
at 11; R. 5067;

see also id.,

at 12; R. 5068).

(Id.,

No such

clarification was ever attempted by plaintiffs.
In short, the net result of Judge Sorensonfs exercise, as outlined above, was to prod both parties into concluding discovery in this case in a reasonable manner.

The

trial court criticized the lack of clarity in plaintiffs'
interrogatories and directed them to clarify the interrogatories before AMC/Jeep would be required to answer many of
them.

AMC/Jeep was directed to provide such answers as were

available to those interrogatories that were capable of being
understood.

Most importantly, however, and as noted
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but totally ignored in plaintiffs1 Brief, Judge Sorenson
contemplated that a formal motion for sanctions would have to
be filed by plaintiffs in the event plaintiffs wished to
claim that AMC/Jeep thereafter failed to respond in good
faith to the court's comments and suggestions.
minute entry in this regard is clear:

The court's

"The court will enter-

tain plaintiff's request for sanctions providing Mr. Johnson
follows the rules of practice."

(R. 729). Judge Sorenson

could hardly have been more precise in stating that his
comments and suggestions, standing alone, would not form the
basis for sanctions; a motion for sanctions would be required.

No such motion was ever filed by plaintiffs.

It

strains credulity, therefore, for plaintiffs to defend the
trial court's challenged rulings on AMC/Jeep's evidence based
on Judge Sorenson's comments.
Although plaintiffs never filed their promised
motion for sanctions, AMC/Jeep did file "Supplemental Answers
and Objections to Certain of Plaintiffs' Interrogatories" on
January 25, 1983.

(R. 755). These answers represent

AMC/Jeep's response to Judge Sorenson's suggestions and
i

comments.

Plaintiffs fail to note in their Brief that

AMC/Jeep in fact responded to Judge Sorenson's suggestions
and comments in this manner.

AMC/Jeep's supplemental answers
•I

were never objected to by plaintiffs and no motion to compel
with respect to them was ever filed by plaintiffs.

•1
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D

*

The Trial Court did not Base its
Exclusion of AMC/Jeep's Evidence on
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, seeking to prevent
AMC/Jeep from presenting certain evidence, was first considered by the trial court on the same day it was filed,
October 7 f 1983.

The Motion contained no reference either to

Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to sanctions.
The trial court's minute entry for this hearing reflects only
the following:
Mr. Howard made a motion for Jeep to be
prevented from raising matters which they
failed to respond to in their answers to
interrogatories. Matter discussed at
length between Court and counsel. The
Court ruled defendant may cross examine,
but is not to bring up new facts which
were not given plaintiff's counsel in
their response to interrogatories; however, if some facts are used and defendant's witness makes a different conclusion, those opinions would be admissible.
(R. 1365).

This synopsis of the day's discussion contains no

hint as to the sweeping evidentiary rulings to be made in the
future by the trial court with respect to AMC/Jeep's crossexamination and evidence.

It states only that AMC/Jeep was

"not to bring up new facts which were not given plaintiffs'
counsel in their response to interrogatories."

It does not

state that AMC/Jeep would be precluded from presenting evidence never requested in plaintiffs' interrogatories.
does it indicate that AMC/Jeep had failed to respond to
plaintiffs' interrogatories.

Moreover, the last clause
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quoted above runs directly contrary to the trial court1 s
blockage of AMC/Jeep's legitimate efforts to cross-examine
plaintiffs' experts.

(See App. Br. at 36-42).

Most impor-

tantly, there is absolutely no indication that the trial
court's statements were based in any way on Judge Sorenson's
prior hearings, or that the trial court intended to
"sanction" AMC/Jeep.
The trial judge's sole intimation of reliance on
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial rulings is found in connection
with plaintiffs' presentation of their Motion in Limine, in
chambers, on October 27, 1983.
R. 3337-3358).

(T., 10/27/83, at 1555-1576;

The trial judge heard plaintiffs' version of

Judge Sorenson's hearings and excluded one of AMC/Jeep's
films on the ground that "Plaintiffs were entitled to have,
or to see, the films and test results before the trial pursuant to their discovery interrogatories."
3353).

(JEd., at 1571; R.

A careful review of the record reveals clearly,

however, that this film bore absolutely no relation to any of
plaintiffs' interrogatories.

It was a film made in 1983 of a

Jeep CJ5 and had nothing to do with the 1972 Commando.
fact, the film was not even prepared by AMC/Jeep.
1557-1558; R. 3339-3340).

In

(IcL, at

Plaintiffs1 interrogatories never

inquired either into testing of CJ5 f s or into testing that
occurred in 1983.

When counsel for AMC/Jeep protested that

the trial judge had misapprehended Judge Sorenson's intent,
the trial judge clarified his ruling, stating:
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"My ruling

was based not only on that, but on what I consider to be the
Rules of Civil Procedure."

(Id,. , at 1574; R. 3356),

Thus,

even in this single instance when the trial judge referred to
Judge Sorenson's pre-trial hearings, it is not at all clear
that the trial judge intended to rely on those hearings to
support his exclusion of AMC/Jeep evidence.

It is absolutely

clear, however, that even if the trial judge intended to rely
on such hearings, the film excluded by the trial judge on
this occasion was not within the scope of any interrogatory
propounded by plaintiffs to AMC/Jeep.
A review of the trial judge's evidentiary rulings
throughout the trial reveals that such rulings were based on
his view of the relevance of AMC/Jeep's evidence and crossexamination, not on the transcript of the hearings before
Judge Sorenson.

The trial judge never related his systematic

exclusion of AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence to any interrogatory or interrogatories; in fact, such relation was
impossible because plaintiffs' interrogatories did not relate
to the AMC/Jeep evidence excluded by the trial judge.

More-

over, as is amplified in the preceding pages of this Brief,
if the trial judge intended to sanction AMC/Jeep by excluding
evidence crucial to the defense of this lawsuit, plaintiffs
should have, at the least, been required to file a Motion for
Sanctions to which AMC/Jeep could have responded.

Hercules

Drayage Company, Inc. v. Canco Leasing Corp., 24 Ariz. App.
598, 540 P.2d 724, 726 (1975) ("Our

interpretation of Rule 37
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would require that the party wishing to avail itself of the
sanctions for failure of discovery must move the court for an
order sanctioning the alleged uncooperative party.")
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPTED DEFENSE OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS IS
UNAVAILING
The bulk of plaintiffs' Brief is consumed with the
effort to single out and defend individually several of the
trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings detailed in
AMC/Jeep's Brief.

(Resp. Br. at 19-38).

Any one of the

trial court's errors, standing alone, would justify reversal
of the judgment on the verdict.

Plaintiffs' attempt to

focus, point by point, on a few selected rulings out of the
many challenged by AMC/Jeep does not blunt the thrust of
AMC/Jeep*s argument that the cumulative effect of the trial
court's evidentiary rulings —

its admission of plaintiffs'

irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, combined with its
blockage of AMC/Jeeps's efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs'
experts, combined with its exclusion of substantial portions
i

of AMC/Jeep's evidence —

requires that the trial court's

judgment on the verdict be reversed.

The flaws inherent in

plaintiffs' particular points are set out below,
4
A.

The Dynamic Science Film was Irrelevant and Unduly Prejudicial and
Should Have Been Excluded

Plaintiffs discuss at length the admissibility of

1
the so-called Dynamic Science film.

(Resp. Br. at 19-27).
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This discussion is in apparent response to Point I of
AMC/Jeep's Brief wherein this filmf along with two other
films introduced by plaintiffs and one of plaintiffs1 expert's charts, are shown to be irrelevant to the issues of
this lawsuit,

(App. Br. at 26-36).

Plaintiffs' decision to

defend only one of the several demonstrative films and exhibits challenged in AMC/Jeep's Brief is not explained in
plaintiffs' Brief, but in any event AMC/Jeep's challenge to
the receipt in evidence of the other two films is not disputed by plaintiffs.
Turning to the Dynamic Science filmf it will be
recalled that AMC/Jeep's objection to this film and virtually
all of plaintiffs' demonstrative evidence and expert testimony centered on its lack of relevance to the only issues
in plaintiffs' case against AMC/Jeep:

(a) whether the plain-

tiffs1 1972 Commando was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands of the manufacturer
because it rolled over when struck from behindf on an interstate highway, by a vehicle traveling approximately 70 miles
per hour, and (b) whether the alleged design defect was a
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries.

Rather than bearing

on the above issues, the Dynamic Science film shifted the
focus of this case away from plaintiffs' accident towards a
rambling investigation of Jeep vehicles, not Commandos, in
general.

As plaintiffs' own witness candidly explained, the

"defect" presented to the trial court and jury by plaintiffs
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"may not have anything to do with this particular accident."
(T., 10/25/83, at 934; R. 2714).
The Dynamic Science film defended in plaintiffs'
Brief is perhaps the best example of the irrelevant and
inflammatory nature of plaintiffs' evidence.

The film's lack

of relevance is detailed at pages 28-29 of AMC/Jeep's opening
Brief.

Suffice it to note here that the film showed Jeep

CJ5's, not Commandos, and was explained by an expert who had
never tested a Commando.

More importantly, the maneuvers

depicted in the film were never shown to bear any relationship to the circumstances of plaintiffs' accident.

Simi-

larly, the movement of the anthropomorphic dummies seated in
the CJ5 was never shown to bear any resemblance to plaintiffs1 movement during the course of their accident.
Plaintiffs' statement in their Brief that "Mr.
Noettl testified that the CJ-5 on the film demonstrated
handling reactions substantially similar to the manner in
which the Jeep Commando would respond under circumstances and
conditions prevalent in this accident," (Resp. Br. at 20), is
a misstatement of the record.
testimony.

Mr. Noettl never offered such

In fact, Mr. Noettl could make no such statement

because he had never tested a Commando nor had he reconstructed plaintiffs' accident.
2907).

(T., 10/26/83, at 1182; R.

Mr. Noettl was utilized by plaintiffs primarily to

testify that "Jeeps," as a generic class of vehicles, are
easier to overturn than a "passenger car."

Id. at 1262; R.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3039).

Plainly, Mr, Noettl was incompetent to render the

Dynamic Science film relevant to the issues in this case.
Plaintiffs also state that Mr. Noettl testified
that "the tests that were appropriate for conditions basically similar to that giving rise to this litigation were the
J Turn and the obstacle avoidance maneuver [depicted in the
film].

(R. 2972). M

(Resp. Br. at 21). A review of the

record cited by plaintiffs for this statement reveals that
Mr. Noettl is referring to the tests shown in the film but in
no way relates those tests to plaintiffs1 accident.

Heref as

throughout his testimony, Mr. Noettl assumes the role of one
testifying to a legislative or administrative committee about
the characteristics of off-road vehicles in general.

His

testimony, and the film he utilized to illustrate that testimony, are not relevant to the issues in this lawsuit.
Contrary to the insistence of plaintiffs that Mr. Noettl
"testified that the film was material, for it demonstrated
the rollover threshold of the Jeep Commando under circumstances similar to that which occurred on the day and place
of the accident," (Resp. Br. at 21-22), plaintiffs are unable
to cite any place in the record where such a foundation was
laid.

In fact, plaintiffs' counsel went so far as to stipu-

late that the film did not simulate the conditions prevailing
at the time of the accident.

(T., 10/26/83, at 1207; R.

2984).
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Plaintiffs respond inadequately to AMC/Jeep's
argument that plaintiffs' experts' films should have been
excluded because they lacked "a foundational showing

that

the tests were conducted under conditions substantially
similar to actual conditions."

Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,

558 F.2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1977).

Plaintiffs1 Brief simply

ignores the established rule which places "the burden ...
upon the party offering evidence of out-of-court experiments
... to.lay a proper foundation demonstrating a similarity of
circumstances and conditions."

Barnes v. General Motors

Corp., 547 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1977).

Plaintiffs' at-

tempt to distinguish Haynes v. American Motors Corporation,
691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982), is simply disingenuous.

The

trial court in Haynes ruled that a commercial film showing a
Jeep CJ5 in off-road situations was irrelevant and inadmissible because neither the vehicle depicted nor the maneuvers
illustrated in the film bore any relation to the plaintiffs'
vehicle or circumstances.

The case is directly on point and

underscores the trial court's evidentiary errors below.
B.

Plaintiffs Fail to Justify the Trial
Court's Erroneous Limitation of
AMC/Jeep's Cross-Examination of
Plaintiffs' Experts

AMC/Jeep's opening Brief details, with full citation to the record, the trial court's blockage of AMC/Jeep's
efforts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts on their crucial
opinion that "Jeeps," as a class of vehicles, overturned much
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more readily than other vehicles and that non-Jeep vehicles
would not have overturned under the circumstances of plaintiffs' accident.

(App. Br. at 36-42).

(See ?., 10/25/33, at

1001-1005, 1018; R. 2780-2784, 2797; T., 10/26/83, at 1266,
1275; R. 3043, 3052).
Plaintiffs' respond to AMC/Jeep's argument by
defending the trial court's "position in legal circles and
his prominence among his colleagues, both before and after
appointment to the bench ...." (Resp. Br. at 27-28).

Counsel

for AMC/Jeep certainly do not disagree with plaintiffs1
assessment of the trial court's reputation, but it is facts
and law, not gratuitous reference to the trial court's
reputation and ability, which must govern the outcome of this
appeal.
Plaintiffs intimate that their experts1 comparison
of "Jeeps" to other vehicles was not elicited on direct
examination by plaintiffs' counsel and that the trial court's
blockage of AMC/Jeep's cross-examination on this point was
proper.

(Resp. Br. at 32). Quite contrary to plaintiffs'

suggestion, plaintiffs' experts rendered their opinion that
"Jeeps" compared unfavorably to "other vehicles" under direct
examination by plaintiffs' counsel.

(T., 10/20/83, at 558-

560; R. 2331-2333 [direct examination by Mr. Howard]; T.,
10/25/83, at 896-897; R. 2676 [direct examination by Mr.
Howard]).
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Plaintiffs next attempt to confuse the issue by
noting that AMC/Jeep was, indeed, allowed to voir dire and
cross-examine their witnesses on several topics.
at 28-35).

(Resp. Br.

What plaintiffs neglect to point out is that the

pages of the record to which they cite involve voir dire and
cross-examination on issues wholly unrelated to the critical
opinion offered by these experts that a "Jeep11 overturns in
circumstances in which "some other car" would not have overturned.
The entire point of AMC/Jeep's argument in this
regard, that plaintiffs' experts were permitted to compare
"Jeeps" to other vehicles but that AMC/Jeep was blocked from
cross-examining on this point, is utterly ignored in plaintiffs argument.

Similarly, plaintiffs never address the

documented charge of AMC/Jeep that "[t]he practical effect of
the trial court's restriction of appellants1 right of crossexamination was to allow plaintiffs' theory of the case to go
unchallenged.

Plaintiffs' experts were allowed to testify

repeatedly and without foundation that 'Jeeps' performed
poorly in comparison to other vehicles, yet AMC/Jeep was
prohibited from exploring the basis for that comparison."
(App. Br. at 39).
C.

The Trial Court's Exclusion of Virtually All of Plaintiffs' Demonstrative Evidence is Plain Error

AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's exclusion
of AMC/Jeep's evidence which would have demonstrated that the
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tests depicted in plaintiffs' films bore no relation to
emergency driving conditions and that "Jeeps" in general and
Commandos in particular are reasonably stable vehicles which
can successfully negotiate realistic emergency situations.
(App. Br. at 42-56).
Plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeeps contentions by
shifting focusr once againf from the facts and the law.
Plaintiffs' charge that AMC/Jeep has charged the trial court
with "incompetence and corruption".

(Resp. Br. at 39).

Suffice it to say that such arguments are as unfounded as
they are gratuitous.
Plaintiffs next rehash their argument concerning
the pre-trial proceedings in this case.

The full and undeni-

able fallaciousness of plaintiffs' argument in this regard is
revealed by their statement that the subject of the film
offered by AMC/Jeep's expert, Mr. Heitzman, had been "previously specifically barred" by Judge Sorenson.
40).

(Resp. Br« at

Judge Sorenson never did any such thing.
First, the film at issue would have been utilized

by Mr. Heitzman to illustrate his opinion concerning the
handling qualities of the CJ5«

The film was plainly relevant

because the CJ5 had been much maligned by plaintiffs' experts
and plaintiffs had presented to the jury the notion that the
CJ5 and plaintiffs' Commando were identical.

Plaintiffs can

point to no interrogatory reviewed by Judge Sorenson which
requests any information concerning the CJ5.

Second, as has
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been previously made clear, Judge Sorenson stated explicitly
to plaintiffs that a motion for sanctions would have to be
filed before the trial court would consider imposing any
sanctions.

No such motion was ever filed, either before

Judge Sorenson or before the trial judge.

Once again, plain-

tiffs make no attempt to defend the actual basis for the
trial judge's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's evidence; the erroneous
belief that such evidence was irrelevant.
It must be noted that plaintiffs make no attempt
whatsoever to defend the trial court's exclusion of Mr.
Heitzman's film showing vehicles with "outriggers" attached
undergoing certain maneuvers.

(See App. Br. at 44-47).

This

film was essential to demonstrate not only that plaintiffs1
film of a Commando equipped with outriggers was misleading,
but also that many vehicles besides "Jeeps" will roll over
under the conditions depicted in plaintiffs' films.
Plaintiffs next argue that AMC/Jeep is precluded
from challenging the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's
demonstrative evidence because "[m]atters not admitted in
evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered on
appeal before the Supreme Court."

(Resp. Br. at -45, quoting

Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453
(Utah 1983)).

Pilcher has nothing to do with AMC/Jeep's

challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings in this
case.

The errors cited by AMC/Jeep were carefully preserved

through proffers reflected in the record before this Court.
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Plaintiffs next defend the trial court's exclusion
of two films offered to demonstrate the testimony of
AMC/Jeep's expert Dr. Warner.

The first of these films would

have demonstrated the weaknesses in plaintiffs' experts'
opinion that "Jeeps" overturn more easily than other vehicles.

The second film was of an exemplar Commando equipped

with outriggersr showing that the Commando is a stable vehicle.

(See App. Bt

at 47-49).

Plaintiffs attempt to

defend the exclusion of these two manifestly relevant films
with the blithe comment that they were "rejected for the same
reasons applicable to the Heitzman film."
46).

(Resp. Br. at 45-

Once again, plaintiffs raise the issue of Judge

Sorenson's 1982 hearings, but no substance is provided by
plaintiffs to support their argument.
As with plaintiffs' argument concerning the irrelevant evidence admitted by the trial court over AMC/Jeep's
objections, plaintiffs fail to address all of AMC/Jeep's
claims of error in the trial court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's
evidence.

Besides the films referred to above, the trial

court also excluded erroneously a series of photographs
offered to demonstrate Dr. Warner's testimony.

Plaintiffs do

not attempt to defend this action.
Finally, plaintiffs simply ignore AMC/Jeep's arguments that AMC/Jeep's demonstrative evidence should have been
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admitted to rebut plaintiffs' irrelevant evidence."1 (App. Br.
at 50-56).

Although it can be surmised that plaintiffs

disagree with the cases and authorities cited by AMC/Jeep, it
is clear that plaintiffs have left AMC/Jeep and this Court no
hint as to the basis for such disagreement.
POINT III
CLOSING ARGUMENTS MADE BY OPPOSING
COUNSEL WERE IMPROPER AND CONSTITUTED
GROUNDS FOR A MISTRIAL
AMC/Jeep has detailed the gross misstatements made
to the jury by opposing counsel during closing arguments.
(App. Br. at 56-59).

Despite the fact that AMC/Jeep had

offered demonstrative evidence to rebut the testimony of
plaintiffs' experts, and such evidence was kept from the jury
2
by the trial court, counsel for defendant Larry Anderson

Plaintiffs make a two sentence attempt to distinguish one
of the many cases cited by AMC/Jeep for its argument that its
demonstrative evidence was relevant to rebut the opinions of
plaintiffs' experts. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the
court in Walker v. Trico Manufacturing Co., Inc., 487 F. 2d
595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974), did
not decide the issue whether state-of-the-art evidence is
relevant to the defense of a strict products liability
action. Rather, as is clear on page 600 of the opinion, the
court held that even if state-of-the-art evidence, standing
alone, was not relevant in the defense of such actions, such
evidence should be permitted to rebut the plaintiff's introduction of similar evidence.
2
At page 20 of AMC/Jeep's Brief a statement made during
closing argument is erroneously attributed to counsel for
defendant Variable Annuity Life. The statement is correctly
attributed to counsel for defendant Larry Anderson on page 57
of the Brief.
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argued as follows:
Why didnft Jeep, having all of the test
data of the plaintiff's experts, knowing
exactly what they had done, even to the
height of the outriggers off the ground;
why didn't they go out and test a
Commando, put some outriggers on there
and to do some testing of their own? Why
didn't they come in here and tell you,
M
We have done the same kind of tests that
the plaintiffs did, we have put the same
number of degrees of steer in on a
Commando, and that vehicle wouldn't turn
over; why didn't they do that? I'll tell
you why: They are afraid to do it* They
didn't dare do it. Because they knew
that Commando would turn over,
(T., 11/3/83, at 109; R. 4659).

Similarly, counsel for

plaintiffs argued to the jury that AMC/Jeep had "No positive
proof.

None at all," (.id. , at 32; R. 4582), that "They

[AMC/Jeep] bring no evidence, none at all," (Ld., at 33; R.
4583), and that AMC/Jeep's experts failed to bring "an ounce
of engineering data." (^d.,

at 35; R. 4585).

The rule stated in AMC/Jeep's opening Brief is that
"a lawyer who has successfully urged the court to exclude
evidence should not be allowed to point to the absence of
that evidence to create an inference that it does not exist."
State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 664 P.2d 277, 280 (Idaho App.
1983) (quoting the American Bar Association Standards, The
Defense Function, Section 7.8(a) (1971)).

The "mischief"

identified in Dudley is precisely the mischief engaged in by
opposing counsel during their closing arguments.
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As this

Court has recently stated:

"The proper remedy for prejudi-

cial attorney misconduct is to order a new trial."

Nelson v.

Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiffs argue that "AMC/Jeep is precluded from
now claiming reversible error as a result of counsel's closing argument by way of its failure to timely object to the
alleged prejudicial statements."

(Resp. Br. at 51). Plain-

tiffs fail to note the undeniable fact that AMC/Jeep strenuously objected to these statements and even moved for a
mistrial because of them.

(T.f 11/3/83, at 193-197).

It is

of no moment that the objection was not made at the time the
statements were made to the jury.

As the court stated in

Johnson v. Emerson, 103 Idaho 350, 647 P.2d 806, 810-811
(Idaho App. 1982) :
We do not interpret [the rule requiring
timely objections] to require counsel to
raise all objections instantly, during
closing argument itself. Frequent objections during argument, even if proper,
risk alienating the court and may serve
only to emphasize objectionable comment
for the jury.... Rather, we hold that if
counsel elects to raise the alleged
improprieties by a motion for mistrial or
by other appropriate means, before the
case is submitted to the jury, the issue
will be preserved for appeal.
AMC/Jeep objected to, and moved for a mistrial based on, the
quoted comments as soon as closing arguments were concluded
and the jury had left the courtroom.

The objection was

certainly timely and served to preserve the issue for this
appeal.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO
UTILIZE AVAILABLE SEAT BELTS
A.

Three Members of this Court have
Expressed a View Consistent with the
Rule that a Plai ntiff's; Failure to
Utilize Avai labl e Seat Belts Constitutes a Fail ure to Miti gate Damages

AMC/Jeep has presented the substantive arguments of
the growing number of courts which allow juries to consider a
plaintiff's failure to utilize seat belts in connection with
the issue of contributory fault and the plaintiff's duty to
mitigate his own damages*

AMC/Jeep also contends that the

jury should have been permitted to consider the fact that
plaintiffs' Commando was equipped with seat belts when deciding whether that Commando was defectively designed.

(App.

Br. at 59-68).
Plaintiffs' response to AMC/Jeep's presentation of
the so-called "seat belt defense" issue is flawed from the
outset.

At the very beginning of their argumentf plaintiffs

misstate that "[t]here exists no controlling or even helpful
case law within this jurisdiction regarding the issue of
admissibility of evidence related to the use of seat belts."
(Resp. Br. at 53). Plaintiffs fail to note the concurring
opinion of Justice Oaks (joined by Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Durham) in Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 18133;
(Slip Opinion—May 1, 1984) (petition for rehearing filed).
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The plaintiff in Acculog brought suit to recover
damages suffered when his van was destroyed by fire.

One of

the issues at trial was whether the plaintiff's failure to
carry a fire extinguisher in his van was relevant to either
the issue of contributory negligence or the issue of mitigation of damages•

The trial court avoided this issue on the

ground that the parties had stipulated to the amount of
damages.

At the conclusion of trialf the jury returned a

special verdict but the trial court ruled that plaintiff had
no cause of action.

The plaintiff appealed and this court

remanded for a new trial.

In connection with the remand,

Justice Oaks authored a concurring opinion in which he offered "guidance" to the trial court on remand with respect to
the issue of mitigation of damages.

With the following

statement, Justice Oaks embraced the arguments utilized by
the courts that have adopted the "mitigation of damages"
approach to the seat belt defense (see Pet. Br. at 61-66):
[T]he amount of damages the plaintiff
would be allowed to recover [after taking
into account comparative negligence] is
subjected to a further reduction dictated
by the common-law rule of mitigation of
damages or what the Restatement calls
"the damages rule as to avoidable consequences .... " Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 465 comment c (1965).
This reduction, on which the defendant
has the burden of proof, applies where
the plaintiff is found to have been
negligent in failing to mitigate or avoid
damages and where this negligence is
found to have increased his total damages
beyond what he would have suffered if he
had not been negligent in this manner.
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Slip. Op. at 7 (emphasis added).
Justice Oaks clearly advocates the admissibility of
evidence regarding non-use of available safety devices in his
quotation of the following "well-reasoned" example propounded
by the court in Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W. 2d 118, 121122 n.2 (N.D. 1983):
Assume: X driving a car, and Y driving a
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not
wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60
percent liable for causing the accident
[the "injury" under Section 78-27-37],
making Yf the motorcyclist, 40 percent
liable for causing the accident. The
jury also finds Y would have avoided 60
percent of his injuries [damages] if he
had worn a helmet; X is 40 percent liable
for causing Y's [damages]. Y proves
$100,000 in damages.
On the basis of these findings, the
$100,000 award would be reduced by 40
percent, which account for Y's contributing to the cause of the accident. Hence,
the award is diminished to $60,000.
The $60,000 should now be reduced to
the extent that Y's [damages] would have
been [avoided] had he worn a helmet,
i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves
a total award of $24,000.
Id., at 8 n.l.
The issue before this Court does not involve any
argument that plaintiffs caused their accident by failing to
use their seat belts.

Rather, AMC/Jeep's argument to this

Court is found in the third paragraph quoted above; plaintiffs' damages should be reduced by the amount that their
damages would have been "avoided" had they worn their seat
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belts.

Surely, if three members of this Court would consider

non-use of a motorcycle helmet relevant to such an inquiry,
evidence of non-use of the universally available seat belt is
also relevant.
This is precisely the view espoused by many courts
that have permitted juries in product liability cases involving automobiles to consider a plaintiff's failure to utilize
available seat belts in determining the plaintiff's damages.
See Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So.
2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y. 2d 444*, 323
N.E. 2d 164, 167 (1974).

These cases, and Justice Oaks 1

opinion, are consistent with Prosser's indication that the
plaintiff's duty to mitigate his damages is equivalent to the
doctrine of avoidable consequence, which precludes recovery
for any damages which could have been eliminated by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.

W. Prosser,

Handbook of the Law of Torts Section 65, pp. 442-444 (4th Ed.
1971).
Although this concept has been applied most often
to post-accident conduct, courts recognize that this does not
preclude its application to pre-accident conduct.

Plain-

tiffs' claim that "the duty to mitigate damages cannot arise
before the plaintiff is damaged," (Resp. Br. at 62-66),
exalts theory over common sense and sound policy.

Evidence

of a plaintiff's failure to utilize an available seat belt
should be admitted because seat belts afford the automobile
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occupant an unusually effective means by which a person "may
minimize his or her injuries prior to an accident."
Barker, 323 N.E. 2d, at 168.

Spier v.

The simple fact is that in many

cases, as in this one, it can be demonstrated that the failure of a plaintiff to use an available seat belt exacerbated
the plaintiff's injuries.

See Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary

Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 231235 (1980).
B.

Plaintiffs' Knowledge, or Lack of
Knowledge, With Respect to the Presence of Seat Belts in their Vehicle
does not Bear on AMC/Jeep's Defense
Based on Plaintiffs' Failure to Use
their Seat Belts.

Plaintiffs point out that AMC/Jeep was barred by
the trial court from introducing evidence of plaintiffs1
failure to use their seat belts because there was no showing
that plaintiffs knew of the seat belts or that they made a
conscious decision not to use them.

(Resp. Br. at 54-56).

The trial court's position, as well as plaintiffs1 argument
in this regard is not supported by either law or common
sense.

Even assuming that the location of the seat belts is

relevant to plaintiffs' culpability in failing to use them,
such facts only present a question for the jury to decide,
not a basis for excluding from the jury's consideration the
failure to use the belts.
In any event, plaintiffs' awareness of the seat
belts does not bear directly on the issue at hand.
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There is

no dispute that plaintiffs' Commando was equipped with seat
belts.

It can hardly be the fault of AMC/Jeep that those

seat belts "were under the seat" as alleged by plaintiffs.
(Resp. Br. at page 56). Also, whether or not plaintiffs made
a "conscious decision" to eschew the use of their seat belts
is not at issue here.

Whether conscious or simply unwise,

AMC/Jeep contends, and the evidence would have shown, that
plaintiffs' failure to use their seat belts contributed to
their injuries.

The amount that plaintiffs' damages should

have been reduced by reason of that failure is an issue for
the jury to decide.

The trial court erred in preempting this

issue of fact.
C.

The Absence of a Statutory Obligation
does not Preclude the Imposition of a
Common Law Duty to Utilize Available
Seat Belts.

Plaintiffs next argue that "there exists no statutory nor common law duty to utilize a seat belt."
at 57-60).

(Resp. Br.

AMC/Jeep has never contended that there is a Utah

or federal statute requiring one to utilize an available seat
belt.

But plaintiffs' leap from that fact to the assertion

that no duty exists at common law to utilize a seat belt is
unsupported and unfounded.

The absence of statutory obliga-

tions to use reasonable care and to mitigate damages has been
no bar to the common law development of those doctrines.

For

example, the fact that there is no statutory obligation to
wear a crash helmet when operating a motorcycle did not deter
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Justice Oaks from stating that failure to wear a crash helmet
would be relevant to the issue of mitigation or avoidance of
damages.

Acculog, supra, at 8 n.l.
Plaintiffs argue that it is for the legislaturef

not the courts, to decide whether to "penalize a plaintiff
for not using seat belts ... . "

(Resp. Br. at 59, quoting

Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont.
1980); see also id., at 60-62).

The Florida Supreme Court,

in ruling that a jury should be allowed to consider evidence
of a plaintiff's failure to use available seat belts, responded to this call for judicial restraint most convincingly:
[The plaintiff] asserts that the single
most compelling reason for such a holding
[i.e., that the jury cannot consider the
plaintiff's failure to use seat belts] is
the principle that courts are law interpreting and not lawmaking and argues that
we should not act in a peculiarly legislative manner.
We disagree and find this issue
particularly appropriate for judicial
decision. In the past, this Court has
not abdicated its continuing responsibility to the citizens of this state to
ensure that the law remains both fair and
realistic as society and technology
change.
To abstain from acting responsibly
in the present case on the basis of
legislative deference would be to consciously ignore a limited area where
decisions by the lower courts of this
state have created an illogical exception
to the doctrine of comparative negligence
... and the underlying philosophy of
individual responsibility ....
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Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnisy supra, 451
So. 2d, at 451.
Product liability law creates incentives for manufacturers to design and make safe products and thus promotes
the goals of tort law by limiting the risk of harm.

But loss

prevention and risk avoidance is not solely in the hands of
manufacturers*

Safety is a two-way street.

Despite plain-

tiffs' charge that "the seat belt defense is inappropriate in
the context of strict liability," (Resp. Br. at 69-70), the
party in the best position to promote safety may be someone
other than the manufacturer, such as the product user.
In this case, the jury should have been permitted
to consider whether and to what extent plaintiffs' failure to
utilize available seat belts contributed to their damages.
This is consistent with the Restatement's position that every
person—product user, manufacturer, and retailer—has a duty
to act reasonably by exercising "those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society
requires of its members for the protection of their own
interests and the interests of others."

Restatement (Second)

of Torts Section 283 comment b (1965) (emphasis added).

This

is the basis for tort rules relating to contributory fault,
misuse, assumption of the risk, last clear chance, avoidable
consequences, comparative causation, and mitigation of damages, all of which hold the plaintiff responsible for the
consequences of failing to exercise reasonable care for his
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own safety.

These rules apply with equal force to product

liability actions where "the user frequently can control the
risk by avoiding foolish uses or by making use of some specific knowledge about significant alternatives that are in
his or her control."
225.

Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev, at

See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303

(Utah 1981), holding that it is proper for the jury to consider the faults of both plaintiff and defendant when they
"have united as concurrent proximate causes of an injury" in
strict product liability cases.
D.

Plaintiffs Fail to Respond to
AMC/Jeep's Argument that the~~Jury
Should have been Permitted to Consider the Fact that the Commando was
Equipped with Seat Belts in Connection with the Issue of Design
Safety.

As AMC/Jeep argued in its opening Brief, the presence of seat belts in the accident vehicle is also relevant,
in a design defect case such as this, on the question whether
the vehicle is inherently unsafe and unreasonably dangerous
because the safety of a vehicle's design cannot be fairly
evaluated if the fact finder is precluded from considering
the principal safety features designed into the vehicle for
the express purpose of providing protection to the occupants.
This Court has recognized that "[s]trict liability
in tort is not the equivalent of making the manufacturer or
seller absolutely liable as an insurer of the product and its
use."

Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302
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(Utah 1981).

Tort law does not require automobile manufac-

turers to make "accident proof" vehicles.

Larsen v. General

Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 499 (8th Cir. 1968).

Such a

vehicle is impossible to make because accidents and collisions are inevitable.

Thus, a manufacturer's duty is only to

produce vehicles that are not unreasonably dangerous.

See

Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah
1979) (adopting the language of Section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of.Torts, requiring the plaintiff in a strict product liability action to prove that the product at issue was
in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to the
ultimate consumer).
Whether the manufacturer's duty has been met in a
particular case cannot be determined in a vacuum simply by
focusing on the allegedly defective aspect of the design.
Manufacturers make design decisions with the whole vehicle in
mind, balancing a wide range of considerations.

The jury in

a design defect case like this one must be given the same
opportunity to consider the vehicle as a whole.

Wilson v.

Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D.
Va. 1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174-1175 (1978).
In evaluating whether a vehicle's design taken as a
whole is reasonably safe, many factors are relevant.

See

Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33
Vand. L. Rev. 551 (1980).

The size and style of the vehicle,
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its price, and its intended uses are all pertinent.

A person

who purchases a convertible car cannot expect the kind of
protection that he would have in a hard top and the courts do
not impose a duty on the manufacturer to design a convertible
car which meets the same safety standards.

Dreisonstok v.

Wolkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-1075 (4th Cir.
1974); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811-812
(10th Cir. 1981).
Consideration must also be given to the safety
features inherent in the design of the vehicle in question.
E.g., Wilson, supra, 445 F. Supp., at 1371; Daly, supra, 575
P.2d, at 1174.

Cases alleging harm caused by a defect in

design, regardless of the aspect of the product impugned,
always raise questions about whether, through safety features
designed into the vehicle, the manufacturer met its duty to
design a vehicle that provides reasonable protection against
foreseeable risks of harm.
Seat belts are placed in vehicles for the express
purpose of reducing the risk of injury to vehicle occupants.
This was as true of the seat belts in plaintiffs' Commando as
it is in the case of all modern vehicles.

It is neither

feasible nor fair to determine whether a vehicle is unreasonably dangerous without considering the presence of seat
belts, the specific purpose and effect of which are to meet
the manufacturer's duty to reduce unreasonable risks of
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injury.

See Werber, supra, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev., at 253-

254.
The jury's consideration of the whole vehicle in a
design defect case like this one is particularly appropriate
in Utah.

In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601

P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), this Court adopted the standard of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Section

402A provides, in pertinent part, that "[o]ne who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user of consumer ... is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user ...."
added).

(Emphasis

Many courts and commentators have noted that in

design defect, as opposed to manufacturing defect, cases the
"unreasonably dangerous" language of Section 402A assumes
particular relevance:
[0]ur experience teaches us that, in the
conscious design choice cases, where
there is no other (available) standard,
excision of the unreasonably dangerous
concept denudes Section 402A of its only
vehicle for infusing into the notion of
"defect" a meaningful guide to its determination. Dean Wade has written that in
(conscious) design defect cases, the
concept of defective condition standing
alone is inappropriate, and that it has
no independent meaning and is apt to
prove misleading. Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J.
15 (1965). Accord, Ross v. Up-Right,
I N c , 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968). We
agree. Professor Keeton believes that,
in the area of design problem "defective"
means unreasonably dangerous. Keeton,
Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 32 (1973).
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Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law).
Thus, in deciding whether plaintiffs' Commando was
defectively designed, as asserted by plaintiffs, the jury was
required to decide whether the Commando was unreasonably
dangerous.

As the court stated in an analogous case, evi-

dence that an accident vehicle had been equipped with seat
belts should be admitted for the purpose of determining
whether the vehicle was defectively designed because the jury
must determine "whether the auto as a whole was defective and
unreasonably dangerous ....M

Wilson v. Volkswagen of

America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (E.D. Va. 1978).

It

is simply impossible to consider individual design decisions
in a vacuum because such decisions are made as part of a
myriad of design decisions that go into the manufacture of
the whole vehicle.
Plaintiffs would have it that their presentation of
but one aspect of the Commando, the strength of its roof when
subjected to a roll over, is enough to show that the Commando
was defective.

This precise argument was rejected by the

California Supreme Court in Daly v, General Motors Corp., 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978).

The plaintiffs in that

case sued the defendant manufacturer for damages suffered as
the result of an automobile accident.

The plaintiffs' theory

against the manufacturer was that a door latch had been
improperly designed.

At trial, and over the plaintiffs'
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objections, the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence
that the accident vehicle was equipped with a seat beltshoulder harness system, and a door lock, either of which if
used would have prevented the injury complained of.

The

plaintiffs' lost at trial and, on appeal, challenged a jury
instruction which directed that

Wf

[i]n determining whether or

not the vehicle was defective you should consider all of the
equipment on the vehicle including any features intended for
the safety of the driver.,M

575 P.2d, at 1174.

It was the

plaintiffs' contention, as plaintiffs contend here, "that
only the precise malfunctioning component itself, and alone,
may be considered in determining whether injury was caused by
a defectively designed product."

IcL

The California Supreme

Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention, stating as
follows:
The jury could properly determine whether
the (accident vehicle's] overall design,
including safety features provided in the
vehicle, made it 'crashworthy,' thus
rendering the vehicle nondefective.
Product designs do not evolve in a
vacuum, but must reflect the realities of
the market place, kitchen, highway, and
shop. Similarly, a product's components
are not developed in isolation, but as
part of an integrated and interrelated
whole. Recognizing that finished products must incorporate and balance safety,
utility, competitive merit, and practicality under a multitude of intended
and foreseeable uses, courts have
struggled to evolve realistic tests for
defective design which give weight to
this necessary balancing. ... However
phrased, these decisions emphasize the
need to consider the product as an integrated whole.
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Id., at 1175.

See also McElroy v. Allstate Insurance Co.,

420 So. 2d 214 (La. App. 1982).
In this case, the Commando's roof, or even its roll
over characteristics, are no more important a part of the
vehicle than are its steering column, interior padding, door
locks, suspension and seat belts.

The trial court's exclu-

sion of any evidence relating to seat belts is no more logical than the exclusion of any other safety device that
AMC/Jeep had designed into the Commando.

In fact, the trial

court's exclusion of AMC/Jeep's seat belt evidence is particularly incongruous because that evidence would have shown
that, if utilized, the seat belts would have prevented precisely the type of injury complained of by plaintiff Steven
Whitehead.

(T., 10/31/83, at 2018; R. 3806).

In effect, the

trial court barred the jury from considering the most critical safety feature designed into the Commando by AMC/Jeep.
This Court should hold that evidence of the presence of seat belts should be admitted on the issue of design
defect in this case.

Admitting this evidence is a simple

matter of fairness.

It will merely allow the jury to con-

sider evidence regarding the capacity of seat belts to prevent and reduce injuries, along with all other relevant
evidence, in determining whether the vehicle, taken as a
whole, is defective and unreasonably dangerous as plaintiffs
allege.
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E.

The Trier of Fact is Capable of
Understanding and Applying Rationally
the "Seat Belt Defense"

Plaintiffs assert that evidence with respect to
seat belts and their relationship to a plaintiff's injury "is
simply too speculative to be placed in issue before a jury."
(Resp. Br. at 67-68).

A jury's task in deciding whether, and

to what extent, a plaintiff's failure to utilize available
seat belt contributed to his injury, however, is hardly more
difficult than comparative causation principles applied
regularly by Utah juries under Utah's comparative negligence
statute.

As this Court said recently, in holding that these

comparative principles are applicable in strict liability
actions, "we believe that judges and juries will have little
difficulty assigning the relative responsibility each is to
bear for a particular injury when the ultimate issues in such
comparisons are relative fault and relative causation."
Mulherin, supra, 628 P.2d, at 1304.

A jury is capable of

weighing seat belt evidence in any tort action, and this case
should be remanded for a new trial so that a jury can consider the evidence proffered by AMC/Jeep.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT BASED ON AMC/JEEP^S
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
AMC/Jeep has detailed the trial court's erroneous
decision to ignore AMC/Jeep's defense based on the statute of
limitations found in Utah's Product Liability Act, Section
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78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated.

(App. Br. at 68-74).

As

plaintiffs admit, the statute of limitations defense was
already before the trial court in the answer of defendant
American Motors Sales Corporation.
was filed without objection.

(R. 84-87).

That answer

At the same time American

Motors Sales Corporation filed its answer, defendant Jeep
Corporation filed a motion for leave to amend its answer,
filed previously, to bring it into accord with the answer of
American Motors Sales Corporation.

(R. 983-989).

Conceding that AMC/Jeep would have a valid defense
based on the statute's six year limitations provision, (see
Resp. Br. at 73), plaintiffs respond to AMC/Jeep's claim of
error by arguing that the trial court was justified in denying Jeep Corporation's motion to amend its answer on the
grounds that the amended answer would have delayed trial and
would have required "extensive discovery on behalf of the
plaintiff."

(Resp. Br. at 77). Plaintiffs rely on Staker v.

Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah
1983), for their argument that such amendments to pleadings
are rarely permitted at the commencement of or during trial.
Totally ignored by plaintiffs, however, is the glaring fact
which distinguishes this case from Staker and renders plaintiffs' arguments inapposite:

The statute of limitations

issue was already properly before the trial court in the
answer of American Motors Sales Corporation.

The prejudice
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that plaintiffs claim would have resulted had Jeep Corporation's motion to amend been granted simply disappears in
light of the fact that plaintiffs had to contend with
AMC/Jeepfs defense based on the statute of limitations in any
event.

Under these unique circumstances, Rule 15(a), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedurey should have guided the trial court
and leave to amend should have been granted in the interests
of justice.
Plaintiffs also argue that AMC/Jeep "made absolutely no proffer of proof related to the Product Liability
Act or statute of limitations during the entire course of
trial; therefore, the issue is waived."

(Resp. Br. at 74).

The facts critical to this defense were undisputed, however,
and the trial court did not rely on any such argument in
denying AMC/Jeep's motion for directed verdict based on the
statute of limitations.
court without comment.
4775).

The motion was denied by the trial
(T., 11/4/83, at 18-19; R. 4774-

The trial court's failure to direct a verdict on this

ground was erroneous and the trial court's judgment should
therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment on the verdict cannot be
sustained and must be reversed and a new trial or the entry
of judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered for the six independently
sufficient reasons detailed in AMC/Jeep's Brief.

Plaintiffs'

Brief fails to address many of the significant issues raised
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by AMC/Jeep.

The arguments to which plaintiffs have re-

sponded are not explained away or even blunted by plaintiffs1
Brief.
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the
reasons stated in AMC/Jeep's Brief, the judgment on the
verdict must be reversed and a new trial or the entry of
judgment for AMC/Jeep ordered.
DATED this ^

day of October, 1984.
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR

By

L<UT>r £>* s<£^~>

Thomas B.^Green
A t t o r n e y s for D e f e n d a n t s A p p e l l a n t s American MotorsN
S a l e s C o r p o r a t i o n and
Jeep Corporation
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